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Introduction 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to compare three British projects of radical social 
imagination temporally inscribed between the critical economic and political 
conjuncture of the mid to late 1930s and the consolidation of Thatcherism in the 1980s. 
My principal aim is to reconstruct the connections and continuities of three 
differentiated political, historical and personal articulations of the concept “Socialism”, 
and to vindicate a common ascription to the anti-deterministic logic of alternatives and 
possibilities which ultimately singles all three projects out as “dissident”, “anti-
authoritarian” and even “libertarian”.  
In each case, this task imposes a fundamental confrontation and analysis of the 
doctrinal contexts and broader political circumstances in which these authors are rooted. 
It also demands a basic problematisation of their canonical and generic areas of 
definition (as “literature”, “history”, “criticism”, “theory” etc.) in a conscious effort to 
dissolve the post hoc boundaries and epistemic categories which threaten to distort the 
precise contextual geometry of their interventions.   
This is therefore an interdisciplinary comparative assessment of Orwell, 
Thompson and Williams’ radical political programmes under the common 
terminological denominator of “Socialism”. As a result, the particular orientation of 
each author’s treatment is conditioned by this shared pursuit and necessarily leaves out 
(except when the contextual imperative requires otherwise) those aspects (fundamental, 
no doubt, to any exhaustive characterisation of their respective intellectual 
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contributions) which do not directly inform the individual voice and imaginary of an 
oppositional or alternative project of social organisation. Even within these limits, 
however, the survey may seem incomplete. Notable areas of silence can certainly be 
pointed up which no thematic or methodological criterion necessarily imposes. Thus, 
for example, one could mention the strategic importance of Orwell’s anti-imperialist 
ideas (first crystallised in his novel Burmese Days), as they come to shape and define 
his more explicitly socialist outlook. Similarly, Williams’ writings on drama (and even 
his own, authored, plays), which are not considered here, both define and expand the 
range of his political references. A further silence may be detected in Williams’ ground-
breaking work on the media (especially on television), as well as in his earliest 
intellectual productions (of the Forties and early Fifties). Likewise my discussion of 
Thompson leaves out his extended analyses – beyond The Making of the English 
Working Class and its related texts – of the eighteenth century.    
 This is, in any case, a representative selection of moments, arguments and 
emphases within the respective “problem-spaces” of these authors. And it is my belief 
that the selectivity which they entail may nevertheless come across as integral to and 
consistent with the articulation of a unitary problematic. 
This unity is offered according to a tripartite organisation. I have selected three 
sets of binary labels which, however reductive (or overly indeterminate and hence 
sprawling) in semantic scope, summarise the thematic specificities of each author’s 
position. Needless to say, the programmatic – theoretical and even temperamental – 
emphases often overlap, suggesting a schematism which in no way exhausts the 
political imaginaries rehearsed by each of them.   
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Thus the first section, which deals with Orwell’s political evolution from the 
moment of his encounter with the dire “condition” of industrial capitalism in the North 
of England, through a concrete definition of his revolutionary socialist vision in Spain, 
to a final (and more tentative than often acknowledged) compromise with British social 
democracy, is headed by the signpost “Revolution and Reform”. 
The second section, devoted to E.P. Thompson in the context of Communist 
dissidence in Britain, opens under the banner of “History and Humanism”. Thus, while 
the stress appears to fall (as indeed it often does throughout the presentation) on 
Thompson’s interlacing of a particular epistemology of historical inquiry with the 
specific political aims of his “socialist humanist” revision of the Communist tradition, 
this does not detract from an obvious commitment to “revolutionary” change in a sense 
which connects with and extends (into the contexts of the 1950s and beyond) Orwell’s 
preoccupations with anti-authoritarian egalitarianism and socialist renewal.    
The third and final section deals with the prominent thematisation of “culture” 
within Williams’ oeuvre both as a crucial scientific object in its own right and as a 
projective articulation of a specifically social problematic within capitalism. For 
Williams, “community” is an operative concept which, despite ongoing 
problematisations and changes in critical status, appears to condense the main lines of 
development of a totalising vision of struggle and social transformation. In spite of the 
obvious evolution which his thinking undergoes over the three decades under 
examination (from around 1958 until his death in 1988), and despite the varying 
emphases subsequently accorded to his focal terms and concepts, the section preserves a 
nominal selectivity in its general thematisation of “Culture and Community”. 
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A conceptual force-field which almost inevitably imposes itself in any 
discussion of radical social imagination is that governed by the term “utopia”. Its 
multiple and often incompatible theorisations have nevertheless converged upon a 
substantial commitment to the “othering” possibilities inscribed in the imagination of 
interpersonal arrangements (whether these possibilities are of a narrative, philosophical 
or anthropological kind). A common feature of the definitions and projects found across 
the term’s intellectual history (from Thomas More to William Morris and from Karl 
Mannheim and Ernst Bloch to Fredric Jameson) is the ontological commitment to a 
radical disturbance of existing conditions and relations of power. Empirical history, 
however, especially in the wake of Stalinism and the Cold War has earmarked its ethical 
thrust with a narrow political referentiality. As Jameson argues, “‘utopian’ has come to 
be a code word on the left for socialism or communism; while on the right it has 
become synonymous with ‘totalitarianism’ or, in effect, with Stalinism.”1 Jameson has 
nevertheless insisted that, under conditions of “late capitalism” (the term he borrows 
from Ernest Mandel to characterise contemporary developments in the mode of 
production):2 “[t]he Utopian form itself is the answer to the universal ideological 
conviction that no alternative is possible, that there is no alternative to the system. But it 
asserts this by forcing us to think the break itself, and not by offering a more traditional 
picture of what things would be like after the break.”3 
                                                          
1
 Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia” New Left Review II, 25 (January-February 2004), 35. The 
single most important recent contribution to the field of utopian studies is arguably Fredric Jameson’s 
Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (London: Verso, 
2005). For a seminal survey of the field, see Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990); see also Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian 
Imagination (London: Methuen, 1986) and Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor, The Politics of Utopia 
(London: Hutchinson Educ., 1982)  
2
 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1999 [1972]); Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, 
the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991) 
3
 Jameson, Archaeologies, 232 
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Thus, while the utopian form may offer a viable alternative for an advanced 
postmodern conjuncture, it is more dubious whether a description in terms of 
utopianism thus understood may thoroughly clarify the contexts and contents of 
dissident British Socialism between the late 1930s and the onset of Thatcherism. For 
indeed, as Jameson himself remarks, “[t]he very political weakness of Utopia in 
previous generations – namely that it furnished nothing like an account of agency, nor 
did it have a coherent historical and practical-political picture of transition – now 
becomes a strength in a situation in which neither of these problems seems currently to 
offer candidates for a solution.”4  
This weakness becomes apparent in the always vexed and controversial reading 
of Orwell’s “dystopian” or “anti-utopian” classics, for example. As Andrew Milner has 
argued, contra Jameson, the reduction of Orwell’s political problematic to Cold War-
influenced terms of utopia/anti-utopia (reinforcing the impression that Orwell’s loyalties 
lie, unproblematically, with the liberal-capitalist end of the spectrum) leaves out an 
experiential wealth which, properly analysed, would effectively confute any simplistic 
rendition of the polarity with which Jameson seeks to align himself (anti-communism vs 
anti-anti-communism). What is lacking in the “utopian/anti-utopian” account offered by 
Jameson is, precisely, the dimension of agency which articulates the plurality of voices 
and emphases of the present project. As we will see, the terms “experience” and 
“agency”, albeit complex and often diffuse on their own, nevertheless manage to 
capture the conjunctural singularity of particular histories whilst entertaining an 
ontological commitment to the “othering” of social reality – or, as Jameson puts it, to 
“the break”.    
                                                          
4
 Jameson, ibid., 232  
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Thus Orwell’s engagement with the abysmal sites of the Great Depression lays 
down a basic framework for the practical development of the idea of experience that his 
subsequent works (after his participation in the Spanish Civil War) will flesh out. The 
physical immediacy of capitalist-induced destitution supplies a starting-point, an initial 
configuration of the class society which will then enable the writer’s transition to 
“consciousness” and to the subsequent discriminations of his emancipatory project.   
The political outlook bestowed by the events in Catalonia signifies a marked 
advance in his idiosyncratic understanding and formulation of a workable Socialism in 
the context of the 1930s. In particular, the encounter with a fledgling totalitarian 
deviation from the blanket definitions of his early radicalism establishes a precise 
framework of counter-hegemonic imagination. The concrete history of his loyalties – 
the direct involvement with the POUM militia and the British ILP, with the Home 
Guard and the “vision” of an English Socialist Revolution, and finally his assumption of 
a “compromise” of sorts before the totalitarian menace – offers an irreducible matrix of 
idiosyncratic potentialities, all of them equipped with a clear definition of historical 
agency and a precise instantiation of the “break” with hegemonic power relations.  
This outlook is utopian, in the sense of offering an imaginative scenario of the 
systemic break, but it is also processual and agentive in a way that reaches beyond the 
functional possibilities of utopia (according to Jameson’s account), opening up its 
ontology to a far more extensive range of possibilities.  
Similarly, the “conjuncture” of dissident Communism in Britain as developed in 
the early years of the Cold War and, especially, as marked by the dramatic turning-point 
of 1956, offers a productive matrix of oppositional imagination which is not contained 
within the institutional boundaries of a singular political project. On the contrary, the 
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multiplicity which asserts itself in the work of, for example, the Communist Party 
Historians’ Group, and in particular in the anti-authoritarian initiatives of an author like 
Edward Thompson, opens up an “illimitable” range of connections and opportunities for 
an inventive and anti-essentialist re-articulation of Socialism. 
Thus, Thompson’s work on the formation of the English working class, on the 
antinomian identity in English Protestantism, on the “utopian” Socialism of William 
Morris as well as his more public commitments to the regeneration of the British 
Communist movement and against the “exterminist” logic of the Cold War, represent 
irreducible instances of a vocal political determination to re-create the conditions of 
common (social) life in open defiance, not only of the “bourgeois idea of society”, but 
also of the more sclerotic tendencies within the contemporary Left. 
Finally, the intellectual project of Raymond Williams supplies a benchmark and 
ineluctable reference-point for any assessment of the triumphs and failures of the post-
war project(s) of British Socialism. In particular, his extended engagement with the 
field of “culture” represents a central moment of coordination for instincts, ideas and 
sentiments that pervade the work of both Orwell and Thompson. These authors’ central 
preoccupation with notions of social equality and freedom from dogmatic guidance thus 
find in Williams a coordinated expression and strategic disposition under the aegis of 
“community” and in the intense and emotionally charged “localisation” of general 
concerns about social and collective arrangements and about the inherent possibilities of 
oppositional agency. Lawrence Grossberg has recently argued that: 
If we are to find new ways of (re-)constituting the multiple presents as 
contexts of hope… we have to learn to ‘hear that which one does not 
already understand’… This may reveal new ways to connect to the 
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multiplicity not only of disabling and pessimistic realities, but also of hopes, 
dreams and desires, and seek to define a new and collective project of 
reinventing the ‘possibilities’ of imagination and the ways of being 
modern.5  
What this dissertation proposes to do is to isolate three instances, three 
“moments” of an alternative constitution of possibility within the seemingly exhausted 
conjuncture of British Socialism. The contention is that, far from revealing a monolithic 
or trite ritualisation of hackneyed and failed slogans derived from one particular stock 
of what Grossberg calls “Euro-modernity”, the tonal and contextual variations of our 
three authors manage to extract, from within a relatively well-known narrative of 
emancipatory thought, a measure of particularity – of “that which one does not already 
understand” – which cannot be reduced to a preconceived generality.  
What is being argued, then, is that no monological inscription of emancipatory 
hope can dispense with the local richness of particular histories, of conjunctures and 
circumstances. The common denominator of our three authors is thus, primarily, an 
unwillingness to relinquish the heightened sense of contextuality of their political 
declensions – an insistence on the relevance of “directly lived” forms of resistance and 
oppositionality (as much as of redeemed, alternative worlds) to a general cause of 
human emancipation. For indeed the notion that possibility is fleshed out in the 
particular combinations of social identity becomes something of a leitmotif in the 
political imagination of Orwell, Thompson and Williams. And social identity, as their 
different situations articulate it, is inseparable from a rooted sense of lived history, from 
a precise and intensely collective “experience” of struggle and creation.  
                                                          
5
 Lawrence Grossberg, “Raymond Williams and the absent modernity”, in Monika Seidl, Roman Horak 
and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), About Raymond Williams (London: Routledge, 2010), 32-33 
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GEORGE ORWELL: REVOLUTION AND 
REFORM 
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1. Wigan Pier and the Road to Socialism 
 
The people lived almost entirely by instinct, men of my father’s age could 
not really read. And the pit did not mechanize men. On the contrary. Under 
the butty system, the miners worked underground as a sort of intimate 
community, they knew each other practically naked, and with curious close 
intimacy, and the darkness and the underground remoteness of the pit 
“stall”, and the continual presence of danger, made the physical, 
instinctive, and intuitional contact between men very highly developed, a 
contact almost as close as touch, very real and very powerful. This physical 
awareness and intimate togetherness was at its strongest down pit. When 
the men came up into the light, they blinked. They had, in a measure, to 
change their flow. Nevertheless, they brought with them above ground the 
curious dark intimacy of the mine, the naked sort of contact…1  
 
Writing in “Nottingham and the Mining Country” about childhood memories of 
the native country, D.H. Lawrence rescues a powerful image of community, of organic 
linkage between fellow workers and their social world, projecting beyond the barren 
human landscape of 1930s Britain an alternative vision of social integration. The 
intimate affectivity of the vision emphasises a direct physical continuity of bodies, 
miners’ bodies, carrying the symbolic burden of a combined exposure to the cruder 
                                                          
1
 D.H. Lawrence, “Nottingham and the Mining Country”, in Selected Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1950), 117 
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depredations of industrial capitalism and a deep, instinctual homosociality 
fundamentally antagonistic to the cunning rationalities of modern political and 
economic forms.  
Lawrence’s image of mutuality is indeed closer to Burke’s depiction of the 
foregone “age of chivalry”, of its mores and rules of social intercourse, than it is to the 
contemporaneous discourse of Socialism or Labourism. In effect, his miners’ 
underground community rehearses – in Burke’s words – “that subordination of the 
heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom.”2  
“The colliers – writes Lawrence – were deeply alive, instinctively. But they had 
no daytime ambition, and no daytime intellect. They avoided, really, the rational aspect 
of life. They preferred to take life instinctively and intuitively.”3 The elemental 
immediacy of this existence harbours no discursive or (in Lawrence’s words) 
“materialistic” concern – just the sheer immanence of homosocial affectivity, the sheer 
life of labouring and communing bodies. The irrepressibly utopian content of this 
pastoral image of industrial life – this idiosyncratic version of Lawrentian irrationalism 
–
4
 is precisely set against the “tragedy of ugliness” which defined the “Age of 
Machinery” (as Carlyle had termed the nascent process of industrialisation):5     
The great crime which the moneyed classes and promoters of industry 
committed in the palmy Victorian days was the condemning of the workers 
to ugliness, ugliness, ugliness: meanness and formless and ugly 
                                                          
2
 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 170 
3
 Lawrence, ibid., 118 
4
 Which must, in this context, necessarily acquire the oppositional dimension of a challenge to industrial 
and utilitarian processes of capitalist “rationalisation”. See, for example, Simon Casey,  Naked Liberty 
and the World of Desire: Elements of Anarchism in the Work of D.H. Lawrence (London: Routledge, 
2003), Anne Fernihough, D.H. Lawrence: Aesthetics and Ideology (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993) 
5
 See Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times”, in Thomas Carlyle: Selected Writings (London: Penguin, 
1971) 
12 
 
surroundings, ugly ideals, ugly religion, ugly hope, ugly love, ugly clothes, 
ugly furniture, ugly houses, ugly relationships between workers and 
employers.6 
 
Orwell’s documentary analysis of poverty and unemployment in the first half of 
The Road to Wigan Pier brought Lawrence’s indictment of modern ugliness to bear on 
the particular realities of moral and physical dereliction induced by the economic slump 
of the 1930s. Orwell’s depiction of the human landscape generated by the Depression in 
the North of England is directly influenced by a conceptual sequence (rehearsed 
throughout the Romantic tradition in its classic criticism of Industrialisation) which 
causally relates the “civilising” logic of capitalist rationality and its attendant discourse 
on “progress” to a grim offshoot or by-product of material ruin and spiritual decay. 
The Road to Wigan Pier thus opens with a glimpse of degraded working-class 
life, a dramatic foray into the darker recesses of modern society rather than with the 
relatively triumphalist description of coalmining. The Brookers’ lodging house is a 
condensed repository of degradation; a paradigmatic negation of the principles and 
values of community and organic belonging hypostasised by Lawrence. Neither 
Gemeinschaft nor Gesellschaft,7 the world inhabited by the Brookers and their like is a 
lumping together of miseries and humiliations – a voiding of humanity branded with the 
logic of class stratification: 
On the day when there was a full chamber-pot under the breakfast table I 
decided to leave. The place was beginning to depress me. It was not only 
                                                          
6
 Lawrence, ibid., 120  
7
 In the terminology popularized by Ferdinand Tönnies. These are often translated as “community” and 
“society”,  respectively. See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (Newton Abbot: David & 
Charles, 2002 [1887]) 
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the dirt, the smells and the vile food, but the feeling of stagnant 
meaningless decay, of having got down into some subterranean place 
where people go creeping round and round, just like black beetles, in an 
endless muddle of slovened jobs and mean grievances. The most dreadful 
thing about people like the Brookers is the way they say the same things 
over and over again. It gives you the feeling that they are not real people at 
all, but a kind of ghost for ever rehearsing the same futile rigmarole… But 
it is no use saying that people like the Brookers are just disgusting and 
trying to put them out of mind. For they exist in tens and hundreds of 
thousands; they are one of the characteristic by-products of the modern 
world. You cannot disregard them if you accept the civilisation which 
produced them. For this is part at least of what industrialism has done for 
us.8 
The material and moral penury of a particularly degraded example of working-class life 
is thus inextricable from the “civilising project” of modernity. There is an inescapable 
consubstantiality and continuity between capitalistic rationality and the local 
embodiments of its systemic failure. This makes the acknowledgment of poverty, its 
close analysis and experiencing, not only requisite for the doctrinal observer – for the 
socialist in the making – as part of a process of ideological development, but rather, a 
general ethical mandate with consequences for all: “[i]t is a kind of duty to see and 
smell such places now and again, especially smell them, lest you should forget that they 
exist.”9 
                                                          
8
 George Orwell, “The Road to Wigan Pier”, in Orwell’s England (London: Penguin, 2001 [1937]), 66 
9
 Orwell, ibid., 66 
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The bid for an organic reconstitution of social life away from the bracing 
dereliction of modern industrial “civilisation”, which has been pointed out as a central 
element of Orwell’s programme (as, for example, in Richard Hoggart’s suggestion that 
Orwell “wanted to belong to a coherent society, [that] he longed for a sense of 
communion.”),10 is predicated on a contrasting pattern of working-class reality which is 
closely associated, as in Lawrence, with the archetypical masculinity of miners. 
Orwell’s depiction of mining in the Northern districts supposes a radical shift in 
tone and emphasis from the bleakness and inertia of a self-defeating working class 
overly exposed to the worse dynamics of an internalised subalternity, to the proud 
proletarian identity of the mining communities. The dynamics of homosociality 
emphasised by Lawrence give way in Orwell to a detailed (and yet equally scopophilic) 
description of underground work. The mine becomes a heroic space – in sharp contrast 
with the vile domesticity of the Brookers’ house – in which the well-nigh superhuman 
powers of the miners meet and defy the internal limit of productive rationality. 
Coalmining supplies the emblem of a native resistance which tips the balance against a 
blanket projection of the working-class condition as deprived and debased. This 
emblematic position is, as Beatrix Campbell has pointed out, the product of a 
characteristic identification, in the critique of industrialism, between oppositionality and 
the mystique of masculinity: “[t]he socialist movement in Britain – and we could add: 
the broad range of anti-industrialist discourses, not only on the left – has been swept off 
its feet by the magic of masculinity, muscle and machinery. And in its star system, the 
accolades go to the miners.”11    
                                                          
10
 Richard Hoggart, “Introduction to The Road to Wigan Pier”, in Raymond Williams (ed.), George 
Orwell: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974), 38 
11
 Beatrix Campbell, Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the 80s (London: Virago, 1984) 
Indeed, there is little doubt, as Campbell points out, that the solid sense of community associated with 
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The miner stands out, in the loaded iconography of labouring figures and 
working-class idols, as a structural pivot commanding symbolic authority and attracting 
the unflinching adherence of a fetishistic discourse made by and for men. Orwell’s 
characteristic definition of the coal miner as “a sort of grimy caryatid upon whose 
shoulders nearly everything that is not grimy is supported” encapsulates this 
fundamental equation between an idealised incarnation of Work – as the real sustenance 
upon which the capitalist machine is propped – and an essential notion of masculinity. 12 
According to Rob Breton: “[i]n its physicality, its demand for total engagement, its 
social usefulness, its community, its demand for ‘manly’ strength, its direct involvement 
with the land and solid materials, and in the image of self-realization it confirms, 
mining encapsulates nonrationalized Work, an idea Orwell isolates and protects”:13  
[T]he fillers look and work as though they were made of iron. They really 
do look like iron – hammered iron statues – under the smooth coat of coal 
dust which clings to them from head to foot. It is only when you see miners 
down the mine and naked that you realise what splendid men they are. 
Most of them are small (big men are at a disadvantage in that job) but 
nearly all of them have the most noble bodies; wide shoulders tapering to 
slender supple waists, and small pronounced buttocks and sinewy thighs, 
with no one ounce of waste flesh anywhere.14 
This eroticisation of the labour-force, taken or cast at its most primary or elemental – as 
sheer corporeality –, paradoxically overturns the symbolic position initially assigned to 
the worker within the social organisation of labour. By hypostasising and fetishising the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
miners is consistently based on the exclusion of women from its central dynamic, “because women’s 
presence would dissolve the symmetry between men’s work and masculinity”, Campbell, ibid., 98   
12
 Orwell, ibid., 68 
13
 Rob Breton, Gospels and Grit: Work and Labour in Carlyle, Conrad, and Orwell (Toronto, Buffalo 
and London: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 161 
14
 Orwell, ibid., 69 
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sterling physicality of these Nietzschean Übermenschen of modern industrialism, their 
enforced position in the system (their objective ‘nature’ as cogs in a complex 
machinery) is undercut and ultimately replaced by a figure of immanence and self-
referentiality for which no external – mechanistic, functional or systemic– use can be 
prescribed.  
    Orwell’s libidinal engagement with the archetypes of industrial civilisation is 
counterbalanced, in the remaining sections of the first half of the book, with substantial 
documentary mapping of the actual conditions endured by many of these iconic 
representatives of working-class life. Thus the cruder effects of the crisis are 
contextualised in a particular devastation of the very foundations of “civilisation”.15  
 The second half of the book analyses the facts of class which made his 
integration with the working-class communities of the North an ultimately failed 
project. As Ben Clarke has pointed out, despite “his admiration for the working class, 
Orwell is simply ‘not one of them’, just as he equally simply is ‘a bourgeois’. The 
complex network of practices and values that defines the communities he visits prevents 
his integration. It also undermines his position as a social explorer.”16The highly 
idiosyncratic and opinionated quality of this section of The Road would eventually earn 
Orwell the unqualified ire and contempt of broad sectors of the British Left.17 Most 
tellingly, it caused the book to be published with an editorial note by Victor Gollancz in 
                                                          
15
 Bernard Schweizer, Radicals on the Road: the Politics of English Travel Writing in the 1930s 
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which he expressed, on behalf of the Left Book Club, his disagreement with Orwell’s 
conclusions.  
Orwell begins by delineating a personal trajectory of conversion to the socialist 
cause, examining the whys and wherefores of his decision to “see the most typical 
section of the English working class at close quarters.” “This – writes Orwell – was 
necessary to me as part of my approach to Socialism”.18 Orwell conceives his “descent” 
into the northern “abyss” of proletarian England as a fundamental and ineluctable step 
in the process of political development which had first seen him break with British 
imperialism in Burma and then experience the “down and out” life of a tramp in the 
urban underworlds of London and Paris. However, the project involved in his 
exploration of the northern working class signalled a qualitative leap, a change of moral 
substance which explicitly postulated Socialism – however embryonically or 
instinctively conceived – as the precise horizon of political achievement against which 
concrete realities and limitations were to be judged. 
His reflection commences with a cross-examination of English class realities 
and, in particular, with the difficult topography of middle class distinctions and 
prejudices. Thus, he famously characterises his own background as “lower-upper-
middle-class” – a particular stratum or “sub-caste” within an intricate series of 
bourgeois layers. Orwell emphasises in this respect that, however useful the economic 
determination may appear in terms of establishing the identity of a particular individual 
or family within the accepted divisions, “the essential point about the English class-
system is that it is not entirely explicable in terms of money. Roughly speaking it is a 
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money stratification, but it is also interpenetrated by a sort of shadowy caste-system; 
rather like a jerry-built modern bungalow haunted by medieval ghosts.”19  
Orwell explains the virulence of much upper-middle-class prejudice (of the sort 
he himself had imbibed during his formative years and from which his socialist 
conversion was to mark the final break) as a particular ideological function of the often 
crude material differences between the various bourgeois rungs. The common 
denominator of these groups was a firm prejudice and an ingrained snobbishness 
directed against the working classes. However, the lower strata within them, the 
“shabby genteel” and generally impoverished middle classes played a specific role in 
the defence and upkeep of the bourgeois ideological fortress. These “down-at-heel” 
members of the class were in that sense “the shock-absorbers of the bourgeoisie”: 
The real bourgeoisie, those in the £2,000 a year class and over, have their 
money as a thick layer of padding between themselves and the class they 
plunder; in so far as they are aware of the Lower Orders at all they are aware 
of them as employees, servants and tradesmen. But it is quite different for 
the poor devils lower down who are struggling to live genteel lives on what 
are virtually working-class incomes. These last are forced into close and, in 
a sense, intimate contact with the working class, and I suspect it is from 
them that the traditional upper-class attitude towards ‘common’ people is 
derived.20  
The most basic aspect of the general characterisation and screening of the working 
classes operated by the bourgeois mentality is also the most irrational and hard to 
eradicate. This is the belief, from which a middle-class upbringing is indissoluble, that 
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“the lower classes smell”: “[t]hat was what we were taught – the lower classes smell. 
And here, obviously, you are at an impassable barrier. For no feeling of like or dislike is 
quite so fundamental as a physical feeling”.21  The rooting of prejudice in a fact of sheer 
physicality thus creates a chasmic antagonism, which even the best of one’s intellectual 
efforts and deep-seated political convictions can do little to unsettle. Orwell insists on 
the extraordinary resilience of habits, manners and prejudices acquired in the early 
stages of a middle-class upbringing. His point is that the former are fundamentally 
inseparable from the latter, and so, that the instinctive badges of class identity – 
however trivial they may appear – actually betray a fundamental assumption of 
superiority and continue to shape, even beyond the nurturing ground of a middle-class 
background, the individual’s unconscious allegiances: 
Perhaps table-manners are not a bad test of sincerity. I have known numbers 
of bourgeois Socialists, I have listened by the hour to their tirades against 
their own class, and yet never, not even once, have I met one who had 
picked up proletarian table-manners. Yet, after all, why not? Why should a 
man who thinks all virtue resides in the proletariat still take such pains to 
drink his soup silently? It can only be because in his heart he feels that 
proletarian manners are disgusting. So you see he is still responding to the 
training of his childhood, when he was taught to hate, fear, and despise the 
working class.22 
The specific resistances induced by this early training in prejudice make any 
genuine attempt to transcend the class differential – in substance and not merely in 
appearance – a genuine personal struggle which the aspiring middle-class socialist must 
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necessarily confront. Orwell locates the roots of his own struggle in the acute 
experience of oppression with which he had been acquainted in Burma. The bitterness 
and injustice generated by five years in the British Imperial Police were to issue in a 
sense of self-estrangement and in a radical urge to “get right down among the 
oppressed, to be one of them and on their side against their tyrants”: 
It was in this way that my thoughts turned towards the English working 
class. It was the first time that I had ever been really aware of the working 
class, and to begin with it was only because they supplied an analogy. They 
were the symbolic victims of injustice, playing the same part in England as 
the Burmese played in Burma.23  
This fundamentally immature desire to mingle with the despised “others” of a markedly 
blinkered class ideology took the form, in these early years of reaction against the 
inherent outlook of his bourgeois background, of an “extreme” and yet still 
“unconscious” courting of underclass life: Orwell’s strenuous efforts to “go native” 
among London tramps are marked by a crucial overcoming of the physical scruple 
which he relates to a middle-class upbringing.24 This preliminary step will only acquire 
retroactive value with the securing of an enlightened position vis-à-vis the structural 
causes of class division; that is, with the assumption of an explicitly socialist 
programme of action.  
Orwell’s central emphasis and injunction in the second part of The Road is 
precisely the need to reconcile political vision with a real acknowledgement of deep-
seated class instincts, and thus ultimately, to consciously undertake the difficult road 
beyond class not by circumventing its facts – and real blocks to action – but by limiting 
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and reducing their relevance to effective socialist transformation. In this perspective, 
many good-willing attempts to “break” class barriers by enacting facetious scenarios of 
communal sharing which tend to ignore the radical embeddedness of prejudice and 
separation are fundamentally flawed:  
All such deliberate, conscious efforts at class-breaking are, I am convinced, 
a very serious mistake. Sometimes they are merely futile, but where they do 
show a definite result it is usually to intensify class-prejudice... You have 
forced the pace and set up an uneasy, unnatural equality between class and 
class; the resultant friction brings to the surface all kinds of feelings that 
might otherwise have remained buried, perhaps for ever.25  
The opposite temptation to demonise the bourgeoisie from a supposedly advanced 
proletarian position – one claiming to have “seen through” the bankruptcy of bourgeois 
values and culture as a whole – is, according to Orwell, a parallel source of 
estrangement and a further obstacle to the necessary creation of inter-class socialist 
alliances. This hostile and reductionistic approach, which Orwell associates with “the 
younger Communist writers” and the Left Review – generates a further dislocation of the 
real challenges and aims in the attempt to surpass the class divide. In that sense:  
The only sensible procedure is to go slow and not force the pace. If 
you secretly think of yourself as a gentleman and as such the superior of the 
greengrocer’s errand boy, it is far better to say so than to tell lies about it. 
Ultimately you have got to drop your snobbishness, but it is fatal to pretend 
to drop it before you are really ready to do so.26   
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The road to Socialism, as Orwell explicated it in the pre-revolutionary – that is, 
pre-Spanish Civil War – approach of The Road to Wigan Pier, is thus a hazardous and 
meandering road around ingrained conceptions and prejudices (around “ideologies”) 
with the distinctive, and all too real threat of Fascism lurking in the background. The 
parlous state of the movement, both nationally and internationally, prompts a critical 
reconsideration of both its material underpinnings (the class divide and the set of 
ideological responses it generates) and its doctrinal components. This particular turn in 
Orwell’s argument is by far the most controversial and symptomatic of what, at this 
stage in his political development, can only be characterised as the preliminary phase of 
his Socialism. The basic identification of its doctrinal core is thus a commonsensical 
acknowledgement of egalitarianism and mutuality in a time of dire inequalities and 
social fragmentation: “the idea that we must all co-operate and see to it that everyone 
does his fair share of the work and gets his fair share of the provisions, seems so 
blatantly obvious that one would say that no one could possibly fail to accept it unless 
he had some corrupt motive for clinging to the present system”.27 And yet, “the fact that 
we have got to face is that Socialism is not establishing itself. Instead of going forward, 
the cause of Socialism is visibly going back. At this moment Socialists almost 
everywhere are in retreat before the onslaught of Fascism, and events are moving at 
terrible speed”.28 The root-cause of this retreat must therefore be sought out, at least 
partially, in the specific imaginaries invoked by Socialists, in the established outlook of 
a theory of social praxis that “in the form in which it is now presented to us, has about it 
something inherently distasteful – something that drives away the very people who 
ought to be flocking to its support”.29   
                                                          
27
 Orwell, ibid., 173 
28
 Orwell, ibid., 174 
29
 Orwell, ibid., 174 
23 
 
Orwell polemically associates this repulsive kernel of the theory with the specific 
theoretical reflexes of orthodox Marxism (or even Marxism tout court). In establishing 
this long-standing, and often problematical, association (which will remain largely 
unrevised throughout his subsequent work), Orwell centrally targets some of the more 
obtuse pronouncements of a simplistic teleological vision welded to assumptions of 
“historic necessity” and the inexorability of Socialism itself.30 The very occurrence of 
Fascism as a novel, determining force in the balance of political loyalties appears to 
confirm the failure of any such “iron laws” of historical prognostication.  
Orwell’s counter-intuitive method is to expose the limitations of the anti-socialist 
view by proceeding from within, that is, by charting the sources and logical steps 
followed by “the ordinary objector to Socialism.” The first observable fact in any close 
study of existing Socialism is that, “in its developed form [it] is a theory confined 
entirely to the middle class.” Thus, its prime adherents – at least in the English context 
with which Orwell is here concerned – are not working-class individuals with organic 
links to the industrial areas, but essentially bourgeois elements with a tendency to cut 
themselves off from any real sense of “common humanity”. The identification of 
Socialists with “cranks” (that is, with “every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-wearer, 
sex-maniac, Quaker, ‘Nature Cure’ quack, pacifist and feminist in England”) engenders 
an automatic reaction of hostility in the “ordinary man”.31 This is with little doubt, as 
has been abundantly observed, Orwell at his most parochial and prejudiced.32 Yet the 
reductionism (and chauvinism) of particular insights is inseparable from the main 
outline of the argument and its outstanding points. Thus the widening gulf between 
                                                          
30
 This criticism, from a radically different perspective, was also formulated by a declared Marxist thinker 
such as Walter Benjamin. His devastating critique of teleological “historicism” pervades his important 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History”, in which the vulgar conception of historical evolution 
encountered in linear interpretations of Marxism is berated for its negation of the complex temporality of 
historical emancipation.  See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Pimlico, 1999), 253-264  
31
 Orwell, ibid., 175 
32
 See, for example, Hoggart, ibid., 38 
24 
 
middle-class Socialism and what Orwell identifies as the commonsensical average is a 
function of the actual distance, in manner, idiom and worldview, between their doctrine 
itself and the experiential horizon of the proletariat. This is especially true of the Fabian 
variety of socialist theory or the jargon-filled orthodox Marxist discourse “which, even 
when it is not openly written de haut en bas, is always completely removed from the 
working class in idiom and manner of thought. The Coles, Webbs, Stracheys, etc., are 
not exactly proletarian writers”.33 Orwell’s claim is that the fine textures of orthodoxy 
and theory are essentially removed from the practical experience and immediate 
political imagination of working people: 
To the ordinary working man, the sort you would meet in any pub on 
Saturday night, Socialism does not mean much more than better wages and 
shorter hours and nobody bossing you about. To the more revolutionary 
type, the type who is a hunger-marcher and is blacklisted by employers, the 
word is a sort of rallying-cry against the forces of oppression, a vague threat 
of future violence. But, so far as my experience goes, no genuine working 
man grasps the implications of Socialism. Often, in my opinion, he is a truer 
Socialist than the orthodox Marxist, because he does remember, what the 
other so often forgets, that Socialism means justice and common decency.34  
In this alignment of the doctrine with a fundamentally bourgeois experience of 
political action, and in the resulting recognition of a basic rift between the theory and its 
avowed collective subject – the proletariat –, Orwell approximates a relatively 
widespread interpretation of working-class attitudes towards Socialism.35 Critical 
stances directed against middle-class dirigisme within the ranks of British Socialism 
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were not infrequent in the interwar period. Ellen Wilkinson’s 1929 novel Clash and 
Harold Heslop’s The Gate of a Strange Field, offer a characteristic response to the 
Fabian-inspired, top-down logic of social transformation.36 Wilkinson was particularly 
vocal about class determinations of political action and about the discrepant loyalties 
these generated. Her portrayal of working-class labour heroine Joan Craig provides the 
narrative cover for, and exploration of, the attempted and ultimately failed encounter 
between the “enlightened” world of a London middle-class intelligentsia with a 
“committed” outlook and the relatively backward world of northern labour activism.37 
The total effect of this representation is indubitably one of frustrated alliance: a 
recognition of the latent incompatibility between extant bourgeois loyalties and a purely 
rhetorical solidarity with the working class.38 Wilkinson opts for class retrenchment, 
calling at the same time for a sincere break with middle-class values and resistances. 
Orwell’s position, though less expedient about the necessary passage beyond 
middle-class ideological boundaries, is largely coincidental with Wilkinson’s criticism 
of the “high-minded Socialist slum-visitor”: “[t]he truth is that to many people, calling 
themselves Socialists, revolution does not mean a movement of the masses with which 
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they hope to associate themselves; it means a set of reforms which ‘we’, the clever ones, 
are going to impose upon ‘them’, the Lower Orders.”39  
One of the more palpable effects of this estrangement of Socialists from 
common feeling and sensibility is, according to Orwell, the blanket rejection to which 
the movement as a whole is often condemned by people who could, at least potentially, 
sympathise with “the essential aim of Socialism.” This induced alienation cannot be 
accounted for in a mechanistically materialist way, as is often the case in the standard 
(vulgar) Marxist analysis. Thus the grim spectacle of 1930s left-wing politics, as Orwell 
interprets it in the English context, is one marked by a general disconnection between 
projected aims (which are regarded as largely compatible with a numerical majority of 
the population) and particular stylistic and intellectual modes of presentation and 
explanation.  
Amongst the ominous consequences of this fundamental breakdown, the rise of 
Fascism as a compensatory strategy indirectly capitalising on Socialists’ incapacity to 
make their case and to generally empathise with popular demands, stands out as the 
most symptomatic development of the period. In the popular reaction against Socialism 
– grounded in a “commonsensical” hostility towards “prigs” –,40 Orwell identifies a 
fundamental aversion to mechanisation. Thus the “Socialist world is always pictured as 
a completely mechanised, immensely organised world, depending on the machine as the 
civilisations of antiquity depended on the slave”.41 This unquestioning complicity and 
even co-extensiveness of Socialism with technological dominance becomes a serious 
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limitation as soon as the mechanical aspect is no longer “merely regarded as a necessary 
development but as an end in itself, almost as a kind of religion”: 
All the work that is now done by hand will then be done by machinery: 
everything that is now made of leather, wood or stone will be made of 
rubber, glass or steel; there will be no disorder, no loose ends, no 
wildernesses, no wild animals, no weeds, no disease, no poverty, no pain – 
and so on and so forth. The Socialist world is to be above all things an 
ordered world, an efficient world. But it is precisely from that vision of the 
future as a sort of glittering Wells-world that sensitive minds recoil. Please 
notice that this essentially fat-bellied version of ‘progress’ is not an integral 
part of Socialist doctrine; but it has come to be thought of as one, with the 
result that the temperamental conservatism which is latent in all kinds of 
people is easily mobilised against Socialism. 42 
The tenor of this analysis brings back the main emphases of the Romantic critique 
of industrialism. The unrelenting onslaught of the machine is the price of a bleary-eyed 
progressivism; and this price is to be paid in a brutal dismantling of the organic balances 
– the harmonious rhythms – of a pre-industrial society. Thomas Carlyle’s prophetic 
formulation of this characteristic stance of nineteenth-century conservatism also defined 
the discursive scope of its critical target and named it, evocatively, “the Age of 
Machinery” (an “epoch” of which 1930s Socialism as anatomised by Orwell, no doubt 
constituted – as Jacobinism and Chartism before it – a precise and organic function):   
It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward sense of that word; 
the age which, with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches and 
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practises the great art of adapting means to ends. Nothing is now done 
directly, or by hand; all is by rule and calculated contrivance. On every 
hand, the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a 
speedier, inanimate one. The shuttle drops from the fingers of the weaver, 
and falls into iron fingers that ply it faster... These things, which we state 
lightly enough here, are yet of deep import, and indicate a mighty change in 
our whole manner of existence. For the same habit regulates not our modes 
of action alone, but our modes of thought and feeling. Men are grown 
mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith in 
individual endeavour, and in natural force, of any kind. Not for internal 
perfection, but for external combinations and arrangement, for institutions, 
constitutions, – for Mechanism of one sort or other, do they hope and 
struggle. Their whole efforts, attachments, opinions, turn on mechanism, 
and are of a mechanical character.43      
The consubstantiality of this structural dynamic of modern society and the 
accompanying forms of social organisation and political rule is, for Carlyle, 
indisputable. Indeed, “[n]owhere... is the deep, almost exclusive faith we have in 
Mechanism more visible than in the Politics of this time.” The radical adherence to 
“institutions, constitutions” and an associated progeny of “mechanical” exertions 
against that “subordination of the heart” which, according to Burke, “kept alive, even in 
servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom,”44 supplied further proof of an 
unstoppable drift towards “speedy anarchy”.45 In a similar vein of interpretation, Orwell 
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credits the predominant form of Socialism of his contemporaries with an analogous 
projection: the endless mediations and “rationalisations” supposed by technology and 
machinery fundamentally deny the human element in creativity. With the social division 
of labour – which pulsates at the core of Orwell’s description of the industrial condition 
in which Socialism has its roots – comes the end of that unitary process of production in 
which the worker can directly relate to the outcome of her/his work – and in which work 
itself displays the lineaments of an organic and total process requiring, so to speak, an 
integral productive intelligence – a craft, rather than a dictated gesture or isolated 
operation in an impersonal series.46 The boundless extensiveness of the mechanisation 
process leaves no exempted area, subjecting all and sundry to its logic and rituals: “[t]he 
machine would even encroach upon the activities we now class as ‘art’; it is doing so 
already, via the camera and the radio. Mechanise the world as fully as it might be 
mechanised, and whichever way you turn there will be some machine cutting you off 
from the chance of working – that is, of living”.47  
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2. Imagining the Revolution 
 
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 offered a unique opportunity for 
the articulation of various political stances equipped with a concrete vision of radical 
social transformation. The broad ideological spectrum of anti-fascism, which had been 
gathering momentum since the beginning of the decade, was now granted the specificity 
of a geographically localised conflict endowed with an ominous reference to general 
developments in the international political arena.  
The predicament of the Spanish Republic after the military uprising of July, 
which had initially commanded the sympathies of a broad anti-fascist audience 
internationally, in fact concealed a diversity of tensions and drives with varying 
revolutionary emphases within its own camp. The internal fragmentation of Republican 
Spain along antagonistic ideological lines both confutes the simplistic rendition 
customarily offered by Communist-influenced versions of the conflict (as a purely anti-
fascist and pro-democratic struggle) and reveals a rich and complex flourishing of social 
utopianism.1 Anarchist experiments in collectivisation (of the land and industries) 
represent the foremost advance of a spontaneous agenda which the military revolt itself 
had prompted and which had then served in many areas as the primary defensive 
bulwark against the coup’s success.2  
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Collectivisation and the creation of the militias were concrete wartime 
manifestations of the anarcho-syndicalist programme, which, as George Esenwein and 
Adrian Shubert have pointed out, by 1936, “had filtered down to even the least literate 
segments of society”.3 The sort of hegemony attained by anarchist ideas among broad 
sectors of the industrial proletariat (especially in Catalonia) and the propertyless 
peasantry (especially in Andalusia) secured a high degree of resilience and practical 
élan for the revolutionary experiment when the hour of its realisation arrived. This 
revolutionary vision was effectively rooted in a moral – and perhaps even millenarian – 
vision of radical social change.4 The practicalities of economic organisation, for 
example, were necessarily second to an overarching concern with the transformation of 
societal values: “[t]o create a society based on justice was their main goal; they had no 
interest in establishing competitive economic structures which only enriched the 
community materially”.5 
The visionary outlook of the Spanish Revolution was inescapable, as was its 
sincere bid to break with a common past of perceived injustice in which the woeful 
trinity of church, state and capital had long featured as distinct and inseparable roots of 
a common oppression.6 The “vision” which the revolutionary outbreak had consigned to 
the streets in the summer of 1936 was to capture the attention of intellectuals of a 
radical inclination and sometimes even spur their belief in the feasibility of utopian 
social change. The case of George Orwell is both paradigmatic and highly idiosyncratic 
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in that his Spanish experience represents a turning point for a very personal quest and 
ideological trajectory (which would issue in “disillusionment”, according to the 
standard and yet highly problematical account of his subsequent political evolution), but 
also a characteristic opening and commitment to the possibilities of a concrete, 
unfolding, utopia. As confirmed by the often-quoted passage from a letter to Cyril 
Connolly, “I have seen wonderful things & at last really believe in Socialism, which I 
never did before”.7 The physical and moral immediacy of an unrestrained and explosive 
social experiment at work had effectively unleashed the promissory potential of a 
hitherto persuasive – but mostly untested – projection: the tentative Socialism of The 
Road to Wigan Pier.  
According to Alex Zwerdling, Orwell’s temperamental pessimism allowed, at 
certain, strategic moments, for genuine flights of optimism which ultimately enabled his 
commitment to radical politics. These included, as his overall approval of the 
revolutionary experiment in Spain attests, a belief “that the competitive drive in human 
beings which supports a system of inequality need not be stronger than the sense of 
communal loyalty; that the means used to transform society (whether revolutionary or 
reformist) do not necessarily compromise the hope of creating a world without 
privilege.”8  
A “sense of communal loyalty” seems indeed to be the prevalent and most 
enduring effect of Orwell’s engagement in the Spanish conflict, one which underpins 
his subsequent processing of direct personal experience into the sustained political 
reflection which pervades Homage to Catalonia. The book famously opens with the 
recollection of a chance encounter, at the POUM barracks in Barcelona, with an Italian 
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militiaman who would come to “typify”, retrospectively, “the special atmosphere of that 
time”, and to represent the peculiar instantiation afforded by the war, in a real, tangible, 
dimension, of the often abused and reified abstract notions which proliferated in radical 
political discourse: “[s]omething in his face deeply moved me. It was the face of a man 
who would commit murder and throw away his life for a friend – the kind of face you 
would expect in an Anarchist, though as likely as not he was a Communist.”9 Orwell’s 
instinctive association of the militiaman’s inherent decency with the fundamental ethos 
of Anarchism is justified by the specifically anarcho-syndicalist profile of the state of 
affairs he encountered upon arrival in Barcelona. The shock of revelation (the well-nigh 
epiphanical crystallisation of a liberating vision of secular, egalitarian deliverance) had 
been recorded a few months earlier by Franz Borkenau in a text that would have a direct 
influence upon Orwell’s, The Spanish Cockpit.10 Borkenau describes his first 
impression of the city in transformation as a grand deployment of spectacular 
proportions:  
Again a peaceful arrival. No taxi-cabs, but instead old horse-cabs, to carry 
us into the town. Few people in the Paseo de Colón. And, then, as we turned 
round the corner of the Ramblas (the chief artery of Barcelona) came a 
tremendous surprise: before our eyes, in a flash, unfolded itself the 
revolution. It was overwhelming. It was as if we had been landed on a 
continent different from anything I had seen before.  
The first impression: armed workers, rifles on their shoulders, but wearing 
their civilian clothes… The fact that all these armed men walked about, 
marched, and drove in their ordinary clothes made the thing only more 
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impressive as a display of the power of the factory workers. The anarchists, 
recognizable by badges and insignia in red and black, were obviously in 
overwhelming numbers. And no bourgeoisie whatever! No more well-
dressed young women and fashionable señoritos on the Ramblas! Only 
working men and working women; no hats even!11 
The exhilaration suggested by this passage and the surmise of having landed upon an 
entirely new “continent” is taken up by Orwell, who recognises the significance of the 
unfolding spectacle as the effective assumption of power by the working class: “[i]t was 
the first time that I had ever been in a town where the working class was in the 
saddle”.12 The flourishing of proletarian power is soon confirmed visually by the 
proliferation of initials allusive to the various unions and parties (CNT, FAI, UGT, 
POUM etc.), by the accompanying invasion of red and black-and-red flags, 
revolutionary slogans and mannerisms (in the form of address, for example) and, most 
importantly, by the radical equalisation of individual appearance, with a virtual 
banishment of “bourgeois” dress codes. However brutal, tenuous or even pathetic, 
Orwell acknowledges the sheer importance of this situation as a prelude to the ethical 
transformation on which his developing idea of Socialism rested:13 “All this was queer 
and moving. There was much in it that I did not understand, in some ways I did not 
even like it, but I recognised it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for”.14 At 
the root of this conviction lies a belief in the essential sincerity of the whole process – 
indeed a belief which will sustain his commitment to Socialism and the anti-fascist 
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struggle and function as an ethical yardstick in his subsequent exposure of Communist 
totalitarianism: “[a]bove all, there was a belief in the revolution and the future, a feeling 
of having suddenly emerged into an era of equality and freedom. Human beings were 
trying to behave as human beings and not as cogs in the capitalist machine”.15   
The virtual effacement of class differences was, in Orwell’s opinion, a 
fundamental inheritance from the early revolutionary stages of the war, which even 
subsequent betrayals and defections would be unable to fully dismantle. As he would 
later recall in a review of Mary Low and Juan Breá’s Red Spanish Notebook: 
For several months large blocks of people believed that all men are equal 
and were able to act on their belief. The result was a feeling of liberation 
and hope… No one who was in Spain during the months when people still 
believed in the revolution will ever forget that strange and moving 
experience. It has left something behind that no dictatorship, not even 
Franco’s, will be able to efface.16 
 
The military revolt of July 18-19, 1936 had issued in the spontaneous formation of 
workers’ militias by the various political and labour organisations. The massive 
defection of military cadres to the insurgent camp left the Republican government 
effectively lacking in defensive resources. Various emergency executive measures were 
taken after the uprising – including a decree which released enlisted soldiers from their 
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oaths of service and subordination to their officers.17 The effective power vacuum left 
by the government of José Giral was swiftly filled by the unions and working-class 
parties, which managed to transform the official inertia into a spontaneous and 
expedient class response. In the words of President Manuel Azaña:  
The rebellion had undermined discipline everywhere. The professional 
officers were suspect, and the ranks, composed mainly of workingmen, 
preferred to listen to the directives of their unions or parties than to those of 
their commanders… The republican government gave arms to the people in 
order to defend the approaches to the capital. Several thousand rifles were 
handed out. But in Madrid, and especially in Barcelona, Valencia and other 
places, the masses stormed the barracks and carried off the arms.18  
Subsequent attempts (notably, during the month of August) by the government to 
redirect this workerist élan and shape it into a government-controlled force failed 
completely: “thousands upon thousands of volunteers preferred to enlist in the popular 
militia organized spontaneously by the unions and parties.”19 
The militias’ constitutive inspiration and working rationale was inseparable from 
the revolutionary goals set down by the more advanced sections of the proletariat 
which, in places like Barcelona, were predominantly anarcho-syndicalist in 
orientation.20 The centralising instincts of the Popular Front government were 
nevertheless opposed by the large mass of proletarian base organisations, whether 
anarchist (CNT-FAI) or socialist (UGT). The mouthpiece of the UGT (the union headed 
by the left-socialist current of Largo Caballero), Claridad, was unequivocal about the 
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revolutionary nature of the spontaneous response of the working-class, and adamant that 
this should be preserved in any hypothetical reorganisation of Republican forces along 
more or less conventional military lines: 
The new army, if there must be one, should have as its foundation the men 
who are fighting today and not merely those who have not yet fought in this 
war. It must be an army that is in keeping with the Revolution… to which 
the future state will have to adjust itself. To think of replacing the present 
combatants by another type of army that, to a certain extent, would control 
their revolutionary action, is to think in a counterrevolutionary way. That is 
what Lenin said (State and Revolution): ‘Every revolution, after destroying 
the state apparatus, shows us how the governing class attempts to re-
establish special bodies of armed men at “its” service, and how the 
oppressed class tries to create a new organization of this type capable of 
serving not the exploiters but the exploited.’21      
The unambiguous tenor of the UGTist approach would confirm both the co-ordinated 
presence of the revolutionary idea across the broad spectrum of workers’ organisations 
and their relative independence from Popular Frontist moderation and realpolitik (of 
which, of course, the Communist Party was unhesitantly supportive at this time and 
throughout the war).  
Against this general backdrop of hegemonic revolutionary feeling, the particular 
pre-eminence accorded to the anarcho-syndicalist programme – and its running mate, 
the left-communism of the POUM – in urban Catalonia and rural Aragón, can be 
interpreted as a radical but by no means isolated development of a general trend among 
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Spanish proletarian organisations rooted in an advanced vision of class-conscious 
agency. In this context, the militia system was an organic expression of the 
revolutionary “consensus”. As Orwell notes: “[t]he workers’ militias… had the effect of 
canalising into one place all the most revolutionary sentiment in the country. I had 
dropped more or less by chance into the only community of any size in Western Europe 
where political consciousness and disbelief in capitalism were more normal than their 
opposites”.22  
The importance of this discovery for Orwell lies precisely in its practical 
estrangement from the customary reification and debasement of Socialism’s ethical 
content, as practised, especially, by the more “official” or “orthodox” expressions of 
Marxism which he had anatomised in the second half of The Road to Wigan Pier. Thus, 
in revolutionary Barcelona: “[t]here is a sense in which it would be true to say that one 
was experiencing a foretaste of Socialism, by which I mean that the prevailing mental 
atmosphere was that of Socialism. Many of the normal motives of civilised life – 
snobbishness, money-grubbing, fear of the boss, etc. – had simply ceased to exist”.23 
Orwell concedes that the sheer utopianism of this state of affairs could only condemn it 
to a short, transitory, existence:  
But it lasted long enough to have its effect upon anyone who experienced it. 
However much one cursed at the time, one realised afterwards that one had 
been in contact with something strange and valuable. One had been in a 
community where hope was more normal than apathy or cynicism, where 
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the word ‘comrade’ stood for comradeship and not, as in most countries, for 
humbug.24  
This experiential caesura would mark a real departure for Orwell’s Socialism. It would 
ultimately disengage the projective dimension of his analysis from its embryonic 
moment of negative social critique (as tentatively developed in The Road to Wigan 
Pier) and root it decisively in a concrete, positive arrangement. Moreover, and perhaps 
most importantly, due to the effects this would have on his subsequent development, the 
direct experiencing of a real, working utopia supplied the moral ground on which his 
critique of Russophile socialism was premised.25 Having “breathed the air of equality”, 
Orwell reasserts the ethical sources of his initial commitment, definitively severing it 
from the institutional masquerade and intellectual travesty epitomised by various 
Marxisant species and tragically performed behind the Spanish trenches by an imported 
variety of Stalinist orthodoxy: 
In every country in the world a huge tribe of party-hacks and sleek little 
professors are busy ‘proving’ that Socialism means no more than a planned 
state-capitalism with the grab-motive left intact. But there also exists a 
vision of Socialism quite different from this. The thing that attracts ordinary 
men to Socialism and makes them willing to risk their skins for it, the 
‘mystique’ of Socialism, is the idea of equality; to the vast majority of 
people Socialism means a classless society, or it means nothing at all… In 
that community where no one was on the make, where there was shortage of 
everything but no privilege and no boot-licking, one got, perhaps, a crude 
forecast of what the opening stages of Socialism might be like. And, after 
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all, instead of disillusioning me it deeply attracted me. The effect was to 
make my desire to see Socialism established much more actual than it had 
been before.26   
The evident flaws which beset the militia system (notably, a fundamental lack of 
military coordination and discipline),27 combined with the relative inaction of the 
Aragonese front and a consequent desire to “serve the Spanish Government a little more 
effectively”, had at the time made Orwell critical of the revolutionary approach to the 
war and determined to transfer to the International Column at the Madrid front. The turn 
of events which he would encounter upon his return to Barcelona in late April 1937 
would however confirm this retrospective watershed which the militia and its enacted 
“foretaste of Socialism” had signalled for him.28  
The “events of May” in Barcelona marked the onset of a Thermidorean phase in 
the politics of the Republican camp. At the highest level, this internal phase of reaction 
would climax in the removal from office of the left-wing Socialist PM (a critic of 
Moscow and supporter of the revolutionary drift taken by the unions), Francisco Largo 
Caballero, and the accession of the much more amenable to Communist control, Dr. 
Juan Negrín (on 17 May). At the local/regional level of Catalonia, and especially 
Barcelona, it would translate as the demise of real power-sharing by all the anti-fascist 
factions in the devolved Catalan Government (including the POUM and the Anarchists) 
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and the rise to hegemony of the Communist-controlled PSUC. And personally, for 
Orwell, it would transact as a final sanctioning of his “democratic socialist” vision as 
against the multiple and multiform assaults of life-negating orthodoxy upon the real 
expressions of human “decency”.  
Orwell goes on to record the vexed narrative of this Communist-led, internal 
“coup” against the more advanced revolutionary factions which had previously led the 
early political development of the Republican camp. In an attempt to regain control over 
the city, the security apparatus of the Catalan government had been mobilised against 
the strategic positions held by the CNT since the beginning of the war. An initial move 
by the PSUC-dominated police to raid the central telephone exchange on 3 May turned 
the simmering tension into open armed conflict: “[a]ll I could gather was that the 
Assault Guards had attacked the Telephone Exchange and seized various strategic spots 
that commanded other buildings belonging to the workers. There was a general 
impression that the Assault Guards were ‘after’ the CNT and the working class 
generally.” The resulting polarisation of loyalties along class lines – and the gradual 
identification of the different political groups with the pressing alternatives of 
revolution and counter-revolution – dawned upon Orwell with the urgency of a genuine 
political awakening: 
The poorer classes in Barcelona looked upon the Assault Guards as 
something rather resembling the Black and Tans, and it seemed to be taken 
for granted that they had started this attack on their own initiative. Once I 
had heard how things stood I felt easier in my mind. The issue was clear 
enough. On one side the CNT, on the other side the police. I have no 
particular love for the idealised ‘worker’ as he appears in the bourgeois 
Communist’s mind, but when I see an actual flesh-and-blood worker in 
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conflict with his natural enemy, the policeman, I do not have to ask myself 
which side I am on.29 
 Following the clash between government forces and revolutionary organisations in 
Barcelona, and the restoration of “order” by the former, the course of the revolution 
itself and the leading position hitherto maintained by the Anarchists and their left-wing 
associates, were seriously compromised.30 Concomitantly, and in a clear bid to 
consolidate Communist power by purging the rear guard of “Trotskyist” elements, a 
campaign of slander and accusation was orchestrated against the POUM, until finally, 
on 16 June, the party was outlawed and its leaders arrested.31 
The repressive backlash resulted in the incarceration and assassination of 
numerous left socialists from all over Europe and North America, including prominent 
revolutionaries such as the Austrian Kurt Landau and the Czech Trotskyist, Erwin Wolf. 
As John McGovern of the ILP noted in his report about the repression, Terror in Spain 
(1937), after a visit to Barcelona’s Modelo Prison:  
It was a real Prisoners’ International in the Modelo. They came from 
France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and 
America as well as Spain. We were asked by scores of these prisoners to 
expose the operations of the brutal Cheka, with its torture, third degree and 
death for militant Socialist fighters in Spain.32 
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 In a remark which resonates with Orwell’s increasing awareness of the true 
nature of Russian intervention, McGovern goes on to observe that there were in fact 
“two International Brigades in Spain, one a fighting force, drawn from the Socialist 
Movement of the world, and the other an International Cheka drawn from the 
Comintern’s paid gangsters.”33 
Perhaps the most notorious episode of the post-May Thermidor was the 
abduction and subsequent “disappearance” of the POUM General Secretary and one-
time aide of Leon Trotsky, Andreu Nin. A prime target of the Stalinist establishment, 
Nin was transferred to a secret prison in Alcalá de Henares and tortured in a fruitless 
attempt to extract a confession of espionage and collaboration with Franco that would 
ensure the public prosecution of the POUM leadership in a Moscow-style show trial.34 
According to one of the arrested leaders, Julián Gorkin, the aim “was not the 
assassination, pure and simple, of Nin and his principal comrades”, but the “conviction, 
and immediate execution, under the guise of republican legality” of this most coveted of 
Stalin’s preys, the left-communist opposition in Spain.35 
The POUM’s international affiliation with the British ILP (through whose 
mediation Orwell had originally enlisted in the former’s militia) was likewise about to 
produce a crisis within the British Left resulting in a sharp break between the 
independent socialists and the Communists. Attempts to consolidate a “Unity 
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Campaign” of all leftist factions had been set in motion in 1936, drawing the support of 
political figures of note from the Labour Party, the Communist Party, and the ILP, in a 
clear bid to cement the so-called “United Front” against fascism. However, the ILP’s 
increasingly vocal opposition to Soviet policy, as manifested both in the Moscow Trials 
and in the Spanish backlash against the Revolution and the POUM in particular, were to 
prove decisive in the eventual shattering of socialist unity.36 The ILP remained, 
throughout the events of 1937, staunchly critical of Communist policy and resolutely 
committed to the liberation of imprisoned anti-fascists, to the extent that several 
delegations (one of them headed by the party leader himself, the widely acclaimed 
James Maxton) were sent to Spain in an effort to both shed light on the obscure 
developments of Republican repressive policy and to secure the release of incarcerated 
POUM and ILP militants.37    
    
Orwell’s emphasis in Homage to Catalonia is insistently laid on the anti-
revolutionary vocation of Communist policy in Spain, which culminated in the 
totalitarian move to liquidate its left-wing rivals and critics. A committed anti-
Communist response (such as that represented by Orwell’s book) would therefore 
inevitably amount to a principled exposure of the Popular Front programme as an 
inherently fraudulent and misleading alliance of opposites ultimately devised to provide 
an opportunistic justification of Soviet foreign policy. As Orwell observes, “this 
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alliance… is in essential an alliance of enemies, and it seems probable that it must 
always end by one partner swallowing the other.”38  
Orwell’s articulation of a bitterly critical stance towards Communism in his later 
years was indubitably shaped by his Spanish experience. However, as he was ready to 
acknowledge, this chastisement concerned the bureaucratic structures – the, in his 
telling formulation, “gangster-gramophone” embodiment of Communism – which 
dominated the movement, rather than the individual Communists who had managed to 
turn the Spanish War into a sincere outpouring of internationalist solidarity and 
“common decency”:  
One of the most horrible features of war is that all the war propaganda, all 
the screaming and lies and hatred, comes invariably from people who are 
not fighting. The PSUC militiamen whom I knew in the line, the 
Communists from the International Brigade whom I met from time to time, 
never called me a Trotskyist or a traitor; they left that kind of thing to the 
journalists in the rear.39 
The British Battalion of the International Brigades was the British Communist 
Party’s stake in the conflict.40 The prominent role of the Party’s general secretary, Harry 
Pollitt, and of leading functionaries such as Bill Rust (who would write the first official 
history of the Battalion, Britons in Spain) or J.R. Campbell,41 attests to the unmixed 
credentials of the Battalion – along with the rest of the Brigades – as the unambiguous 
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instrument of the Comintern. However, it has been suggested that the internal 
composition of the British unit displayed a more complex and variegated political 
make-up, often allowing for a multiplicity of opinion and adscription which reflected 
the diverse political background of British anti-fascist volunteering. In this respect, and 
despite the close ideological control exerted by the Comintern officialdom within the 
Brigades (most notoriously represented by the French agent André Marty),42 left-wing 
pluralism was a de facto component of the Battalion’s political identity. One estimate 
considers that about one half of the members of the Battalion were Communist, while 
the remaining half comprised a diverse mix of Liberals, Labour supporters, Trotskyists, 
and even a “fraction” of twenty-five or thirty anarcho-syndicalists.43 
All in all, the political outlook of the volunteers seems to have been much less 
directly conditioned by Communist Party doctrine than by a deep-seated commitment to 
native traditions of political radicalism and a loosely defined instinct for social justice, 
equality and liberty. As James Hopkins has suggested, “the majority of the volunteers, 
whether Communist or non-communist, possessed a view of the world that was shaped 
more by Painite radicalism and internationalism than socialist dogma.”44 
Internationalism in particular was one of the main driving forces behind the decision to 
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volunteer, especially in those areas where the vocation of working-class alliances and 
expressions of solidarity had traditionally displayed an internationalist emphasis.  
The case of South Wales is perhaps emblematic in the way that it constituted both 
an outstanding mainspring of volunteering and an exemplary stronghold of Party 
discipline.45 As Hywel Francis observed in his pioneering study, Miners Against 
Fascism, “the core of the response in Wales to the Spanish Civil War… had its origins 
in the particular kind of dynamic society being moulded in the mining valleys of South 
Wales in the crucial years immediately before and during the First World War.”46 The 
coalfield’s cosmopolitan and revolutionary outlook was cemented by the steady influx 
of immigrants (Spaniards, Italians, French, Jews, Irish, English) which had supplied the 
expanding industry with a growing labour force in the early decades of the century. The 
events of 1917 in Russia and the General Strike of 1926 contributed to the consolidation 
of a “proletarian internationalist” perspective which, as Francis remarks, “was ... out of 
step with the mainstream of the British labour movement”.47 In this context, the 
distinctive codes of socialisation deployed by Communists – from the family to the 
workplace –48 provided an attractive conduit for working-class universalism, as well as 
a tangible sense of community and belonging: “[i]n an age of countless small migrations 
born of war and depression, it provided an instant port of call for the socially or 
geographically uprooted, with its own lingua franca, shared values, an esoteric roll-call 
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of celebrities, and habits of meetings, greetings, paper sales and socials to make the new 
arrival feel instantly at home.”49  
The coalfield supplied a particularly advantageous scenario for the proliferation of 
Communist loyalties, since it epitomised the structural homogeneity of a paradigmatic 
single-industry community behaving as an “isolated mass”.50 The role of the South 
Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF, or “the Fed” as it was commonly known) in the 
shaping of this idiosyncratic model of militancy and its specific mode of collective 
consciousness and proletarian sociality cannot be overstressed. “The Fed” was, in the 
words of miners’ leader Will Paynter, “the single decisive union operating in the pits, 
the communities existed around the pit, the union branches were based upon it, hence 
the integration of pit, people and union into a unified social organism.”51 The function 
of the lodges or Federation branches as considerably autonomous bodies amounted to a 
degree of decentralisation which often clashed with Communist notions of “democratic 
centralism”. According to Francis, this federalist approach:  
[E]ncouraged in its turn an independent or even a rather ‘anarcho-
syndicalist’ rank and file outlook towards industrial and political questions 
which came to be known as ‘lodge politics’. It also manifested itself in an 
enduring healthy disrespect for leadership but was nonetheless constructive 
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in its impact. The parallels with the strong Spanish anarcho-syndicalist 
movement are obvious and significant.52 
 
The revolutionary process which Orwell had witnessed in Spain – combined with 
the traumatic experience of Communist totalitarian methods and the blinkered response 
given by the mainstream left – had placed him firmly on the tracks of revolutionary 
Socialism and in direct conflict with the “opportunism” of the Popular Front strategy.53 
Upon his return to Britain, Orwell joined the ILP, the POUM’s British counterpart and 
indeed the party which he now regarded as the only repository of relatively unsullied 
Socialist virtue within the British left.  
Integral to this political vision (as his endorsement of Fenner Brockway’s 
criticisms of the Communist Party line suggests) was the overt opposition to war 
preparations in what ILPers regarded as the shamefaced contribution (by the Labour 
Party and others nominally on the left) to a destructive clash between rival 
imperialisms. Orwell had effectively concluded from his dual struggle against Fascism 
and Popular Front opportunism in Spain that the right course of action at this stage 
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required a frontal challenge to the combined forces of reaction – a sweeping 
denunciation of despotism (whether in the form of Mosley’s blackshirts or the 
Comintern “line”) which would fundamentally rescue the core meaning of Socialism 
from the grip of any totalitarian and undemocratic tendency. As he wrote in the ILP 
journal, The New Leader, upon acceptance of his membership card:  
The tempo of events is quickening; the dangers which once seemed a 
generation distant are staring us in the face. One has got to be actively a 
Socialist, not merely sympathetic to Socialism, or one plays into the hands 
of our always-active enemies… I believe that the I.L.P. is the only party 
which, as a party, is likely to take the right line either against Imperialist 
war or against Fascism when this appears in its British form.54     
The ILP provided the ideological security and moral high ground of an uncompromising 
political vision which had come to embody, in a historical context of Labour and 
Communist Party betrayals, the best traditions of the British Labour Movement.55 It 
granted a salutary resistance to the unholy alliance between the “gangster and the 
pansy” – a phrase which polemically summarised Orwell’s perception of the kind of 
corrupt collusion between an increasingly dogmatic and immoral left intelligentsia and 
the regimes of brutality which the Popular Front was prone to foster: “[s]omebody in 
eastern Europe “liquidates” a Trotskyist; somebody in Bloomsbury writes a justification 
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of it.”56 And finally, it provided the springboard for an intellectual withdrawal from the 
corrupt injunctions of official politics.      
The fictional outcome of this phase in Orwell’s political thinking and of the 
general mood of disillusionment in which it was inevitably steeped was the equally 
pessimistic novel Coming Up for Air. As critic Michael Levenson has pointed out, what 
makes this book “Orwell’s most deliberate novel of the 1930s is that it owes so much to 
a coherent body of thought that also informs the important essay ‘Inside the Whale’”.57 
The critical position which Orwell articulates in “Inside the Whale” represents both the 
intellectual summation and literary corollary of his break with the Popular Front 
mentality, as well as an attempt to account for his own disaffiliated and marginal stance 
in tentative aesthetic-programmatic terms. “Inside the Whale” is a defence of the 
political quietism espoused by Henry Miller as well as a survey of the historical 
sequence which had seen the “amoral” leftist orthodoxy of the Auden-Spender 
generation substitute for the earlier “tragic sense of life” of Joyce, Eliot, Lewis, Pound, 
Lawrence et al. According to this account, the stifling political atmosphere of the 
Popular Front years, with its climacteric of purges and disavowal of revolution, had 
paradoxically provided the ideological ferment on which numerous middle-class 
conversions to the Communist faith had been secured. Paradoxically, because it had 
been the comparatively conservative phase of anti-fascism and commitment to liberal 
democracy of the years 1935-39, rather than the preceding leftist “Class-against-Class” 
or “Third” Period, which had drawn so many to the International Communist 
movement.  
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Orwell explains this as a natural consequence of the deracination which plagued 
intellectual and moral life around 1930. With the collapse of earlier faiths – “patriotism, 
religion, the Empire, the family, the sanctity of marriage, the Old School Tie, birth, 
breeding, honour, discipline” – the need for substitute attachments followed, giving rise 
to a series of manic defections to holistic and equally uncompromising worldviews. In a 
somewhat premonitory intimation of what was to be his own development in the 
following months, Orwell asks: “[b]ut what do you achieve, after all, by getting rid of 
such primal things as patriotism and religion? You have not necessarily got rid of the 
need for something to believe in.”58  
Deprived of an anchoring moral structure and exclusively equipped with an 
abstract urge to belong, Comintern socialism supplied “a church, an army, an 
orthodoxy, a discipline” and therefore a convenient loophole from the challenge of 
experience (indeed from the sort of “experience” which Orwell sought to place at the 
root of his own commitments – all the way from Burma, the London and Paris 
underworlds, Wigan and Spain). Thus “the ‘Communism’ of the English intellectual” 
was a perfectly natural, if morally debased, expression of contemporary angst: “[i]t is 
the patriotism of the deracinated.”59 This moral deficit was nevertheless the precise 
backdrop against which a comparative appreciation of political defeatism or acquiescent 
irresponsibility à la Miller is to be countenanced. It simply represented the state of 
decay into which opportunism, combined “with a sense of personal immunity” (the fact 
that these intellectuals could “swallow totalitarianism because they have no experience 
of anything except liberalism”),60 had managed to hijack the “public-spiritedness” 
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which literature had been invested with in Orwell’s own practice (in his project of 
turning “political writing into an art”). 
The alternative represented by an author like Miller conjured up a definite 
suggestion of political detachment yet also – and here Orwell found a priceless counter 
to the vituperative doxa of official “commitment” – an honest assertion of unmediated 
individual existence. Whilst fully aware of the historical dynamic which surrounded 
him, Miller’s attitude towards those external forces was one of acceptance and 
withdrawal, one of sincere disengagement from the burning issues of the day. Orwell 
evokes the image of Jonah in the belly of the whale (which Miller applied to fellow 
novelist and lover Anaïs Nin) as one accurately descriptive of his own stance. For 
indeed, the inside of the whale represents “a cushioned space that exactly fits you, with 
yards of blubber between yourself and reality, [enabling you] to keep up an attitude of 
the completest indifference, no matter what happens… Short of being dead, it is the 
final, unsurpassable stage of irresponsibility”.61 What this conscious acceptance betrays 
is not the possibility of change itself, but the intrinsic immorality (or amorality, even) of 
political ascription and parti pris within the sphere of creative writing.  
Orwell draws the conclusion that “from now onwards the all-important fact for 
the creative writer is going to be that this is not a writer’s world. That does not mean 
that he cannot help to bring the new society into being, but he can take no part in the 
process as a writer. For as a writer he is a liberal, and what is happening is the 
destruction of liberalism.”62 This extreme declaration may appear to radically contradict 
the course of Orwell’s own trajectory, seemingly undermining the foundations upon 
which his engagement as a writer rested. “Inside the Whale” culminates a phase of 
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growing disillusionment with established political affiliations and a corresponding 
breach of confidence in his role as a committed writer. The retreat represented by 
Coming up for Air is in that sense, a sort of “contribution to the ‘school of Miller’”.63 In 
other words, the political and ethical self-effacement operated by its protagonist George 
Bowling does not imply a wholesale rejection of “commitment” per se, but rather a 
critical – and it could be argued, tactical – withdrawal from available formulae of power 
worship. With this character, Orwell approximates a conscious embrace of anarchism 
(which is no longer the embryonic and impressionistic “Tory anarchism” of his earlier 
years) and a consequent rejection of hegemonic parameters of intervention. The first-
person narrative draws a nostalgic trajectory of recovery prizing a foregone world and 
worldview; an impossible yet by no means superfluous quest for meaning rooted in the 
attachment to simple earthly pleasures and organic rhythms. These are metonymically 
signified as a particular time-frame invested with a retroactive phantasmatic quality – an 
intimation of loss bound up with a vision of utopia: “[b]efore the war it was always 
summer…The stillness, the green water, the rushing of the weir! It’ll never come again. 
I don’t mean that 1913 will never come again. I mean the feeling inside you, the feeling 
of not being in a hurry and not being frightened”.64  
This temporally displaced utopia supplies an alternative logic to the ritual 
depredations of modern life; above all it signifies “a feeling of continuity”, an integral 
sense of security afforded by people who “didn’t know…that the order of things could 
change”.65 In the face of an undifferentiated and increasingly impersonal existence, 
perpetually perched on the brink of destruction (and in which everything is “slick and 
streamlined, everything made of something else”), the sheer immediacy and 
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permanence of a simple activity like fishing provides a necessary – and purposeful – 
counterblow to the brutal injunctions of the 1930s. George Bowling puts it curtly yet 
symptomatically: “fishing is the opposite of war”.66 Fishing emblematises the logic of 
resistance put forward in Coming up for Air. It expresses both an impossible attachment 
to a lost world of experience (a longing for organicity) and a wholesale indictment of 
the spurious modern substitutes.67  
The sentimental world of Lower Binfield (a world in which “it was always 
summer”) is not, however, concocted in a vacuum. On the contrary, George Bowling’s 
exercise in nostalgia is prompted by a sense of contextual urgency, by a biting need to 
respond to the alienations imposed upon him, rather than by an undiscriminating 
acquiescence. Prominent among these alienations stands the mechanical insistence on 
commitment fostered by the “real” world of impending war, mortgage-paying suburban 
life and Left Book Club meetings. Orwell’s strategy of rejection weaves a binding 
thread through these – in principle – contradictory positions of consciousness (from 
petty bourgeois self-delusion to alleged leftist enlightenment), exposing a common lie 
and degraded moral stance in which the demand for “commitment” ultimately betrays a 
dishonest reverence for naked, brutal power. This frightful collusion of destructive 
passions – the bottom line of which is fear –68 conspires to push history down the bleak 
road of a totalitarian future: “[t]he world we’re going down into, the kind of hate-world, 
slogan-world. The coloured shirts, the barbed wire, the rubber truncheons.”69 Anti-
fascism, in this context, merely provides a hate-driven excuse for the general exercise of 
ever-expanding oppression.  
                                                          
66
 Orwell, ibid., 24, 85 
67
 As Levenson points out, “[f]ishing in Coming up for Air is what sex was in Tropic of Cancer”, ibid., 73 
68
 “Fear! We swim in it. It’s our element. Everyone that isn’t scared stiff of losing his job is scared stiff of 
war, or Fascism, or Communism, or something.”, Orwell, ibid., 15-16 
69
 Orwell, ibid., 157  
56 
 
This summary diagnosis consequently necessitates, in Orwell’s opinion, a 
militant (not an unaware or in any way frivolous) response which may well, given the 
circumstances, don the paradoxical form of “irresponsibility”. Thus the call for 
disengagement expressed in “Inside the Whale” is by no means incompatible with a 
political endorsement of revolutionary pacifism or indeed of a revolutionary purism 
which would salvage from the Aragonese trenches and street barricades of Barcelona 
the embodied meaning of equality. On the contrary, it complements a political analysis 
rooted in radical disillusionment with an aesthetic determination to avoid submission or 
collaboration with the dehumanising forces of history (whether these are called 
capitalist, fascist or socialist). In that sense, the “destruction of liberalism” lamented by 
Orwell in his commentary is predicated on a particular experience of hope and its 
subsequent repression under the devastating forces of modern history. It does not 
contradict a belief in or even a passionate hankering for the radical transformation of 
liberalism’s social structures; rather, it signifies a fatalistic recognition of this 
transformative will’s stalling progress at the hands of bureaucratic whim and power 
grubbing.      
If the endorsement of the ILP stance had been arrived at as a result of a painful 
yet revealing journey of political conversion, with distinct effects as we have seen on 
his conception of imaginative writing, the articulation of a fully satisfactory answer to 
the challenge of political life and its recurring intersections with the literary craft 
remained an unfinished task. From the bitter consciousness evinced by Orwell in 
“Inside the Whale” to the revised emphases of his programmatic “Why I Write”, there 
lies a critical phase in his development which, as we shall examine in the following 
pages, would mark both a fundamental shift in his idiosyncratic formulation of 
Socialism and a notable contribution to the radical debate of the wartime left.  
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“Why I Write” presents a further stage in Orwell’s ongoing efforts, ever since his 
experiential breakthrough in Spain, to reconcile an unremitting sense of historical 
rootedness and political answerability to the social and aesthetic specificities of 
literature. The temporary compromise-cum-disengagement attained in “Inside the 
Whale” was, six years later, transmuted into a willing acceptance of “commitment” as 
an integral approach defining his entire trajectory:  
 Everyone writes of [political subjects] in one guise or another… And the 
more one is conscious of one’s political bias, the more chance one has of 
acting politically without sacrificing one’s aesthetic and intellectual 
integrity. 
   What I have most wanted to do throughout the past ten years is to make 
political writing into an art. My starting point is always a feeling of 
partisanship, a sense of injustice. When I sit down to write a book, I do not 
say to myself, “I am going to produce a work of art.” I write it because there 
is some lie that I want to expose, some fact to which I want to draw 
attention, and my initial concern is to get a hearing.70  
 
The provisional security afforded by Orwell’s revolutionary “withdrawal” of 1939 
against the tragic realisation of impending totalitarian hegemony was soon abandoned 
for a brand of Socialism which seemed to adapt the primal scene of revolutionary 
experience – Spain – to the specific circumstances of wartime Britain. From a sense of 
national redefinition (on the domestic front of 1940) of the initial premise, a 
reconstructive and revisionist history of personal purpose would arise with a future 
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claim to the new challenges and accomplishments of the post-1945 period. Thus 
“[e]very line – Orwell concludes – of serious work that I have written since 1936 has 
been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic Socialism, 
as I understand it.”71     
The problem resides, however, in the attempt to explicate Orwell’s evolution, of 
what conceptual operation takes places during the defining months of the western 
campaign in 1940, whereby the natural corollary of his response to the totalitarian 
menace (as he regards it, embodied in the Popular Front) is finally replaced by an 
enthusiastic belief in the transformative potential of the war. Orwell’s much-quoted 
answer to the enigma gives the signing of the Russo-German pact of non-aggression as 
the critical watershed. As he famously noted in “My Country Right or Left”, the true 
nature of his feelings concerning the war suddenly became apparent in a dream which 
he supposedly had on the eve of the signing. This oneiric revelation imparted two 
notions which his previous strategy of resistance had obscured: “first, that I should be 
simply relieved when the long-dreaded war started, secondly, that I was patriotic at 
heart, would not sabotage or act against my own side, would support the war, would 
fight in it if possible.”72 The fundamental implication of this change of tack was not a 
substitution of patriotic feeling for the firm revolutionary internationalism which had 
animated his participation in the Spanish Civil War, but rather an affirmative adaptation 
of the revolutionary agenda to the exceptional circumstances brought on by the new 
conflict. In a context of general emergency and radical social and political changes, 
patriotism supplied a resilient conduit on which to build the fresh transformative 
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impulse – a secure emotional basis for his Socialism which the defeatist approach of 
1939 had clearly lacked. Thus he could go on to claim that:  
Patriotism has nothing to do with conservatism… Within two years, maybe 
a year, if only we can hang on, we shall see changes that will surprise the 
idiots who have no foresight. I dare say the London gutters will have to run 
with blood. All right, let them, if it is necessary. But when the red militias 
are billeted in the Ritz I shall still feel that the England I was taught to love 
so long ago and for such different reasons is somehow persisting.73      
The full significance of this reversion to his committed role as an actively 
dissenting writer and “public intellectual”, beyond the separation of functions advocated 
in “Inside the Whale”, was to be rehearsed at greater length in The Lion and the 
Unicorn (1941).  There is little doubt that, as John Newsinger has pointed out, “Orwell 
saw the situation in Britain through Spanish glasses.”74 His idiosyncratic analysis of the 
changing political temperature in Britain after the fall of France and the actualisation of 
the threat to British sovereignty was clearly modelled on the spontaneity and radicalism 
with which Republican strongholds were imbued in the early stages of the Spanish war. 
The emblematic status accorded to the popular militias in particular was mobilised as a 
major inspiration and horizon of political aspiration for Britain’s coming struggle.  
The creation of the Local Defence Volunteers (later the Home Guard) following 
the Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden’s radio appeal on May 14th 1940, 
provided an ideal conduit for the crystallisation, in paramilitary form, of this 
revolutionary-cum-patriotic fervour. The Home Guard presented veterans from the 
Spanish war with a sense of continuity with the popular anti-fascist struggle of the 
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Thirties and, especially, with an opportunity for the redeployment of the revolutionary 
vision of 1936. In this context, radical voices such as the ex-Communist and once 
captain of the British Battalion of the International Brigades, Tom Wintringham, 
became household references overnight. His private training school at Osterley Park, 
London, would mark one of the utopian feats associated with the early stages of the war, 
as it sought to equip the Home Guard with a political rationale for the urgent tasks of 
home defence. Wintringham’s slogan, which he popularised through his journalism was 
“An Aroused People, an Angry People, an Armed People” – an unequivocal invocation 
of his radical democratic agenda for the art of war.75 Wintringham’s highly topical 
efforts included a number of books on the urgency of army reform and the intrinsic 
virtues of voluntary military organisation.76 The zeal with which Wintringham credited 
these “armies of freemen” no doubt played a significant part in the actual dynamics of 
volunteering. As Angus Calder has observed: “it was clear from the outset that no 
modest role as observers would content the LDV when the time came. Volunteers 
intended to defend their villages and streets, and to blow up a few tanks in the process. 
As equipment, very slowly, became available, Britain acquired a network of amateur 
garrisons which would have harassed and held up a determined invader.”77    
Orwell’s assessment of the Home Guard in late 1940 and early 1941 (in articles 
such as “The Home Guard and You” and “Don’t Let Colonel Blimp Ruin the Home 
Guard”) is indicative of the strategic importance he accorded, in parallel with 
Wintringham and other veterans from the Spanish Civil War, to the institution of a 
genuinely popular paramilitary force along potentially revolutionary lines.78 As he 
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pointed out in “The Home Guard and You”, “[f]or the first time in British history the 
chance exists for socialists to have a certain amount of influence in the armed forces of 
the country.”79 But this potential development in a revolutionary or radically 
transformative direction was by no means a foregone conclusion. It would have to 
overcome the resistance of a rival trend which saw the formation of these volunteer 
units as merely the “the complete answer to the “old sweat’s” prayer”80 or, in other 
words, a regressive opportunity for the Colonel Blimps of the Great War. In Orwell’s 
view, two distinct and contradictory “currents of thought” were to be distinguished in 
the Home Guard. One was the popular democratic strand associated with Wintringham, 
Hugh Slater and the Osterley Park School, whilst the other derived from the 
conservative, “parade-ground” mentality of the old guard.81 As a result, observed 
Orwell, the “Home Guard is trembling in the balance, uncertain whether it wants to 
become a real People’s Army or a not-very-good imitation of the pre-war 
Territorials”.82  
Given the emergency of the hour, it was the duty of Socialists to enter the Home 
Guard with a view to influencing its political direction, for “the influence of even a few 
thousand men who were known to be good comrades and to hold left-wing views could 
be enormous.”83 At this point Orwell arrives at a moment of synthesis, adapting the 
ILP-POUM stance towards the Spanish situation to the specific circumstances of Britain 
in 1940. As he argued in “Our Opportunity” (an article which was reprinted  in Victor 
Gollancz’s collection The Betrayal of the Left: An Examination and Refutation of 
Communist Policy as “Patriots and Revolutionaries”): “England is in some ways 
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politically backward, extremist slogans are not bandied to and fro as they are in 
continental countries, but the feeling of all true patriots and all true Socialists is at 
bottom reducible to the “Trotksyist” slogan: “[t]he war and the revolution are 
inseparable.”” Consequently, Orwell concludes: “[m]uch of the failure of the English 
Left is traceable to the tendency of Socialists to criticise current movements from the 
outside instead of trying to influence them from within”.84 Orwell’s semi-Trotskyist 
argument turns here into an unabashed recommendation of entryism. Only a Home 
Guard penetrated by conscious Socialists would preserve it from the reactionary drift 
induced by Colonel Blimp. And yet at the same time, only a genuine commitment to the 
patriotic, as much as the revolutionary, struggle would secure – contra the “defeatists”, 
Communists and ILPers alike – the eventual success of Socialism.          
The final modulation of this “revolutionary patriotic” agenda was largely due, as 
Bernard Crick has observed, to “a remarkable conjunction” of people that congregated 
in London during the summer months of 1940.85 These included the Zionist 
propagandist Tosco Fyvel, who had previously written an insightful dissection of the 
contemporary situation in The Malady and the Vision, the publisher Frederic Warburg 
(who served in Orwell’s Home Guard unit) and the anti-Nazi refugee and later German 
correspondent of The Observer, Sebastian Haffner – as well as Orwell himself.86 The 
foursome’s regular meetings in Warburg’s London flat and in Fyvel’s farmhouse in 
Berkshire soon gave rise to an editorial project – “an important new series” –which 
would capitalise on the ripe political atmosphere of the post-Dunkirk months.87  
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Fyvel’s The Malady and the Vision, in particular, has been vindicated as “the 
intellectual inspiration” for the Searchlight Series. 88 The book (“an analysis of political 
faith”, according to its subtitle) presents a historical survey of the various European 
trajectories of descent into the dire condition of 1940, charting Germany’s, Russia’s and 
Britain’s fates since the Great War. In a characteristic gesture which would reverberate 
throughout Orwell’s prognostic statements in his writings of the period, Fyvel conjures 
up a distinct sense and foreboding of finality: 
The memories suggest that there is around us a sense of an end. And end to 
– what? To say, an end to capitalism, to Western civilisation, is to repeat 
what has been said so often as to be trite, yet in a far deeper sense than most 
have thought, it is true: we have come to an end, an utter end of the life in 
which the relation of man to man is determined by a money civilisation, of 
the life of our sprawling cities, of the anonymous urban crowd.89 
The first volume to appear in the Series, in what was to some extent a programmatic 
development from Fyvel’s oracular vision, was Orwell’s The Lion and the Unicorn 
(published in February 1941), an essay which articulated a particular bid for action with 
a mature statement of his views about the imbrication between national imagination and 
Socialism.90 The essay famously opened with the line “As I write, highly civilized 
human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me”, which immediately launched into 
a sustained reflection about the uniquely mobilising power of the national idea, over 
against its rivals, religion and class: “[o]ne cannot see the modern world as it is unless 
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one recognizes the overwhelming strength of patriotism, national loyalty. In certain 
circumstances it can break down, at certain levels of civilization it does not exist, but as 
a positive force there is nothing to set beside it.”91  
In the present context, Orwell argued, it was Fascism and Nazism’s awareness of 
this irreplaceable dynamic which had granted these movements the psychological upper 
hand over their domestic adversaries (especially on the Left). Only a commensurate 
response from the Socialist camp could therefore generate the necessary breakthrough. 
But the first step on the road to radical social deliverance demanded an effort, on the 
part of those self-styled left-wingers ever so prone to “chip away at English morale, 
trying to spread an outlook that was sometimes squashily pacifist, sometimes violently 
pro-Russian, but always anti-British”,92 to come to terms with “the emotional unity” 
which ultimately transpired from and transcended class divisions and factional 
antagonisms in moments of crisis: “[t]he nation is bound together by an invisible chain. 
At any normal time the ruling class will rob, mismanage, sabotage, lead us into the 
muck; but let popular opinion really make itself heard, let them get a tug from below 
that they cannot avoid feeling, and it is difficult for them not to respond”.93  
In other words, “let the people sing”, in the popular slogan suggested by J.B. 
Priestley,94 and the organic linkage of the national imaginary will deliver, by an induced 
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sense of collective answerability, its fruits of social transformation. Orwell’s notorious 
comparison of England to a “rather stuffy Victorian family” (a “family with the wrong 
member in control”) or even the crowning metaphor of the book’s first section 
(“England will still be England, an everlasting animal stretching into the future and the 
past”),95 is ultimately inextricable from the political corollary of the book – that the 
revolution was impending and inseparable from the war. The vindication of organic 
continuity therefore entailed a political horizon which did not flounder in the remote, 
abstract sphere of “intellectual” conceptualisation, but which was tangibly grounded in 
the substance of national culture (a substance made up, as he memorably suggested, of 
“solid breakfasts and gloomy Sundays, smoky towns and winding roads, green fields 
and red pillar-boxes”), 96 understood as a “whole way of life”, in a formula which would 
provide a crucial point of reference in later analyses, as we will see when we discuss 
Williams. 
The Socialism of The Lion and the Unicorn is the remarkable product of yet 
another moment of synthesis. It derives its strategic momentum from Orwell’s Spanish 
experience in the militia, yet it tempers that revolutionary urgency with a pondered 
consideration of national feeling (and its impervious reference to continuity and 
organicity). At this point, Orwell “negotiate[s] a way between reform and revolution”. 
“This third way”, writes Newsinger, “would… make it possible to carry through a 
socialist transformation of Britain that would nevertheless leave intact what he 
considered to be the essential qualities and character of the British national culture.”97  
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Orwell’s vision of utopia in 1941 is paradoxically fuelled by a desire to see both 
“red militias billeted in the Ritz” and the essential “decency” of British national culture 
enshrined in a new social landscape shorn of snobbery and privilege. Here the “Orwell 
paradox” begins to show through the cracks of an ideological edifice whose tenuousness 
must be imputed to the simultaneous challenge of an impossible (when not overtly 
treacherous and vocally reactionary) official leftism and a resilient class structure 
forever welded to the fetishism of inequality which had first prompted Orwell’s 
trajectory. The fragile marriage of heaven and hell – of Revolution and English 
patriotism which he attempts in 1940-41 is a symptom of this impossible position – of 
this traumatic deadlock between, so to speak, “Britannia” (the hierarchical dialectics of 
Nation and Empire) and “Oceania” (the corruption of the egalitarian ideal). The titanic 
effort to break free of these brutal opposites entails a highly imaginative, at times 
fanciful, at times contradictory – yet always hopeful – vocation to construct a particular 
alternative; a highly topical resolution of the immediate conjuncture which almost 
invariably bears the marks of paradox: 
An English Socialist government will transform the nation from top to 
bottom, but it will still bear all over it the unmistakable marks of our own 
civilization… It will not be doctrinaire, nor even logical. It will abolish the 
House of Lords, but quite probably will not abolish the Monarchy. It will 
leave anachronisms and loose ends everywhere, the judge in his ridiculous 
horsehair wig and the lion and the unicorn on the soldier’s cap-buttons. It 
will not set up any explicit class dictatorship. It will group itself round the 
old Labour Party and its mass following will be in the Trade Unions, but it 
will draw into it most of the middle class and many of the younger sons of 
the bourgeoisie. Most of its directing brains will come from the new 
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indeterminate class of skilled workers, technical experts, airmen, scientists, 
architects and journalists, the people who feel at home in the radio and 
ferro-concrete age. But it will never lose touch with the tradition of 
compromise and the belief in a law that is above the State. It will shoot 
traitors, but it will give them a solemn trial beforehand and occasionally it 
will acquit them. It will crush any open revolt promptly and cruelly, but it 
will interfere very little with the spoken and written word. Political parties 
with different names will still exist, revolutionary sects will still be 
publishing their newspapers and making as little impression as ever. It will 
disestablish the Church, but will not persecute religion. It will retain a vague 
reverence for the Christian moral code, and from time to time will refer to 
England as “a Christian country”. The Catholic Church will war against it, 
but the Nonconformist sects and the bulk of the Anglican Church will be 
able to come to terms with it. It will show a power of assimilating the past 
which will shock foreign observers and sometimes make them doubt 
whether any revolution has happened.98  
 The limited yet inspirational breakthrough of 1945, the establishment of a social 
democratic blueprint for radical social transformation represented, for Orwell, the 
compromise imposed upon the egalitarian ideal in the defensive strategy against the 
“gangster-gramophone” assault upon living Socialism as he had experienced it in 1937. 
Labour’s wartime “vision of Socialism” was largely premised, as the Labour 
politician and Deputy PM, Herbert Morrison, had declared in 1945, on an extension of 
the “Dunkirk spirit” beyond the confines of its contextual urgency – a galvanic moment 
of unprecedented popular mobilisation transformed into a continued, sustained, effort of 
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“moral” re-foundation of the national collectivity.99 The war effort had revealed a 
profound distrust in standard modes of social interaction motivated – as the ominous 
experience of the 1930s had demonstrated – by exclusive criteria of private profit-
making. The new outlook, forged in the experience of the Blitz, prescribed, according to 
Morrison, “an altered moral sense of the community”, in which the narrow logic of 
private enterprise was overruled by a wider-encompassing standard of social 
initiative.100  
The election of the Labour Government in July 1945 prompted a sharp turn in 
the course of British political life. Even if the roots of this radical “drift” lay firmly in 
the immediate past, in structural and superstructural changes brought about by the 
national emergency of war, it also marked a culmination in the steady advance of 
radical ideas forged over decades of struggle.101 As Francis Williams observed, 
Labour’s 1945 victory was “the manifestation not simply of a transitory mood at one 
general election, but of a genuine and cumulative increase over many years of popular 
support for Socialist policies that had been advanced with increasing precision in every 
phase of the Labour Party’s history.”102 To this cumulative process an amount of topical 
urgency was undeniably attached, as both the potential for collective resilience in the 
face of imminent danger was made apparent by recent events and the ominous memory 
of (equally) collective failure in the years of the Depression weighed down heavily on 
broad sectors of the electorate. Some degree of scholarly consensus has been reached in 
the assessment of wartime radicalism as an original and manifestly potent expression of 
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a desire for social transformation – a wish formation variously rehearsing elements of 
fully fledged Socialism, broad democratic radicalism, pro-Russian feeling, Popular 
Frontism and anti-Fascism.103  
The resumption of normal political activity after the dissolution of the wartime 
coalition and the cessation of the “truce” between Labour and the Conservatives 
confronted both parties with issues of doctrinal identity which had been passed over in 
an effort of institutional neutrality and non-partisanship. For Labour, this meant 
squarely addressing its socialist credentials in relation to the urgent tasks of 
reconstruction which lay ahead and which would invariably preside over the electoral 
contest. The pragmatic radicalism advanced by wartime reform and symbolised by the 
names of Beveridge and Keynes found continuance in Labour’s self-stylisation as the 
“People’s Party” – as the true-blue expression of essential, democratic, Britishness, 
attesting to its secular tradition of practical-mindedness. An early nineteenth-century 
radical discourse was resuscitated in a visionary notion of “the People” which 
transcended – without excluding – the more traditional foothold of Labour identity 
among the industrial working classes.104  
The People was made up of “the producers, the consumers, the useful people”, a 
wide-encompassing section of the national fabric which could identify, in negative 
terms, with those excluded from the stratospheric heights of inter-war “big business”.105 
This discursive manoeuvre easily left Conservative representation erring on the side of 
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the “unproductive” layers, “the big landowners, the captains of industry, the financial 
magnates, the powerful merchants, the cartel controllers, the bankers, the landlords and 
the rentiers”.106 Labour’s manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, made an explicit appeal to 
Labour’s idiosyncratic blend, to the grand native traditions of parliamentary democracy 
and co-operation against the tyranny of privilege and property. It also proclaimed to be 
“a Socialist Party, and proud of it”, its “ultimate purpose at home” being the 
establishment of the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain – free, democratic, 
efficient, progressive, public-spirited, its material resources organised in the service of 
the British people.”107 Gradualism featured as an organic part of its revolutionary logic 
– however paradoxical that may sound – and Parliament remained a mainspring of its 
political dynamic. As Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo suggest, “Labour believed itself 
to be the consummation of an indigenous progressive political tradition”,108 a realisation 
of the long-abiding promise of redemption cultivated by Britain’s historic radicalisms – 
a vision of “Merrie England” itself made feasible by reconstructive urgency and public 
responsibility.  
As the Fabian author John Parker noted, the Party represented “the latest attempt 
of the forces of the Left to extend the rights of common people against the forces of 
privilege” and was the direct “inheritor of the achievements of those who fought for 
liberty in the past”.109 Labour’s heritage of radical transformation was solidly rooted in 
the lineage of British liberty. It was therefore essential for the movement at this crucial 
hour to preserve the nature and working rationale of its institutions: 
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Here in our own land… we have the chance to put political democracy to its 
greatest test. Fascism and Stalinism pour scorn on the very name. We, in our 
democratic Socialist movement, have never subscribed to those sneers. 
Political democracy was won for us in fierce battles against property. In the 
American War of Independence, in the French Revolution, in the struggles 
of the Chartists and all the other great battles, this instrument was fashioned 
for us. All those, our great forebears, believed they were sharpening a 
weapon which would be our strongest aid in the challenge to property and 
inequality and the other evils of society.110         
The emphasis was thus increasingly placed on a metonymic operation of Party 
substituting for Nation – that is, of a democratic political heritage as that represented by 
the British Labour Movement answering to the particular needs and qualities of the 
British people, rather than emanating from alien sources with totalitarian overtones. As 
Herbert Morrison would put it in 1946, “planning as it is now taking place in this 
country under our eyes, is something new and constructively revolutionary which will 
be regarded in times to come as a contribution to civilization as vital and distinctly 
British as parliamentary democracy and the rule of law”.111 Against this background, on 
which Labour and generally progressive thought had fed throughout the war,112 
Churchill’s quip – during the election campaign – that socialism could only be 
introduced with the help of some sort of Gestapo (a notion theoretically developed by 
free market apologists such as Hayek),113 necessarily failed to command a sympathetic 
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response from the labouring and professional layers – that is, from the middle sections 
of the British populace which Labour now addressed as its natural allies.  
A central concern of Labour’s project of national re-foundation lay in the ethical 
and conceptual de-legitimisation of those core tenets of laissez-faire ideology which had 
hitherto secured a grip over social and political life. A major expression of Labour’s 
more advanced intuitions and formulations came from party chairman and prominent 
political scientist Harold Laski. Laski produced a landmark text in 1943 entitled 
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, in which the case for planning reached its 
theoretical peak within the doctrinal parameters of Labour’s democratic tradition.  
The desirability of Socialism was not premised on political whim or arbitrary 
design on the part of individuals or organisations, but followed logically from the 
historical stalemate reached by capitalism in its monopolist phase. Laski reproduced 
elements of the standard Marxist analysis of the fascist phenomenon, linking the extent 
and nature of totalitarian state power and its associated brand of “planning” to the 
inevitable decline of free market economics. Presented with a narrow choice, 
democracies would have to opt for planning with freedom, as consecrated by the 
heritage and programmes of British social-democracy or else succumb to the 
arbitrariness of decaying capitalism within the available structures of totalitarianism. 
The danger of counter-revolution lurked in the wings of free market dynamics, for 
“when a society built upon the acquisitive principle passes into its phase of contraction, 
it entrusts its defence of the principle to men like Hitler and Mussolini and Laval”.114 
This desperate recourse was further endorsed on psychological grounds by the mass of 
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the people. Deprived, by a general failure of societal values, of their collective “right to 
hope”, they would be easily enticed by the dictatorial offer of “relief from 
uncertainty”.115 Only a guaranteed articulation of political and economic liberty (i.e. 
freedom with planning) could possibly usher in the preservation of democracy against 
the interconnected threats of free market anarchy and totalitarian control.  
Laski’s argument explicitly contradicts laissez-faire assumptions about the 
nature of political freedom and its presumed dependency on free enterprise. Contrary to 
liberal economic orthodoxy, an unregulated market society – as the inter-war order 
demonstrated – “cannot be a free society because its internal strains deprive it of 
security; it is therefore fearful and deprived of the climate in which the power to reason 
is assured”.116 On the other hand, the conceptual remit of the term “freedom” cannot be 
removed from particular historical and generally contextual circumstances which 
invariably result in different meanings and emphases. Notions such as “freedom of 
choice” are inseparable from a wider framework of social equality in whose absence no 
community of sense can be achieved (and consequently, no equal value can be 
attached). Material privation and affluence afford irreconcilable standpoints for a 
common judgement of abstract principles: only a shared background in mutually 
intelligible positions can attain a valid assessment of results and experiences. Similarly, 
argues Laski, “[t]he danger of bureaucracy implicit in state-ownership will impress Mr. 
Ford far more than it is likely to impress one of Mr. Ford’s employees who is seeking to 
escape victimization because one of Mr. Ford’s industrial spies has reported that the 
employee has joined a union.”117  
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In this context of ingrained inequality upon which the acquisitive society rests, 
planning offers a system of checks and controls conducive to the reapportioning of 
freedom across the social body. It bids for a re-articulation of equality and freedom after 
years of theoretical divorce and for a restoration of the sense of community under whose 
exclusive sanction democracy may survive. Laski admits that this need not imply  
[T]he necessity of taking over all industry and agriculture by the State. 
Rather, I think, it means that the fundamental bases of economic power shall 
be in the hands of the community; once they are assured to the interest of 
the many, instead of the few, the economic future can develop within the 
framework defined by the possession of these fundamental bases by the 
historic methods of parliamentary democracy.118 
Laski goes on to outline a basic package of measures synonymous not with the full-
fledged establishment of Socialism but, rather, with “the different, though related 
[purpose] of safeguarding our political democracy against those forces of counter-
revolution which are present among ourselves, and were growing in authority and 
determination before the outbreak of war.”119  
For Orwell, the socialist drift to planning was not as evident and natural as Laski 
made it out to be. He concurred that Socialism, defined as the articulation of political 
freedom and economic democracy, was the desirable objective in the wake of capitalist 
failure, but he also noted the ominous possibilities inscribed in the historic emergence 
of different formulas of centralised planning. Thus, in his review of Laski’s Reflections, 
Orwell detected an “apparent... unwillingness to admit that Socialism has totalitarian 
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possibilities.”120 Over and against the ritual Marxist interpretation of the fascist 
phenomenon as a mere retrenchment of capitalism in the face of a proletarian menace, 
Socialists needed to face the fact “that the ‘contradictions’ of capitalism can be got rid 
of non-democratically and without any increase in individual liberty. Economic 
insecurity can be abolished at the price of handing society over to a new race of 
oligarchs.”121  
In an article published in The Left News in April 1941, Orwell had already laid 
down the basic outline of an analysis which would depart from the logic of Socialist 
“necessity” articulated by commentators such as Laski. Thus the “movement towards 
collectivism goes on all the time, though it takes varying forms, some hopeful, others 
horrible.” What needed to be recognised was that the fascistic systems often managed to 
“avoid all the chaos and friction of capitalism, the slumps and crises, the unemployment 
and stagnation.” 122 Nazi Germany (and Soviet Russia, for that matter) appeared to 
develop novel structural features which circumvented the traditional pitfalls of the 
market society, whilst retaining a commitment to inequality and savage oppression. 
Neither Socialism nor capitalism, this new reality was best described in what was to be 
an enduring formula, as “oligarchical collectivism”. The crucial aspect of this emergent 
“movement towards collectivism”, however, was that its general development was 
irreducible to a single pattern or irrevocable “fate”: “it is not certain that it will be all the 
same in a hundred years, or a thousand years, or perhaps even ten thousand years, and 
therein lies the whole reason for struggle.”123  
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Laski’s analytical fusion of political democracy and economic equalisation thus 
seemed to fail on the plane of particular observation and concrete historical experience. 
The upkeep of democratic Socialism required, in the first instance, an accurate 
description of the singular viability of totalitarian systems as an alternative to Socialist 
collectivism. Yet it also – and most importantly – demanded a hopeful recognition of 
the open possibilities ahead: a critical consciousness of the “unresolved” nature of the 
current drift, and of the urgency to enter the contest for collectivisation on the side of 
Socialism.  
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3. Socialism and the Totalitarian Abyss  
 
Orwell’s paradigmatic analysis of the totalitarian phenomenon developed from a 
crucial realisation of the “open” profile of ongoing transformations in capitalism, from a 
clear understanding of the singularity of Fascist and Stalinist adaptations of the idea of 
economic planning in combination with a sheer negation of the basic components of the 
Socialist project of human emancipation. Orwell’s “theoretical” detour at this point in 
his programme-building takes him through the intricate debates of Trotskyism around 
the precise nature of the bureaucratic regimes which, at the breaking-point of the 
laissez-faire paradigm, had managed to offer a pseudo-collectivist alternative shorn of 
egalitarian traces.      
Throughout the 1930s, the notion of “revolutionary betrayal” had become a 
standard trope in left-communist analyses of the Stalinist Thermidor in the Soviet Union 
in a way which could not fail to resonate (especially after 1937) with highly topical 
developments in Spanish Republican politics. This entailed a break or departure from 
the hitherto accepted analysis offered by the Trotsky circle (which had previously 
entertained a “factionalist” interpretation of the bureaucratic distortion and concluded 
that the latter would end in defeat), and a move towards the assumption that the 
consolidation of the regime in the USSR signified a definitive suppression of the 
specifically progressive political content of the Revolution. 
In his standard study of 1937, The Revolution Betrayed, Trotsky retained a 
somewhat ambivalent interpretation of the Soviet Union as a “degenerated workers’ 
state” combining a socialistic economic base with an encroaching political caste of 
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reactionary bureaucrats.1 Trotsky paradoxically acknowledged the dual function of the 
bureaucracy as both upholding the objectively progressive nature of socialised property 
relations and yet representing a political obstacle to revolutionary consolidation: 
Without a planned economy the Soviet Union would be thrown back for 
decades. In that sense the bureaucracy continues to fulfil a necessary 
function. But it fulfils it in such a way as to prepare an explosion of the 
whole system which may completely sweep out the results of the 
revolution… The revolution which the bureaucracy is preparing against 
itself will not be social, like the October revolution of 1917. It is not a 
question this time of changing the economic foundations of society, of 
replacing certain forms of property with other forms… The overthrow of the 
Bonapartist caste will, of course, have deep social consequences, but in 
itself it will be confined within the limits of political revolution.2 
This interpretation created a number of tensions within the international Trotskyist 
movement climaxing in a number of defections which in some cases, as that of James 
Burnham, would eventually pursue highly controversial analyses of the Soviet regime 
along distinctly anti-socialist lines.  
In a critical article published in the internal bulletin of the American Socialist 
Workers’ Party, Burnham took issue with this dual and, in his opinion, highly 
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contradictory, interpretation of the Stalinist phenomenon. According to the prevalent 
view, endorsed by Trotsky himself, Stalinism performed two distinct and mutually 
exclusive functions internally and externally. While it displayed a dual domestic 
character as both a structural prop of socialist property relations and yet a political limit 
to their development, internationally, Stalinism had confined itself to an exclusively 
reactionary role (as Popular Frontism in general and the Spanish situation in particular, 
demonstrated). However, Burnham contended, “Stalinism, even Stalinism in Spain, is 
surely not a “Spanish phenomenon”. Stalinism in Spain as in the Soviet Union and in 
every other country, springs, we have always taught, from the soil of the Soviet Union, 
where among other features, nationalized property relations and the monopoly of 
foreign trade still obtain.”3 It therefore followed, according to Burnham, that the dual 
interpretation of bureaucratic power negated the “class analysis of social phenomena” in 
that it revoked the complex analysis of political and economic aspects without reducing 
one to the other. “Now what the last twenty years, in particular the last two or three 
years, have taught us, if we wish to be taught, is exactly that nationalized production of 
and by itself does not make a workers’ state, does not guarantee the class rule of the 
workers, does not assure the transition to socialism. For these things there is a political 
as well as a socioeconomic precondition.”4 Property rights and relations, Burnham 
argued, were independent of the political structure which, alone, could express the class 
nature of a particular state. Therefore, the factual isolation of the Soviet working class 
from the sphere of power disqualified the characterisation of the Soviet Union as any 
kind of “workers’ state” – degenerate or otherwise.  
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This theoretical dispute within the ranks of Trotskyism would result, for 
Burnham, in eventual disaffection from the movement and in a sharp turn to the right. 
For our present purpose it must be noted that it would also offer a substantial theoretical 
template of analysis of the Soviet case with which Orwell was to engage critically from 
around 1944 until the moment of his death.5 Burnham’s theory of the “managerial 
revolution” would provide a powerful speculative referent which, on Orwell’s reading, 
would problematise rather than merely cancel out, the Trotskyist paradigm of 
interpretation (namely, the idea of a “betrayal of the revolution”).6    
    Burnham’s book The Managerial Revolution (1941) was his first – and most 
important – theoretical pronouncement after his break with Marxism in 1940,7 and a 
direct emanation from his earlier criticism of mainstream Trotskyist analyses of the 
Soviet Union. In this essay, Burnham propounded a new paradigm of social revolution – 
historically on a par with earlier systemic transitions – and predicated it on a series of 
contemporaneous socio-political formations without a strict “formal identity” among 
themselves, yet with a clear structural commitment to the same historical goal (however 
“differing in their stage of development as well as in their local background”).8 These 
formations or ideologies included Nazism, Bolshevism (or at any rate, the particular 
inflection of Bolshevism embodied by the USSR) and American New Dealism (which 
represented a “primitive” stage of managerialism).  
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The managerial revolution constituted a systemic shift of power, affecting 
nations on a global scale (and therefore, unrestricted to those three archetypes), from the 
traditional capitalist class to a new hegemonic class of the managers. The rise of 
management as a distinct and specific social grouping was explicated as a function of 
the exponential complexification of the productive process in the modern era, and more 
crucially, of the increasing advance of new types of effective control (other than 
traditional property rights) over the instruments of production.9 According to Burnham, 
the extension of public ownership under different guises paved the way for the 
irreversible takeover: “[t]he economic framework in which this social dominance of the 
managers will be assured is based upon the state ownership of the major instruments of 
production. Within this framework there will be no direct property rights in the major 
instruments of production vested in individuals as individuals”,10 but rather in a social 
group which, by virtue of its cooptation of the state, would be placed in a ruling 
position. This line of argumentation developed, in a sense, Burnham’s earlier 
postulation of the state as the critical sphere of definition of Soviet society. Its relative 
autonomy from property relations circumscribed power, and consequently, the 
subordinated or hegemonic status of any given class, to its position vis-à-vis the state. 
With the rise of a class “cut out” for an organic relationship to the state machinery, 
power was automatically subsumed within its domain and the subaltern position of the 
other classes was naturalised.  
Whilst acknowledging the sociological originality and insightfulness of this line 
of inquiry (which provided some theoretical guidelines for his own engagement with 
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totalitarian realities), Orwell remained, on the whole, sceptical of the ethico-political 
corollary to be derived from Burnham’s theses. Writing in his Tribune column “As I 
Please” in January 1944, Orwell notes that:  
[T]he basic error of this school of thought is its contempt for the common 
man. A totalitarian society, it is felt, must be stronger than a democratic one: 
the expert’s opinion must be worth more than the ordinary man’s. The 
German army had won the first battles: therefore it must win the last one. 
The great strength of democracy, its power of criticism, was ignored… 
Where Burnham and his fellow-thinkers are wrong is in trying to spread the 
idea that totalitarianism is unavoidable, and that we must therefore do 
nothing to oppose it.11 
Thus the arid conclusiveness of the managerial thesis, whilst partially illuminating a 
structural aspect of totalitarian societies, failed to engage its subject on the level of 
agency and oppositionality and consequently, on that of politics itself. Ultimately, the 
Burnhamian thesis suggested a desertion of the realm of possibility and an apocalyptic 
surrender of human action to the play of larger-than-life forces and invariably corrupt 
sets of interests.  
Burnham’s next book, The Machiavellians, further rationalised the assumption 
that human progress was unattainable (if not aporetic) and that the exercise of power 
was by definition confined to the exploitative monopoly of oligarchies.12 As Orwell 
added in his “Second Thoughts on James Burnham”: 
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 [W]hat Burnham is mainly concerned to show is that a democratic society 
has never existed and, so far as we can see, never will exist. Society is of its 
nature oligarchical, and the power of the oligarchy always rests upon force 
and fraud… All historical changes finally boil down to the replacement of 
one ruling class by another. All talk about democracy, liberty, equality, 
fraternity, all revolutionary movements, all visions of Utopia… are 
humbug… covering the ambitions of some new class which is elbowing its 
way into power.13  
As a descriptive exercise of the dynamics of Soviet statesmanship – Orwell 
conceded in 1946 – Burnham’s position was accurate enough: “[e]vidently the USSR is 
not Socialist, and can only be called Socialist if one gives the word a meaning different 
from what it would have in any other context. On the other hand, prophecies that the 
Russian regime would revert to capitalism have always been falsified, and now seem 
further than ever from being fulfilled”.14 However, “[t]he real question is not whether 
the people who wipe their boots on us during the next fifty years are to be called 
managers, bureaucrats, or politicians: the question is whether capitalism, now obviously 
doomed, is to give way to oligarchy or to true democracy”.15  
The pitfall in Burnham’s epistemology sprang from a blind endorsement of the 
logic of unchecked power – an inclination to credit totalitarian arrangements with the 
infallibility of superior organisation combined with a refusal to countenance resistance 
as an alternative scenario. The paradoxical terminus of Burnhamian reasoning was 
therefore convergence with, rather than distancing from, a totalitarian paradigm of utter 
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political stasis. By 1947, in a book entitled The Struggle for the World, Burnham had 
painted a bleak portrait which to some extent prefigured the hopeless state of affairs of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. A world divided into two power blocks mired in a perpetual yet 
inconclusive state of war, each of them vying for total domination: “[w]e have entered a 
period of history during which the attempt is to be made to organize world dominion, a 
World Empire. There are, however, only two power-groupings capable of making the 
attempt seriously: one led by Communism with its Soviet base, and the other potentially 
under United States leadership.”16  
As Orwell observed, Soviet Communism’s anti-political drift17 was consistently 
replicated in Burnham’s general picture rather than effectively countered. His bid to 
consolidate the American lead in the world imperial race further entailed a number of 
practical measures – notably, the suppression of the American Communist Party – 
which unmistakably pointed towards a close identification with the totalitarian ethos.18 
The capture of total power remained the exclusive horizon of political initiative, hence 
ruling out the possibility of securing a democratic (socialist) third space between the US 
and the USSR: 
Meanwhile there is one other solution which is at any rate thinkable, and 
which Burnham dismisses almost unmentioned. That is, somewhere or other 
– not in Norway or New Zealand, but over a large area – [how] to make 
democratic Socialism work. If one could somewhere present the spectacle of 
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economic security without concentration camps, the pretext for the Russian 
dictatorship would disappear and Communism would lose much of its 
appeal. But the only feasible area is western Europe plus Africa. The idea of 
forming this vast territory into a Socialist United States has as yet hardly 
gained any ground, and the practical and psychological difficulties in the 
way are enormous. Still, it is a possible project if people really wanted it, 
and if there were ten or twenty years of assured peace in which to bring it 
about.19 
Orwell’s project in his final years can be accurately described as a strenuous 
attempt to negotiate a way between this possibilistic projection of a vast and enduring 
third camp between the Soviet and American binomial – between Eurasia and Oceania, 
in the notation of Nineteen Eighty-Four, on the one hand, and the particular 
circumstances of post-war Britain and Europe, on the other. The paradoxical nature of 
this negotiation would usher in a split analysis alternating between a critical yet often 
emphatic support for the Labour government and a continuing adherence to the idea of a 
Socialist United States of Europe. 
 Meanwhile, the denunciation of the Soviet mythos remained an integral element 
of Orwell’s programmatic alternative to Burnham’s worldview. Animal Farm remains 
perhaps the best-known link in this “deconstructive” chain. As famously noted in his 
preface to the Ukrainian edition of 1947, “nothing has contributed so much to the 
corruption of the original idea of Socialism as the belief that Russia is a Socialist 
country and that every act of its rulers must be excused, if not imitated. And so for the 
past ten years I have been convinced that the destruction of the Soviet myth was 
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essential if we wanted a revival of the Socialist movement.”20 The little fable thus 
proceeded to rewrite the narrative of revolutionary betrayal in simple, allegorical terms. 
The story’s time-frame was decidedly marked by the momentous developments taking 
place on the Allied camp at the time of writing – most notably, in what represented 
perhaps the climax in the logic of cooptation by bureaucratic rule, the fable concluded 
with a memorable interpretation of the Tehran conference in 1943 (“which everybody 
thought had established the best possible relations between the USSR and the West. I 
personally did not believe that such good relations would last long; and as events have 
shown, I wasn’t far wrong”).21  
The strategic rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the West completed a 
long process of adulteration of the egalitarian promise of 1917. Perhaps its most 
significant step, earlier in 1943, had been the dissolution of the Communist 
International – the unequivocal sign, in Orwell’s view, that the willed identification of 
the Soviet “pigs” with their erstwhile oppressors, the capitalist powers, was underway. 
As he observed in his London Letter of 23 May to Partisan Review: “one has got to 
consider the effect on the working class membership, who have a different outlook from 
the salaried hacks at the top of the party. To these people the open declaration that the 
International is dead must make a difference”.22 Despite the enormity of the deception, 
the naked sight of collaboration with the class enemy – Orwell surmised – could not fail 
to draw a sincere expression of horror (such as the horse’s neighing at the sight of a pig 
walking on its hind legs) from the disillusioned proletariat.  
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An indication of the degree of formal convergence – or at least, collusion – 
achieved by the Allied Powers during 1942-1943 and in particular, of the novel status 
accorded in official political discourse to the Soviet Union, is given by Paul Addison in 
his description of joint celebrations held in London to mark the first anniversary of the 
Russo-British alliance:  
[A] demonstration and pageant were arranged at the Empress Hall, Earls 
Court, in June 1942. Of the three bodies which organized the meeting two – 
the Joint Committee for Soviet Aid, and the Russia Today Society – were 
under Communist direction. The collection appeal was by the Communist 
Pat Sloan, and the script of the pageant was the work of another Communist, 
Montagu Slater. But the chairman of the meeting was the Bishop of 
Chelmsford, music by the band of the Coldstream Guards, and the main 
speaker was Cripps, a member of the War Cabinet. ‘May God bless Russia’, 
said the Bishop, extending the Popular Front to heaven itself.23 
The assumed exigencies of military co-operation and the prevalent mood of ideological 
whitewashing to which the Stalin regime was consequently subjected were to stand 
directly in the path of Orwell’s attempts to publish Animal Farm throughout 1944.24  
The book utilised a satirical lens filtering the developments of Soviet policy 
from the October Revolution (the overthrow of Jones, the human master of the Manor 
Farm), through the Civil War (emblematised by the “Battle of the Cowshed” between 
the “Red Army” of the animals led by Snowball and the “White Army” of the farmers), 
the Kronstadt uprising (partly suggested by the short-lived hens’ rebellion),25 the Stalin-
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Trotsky split,26 the subsequent Show Trials and executions of the Old Bolsheviks of the 
mid and late 1930s, the shifting policies of the Comintern (from the Third Period 
doctrine to the Popular Front – i.e. from isolationism to co-operation with the farmers), 
to the final alliance with capitalist powers and the suggestion of a rising “iron curtain” 
of distrust and escalating tensions. Most significantly, Orwell fused basic elements of 
the Trotskyist analysis (such as the opportunistic manipulation of a disarmed and 
increasingly alienated proletarian mass by the bureaucracy, in combination with a 
gradual dismantling of the revolutionary élite)27 with a farther-reaching critique of the 
Bolsheviks’ avant-gardism and theory of the Party.   
In his description of the self-appointment of the pigs as the new power group – 
indeed as a new class consolidated on the basis of new relations of production vis-à-vis 
the other animal “classes” (the configuration of the pigs as “brainworkers”) – Orwell 
hints at the analysis later popularised by the Yugoslav Marxist and dissident Milovan 
Djilas in his book The New Class.28 According to Djilas, what distinguished this new 
social class of bureaucratic revolutionaries was its post hoc genesis: “[i]n earlier epochs 
the coming to power of some class, some part of a class, or of some party, was the final 
event resulting from its formation and its development. The reverse was true in the 
USSR. There the new class was definitely formed after it attained power.”29 Similarly, 
the pigs’ rise to social hegemony results from their acquired role as intellectual and 
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practical leaders in the original rebellion, the ensuing corruption of the egalitarian 
impulse therefore developing from, rather than contradicting, the shared position of 
privilege accorded to the revolutionary vanguard. In that sense, the stealing of the milk 
and apples by the pigs and the veil of deception with which this initial “qualification” of 
the principles of Animalism is covered,30 plants the seeds of betrayal which will 
ultimately climax in the declaration (under Napoleon’s Thermidorian rule) that “all 
animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others”.31  
What is at stake in this reading is the problematical political status of the Leninist 
paradigm of revolution and its theoretical and strategic dependence on the vanguard 
party. Orwell’s criticism seems to move on this particular point beyond an otherwise 
loosely Trotskyist impeachment of the Revolution’s bureaucratic drift,32 towards a 
general consideration of the nature of political activity and the inherent pitfalls of a 
Bolshevik-style approach.33  The initial co-optation of the state apparatus by an 
“advanced” social group implied a desertion of the field of politics itself through a 
monological inscription of power under a unitary sign (the Party). This 
overconcentration of power in the exclusive hold of a minority represents a critical step 
towards both the consolidation of arbitrary rule and the unremitting assault upon the 
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egalitarian ideal which underpinned Orwell’s concept of Democratic Socialism.34 As 
A.J. Polan has observed apropos of the political model delineated in Lenin’s The State 
and the Revolution, “[a] concept of politics as identical with the issue of the possession 
of state power must of course abolish politics as activity and replace it with politics as 
apparatus”: 
The problem of the simple state of Lenin’s model, simply put, is that the 
fewer institutions there are that make up the body politic, the greater the 
proportion of the total sum of power that will be lodged in each institution. 
If these institutions are reduced to one, or to a set of institutions that are not 
significantly separated, power is unitary, not distributed. This, then, is the 
negation of the field of democratic politics.35 
Herein lies perhaps the conceptual link between the narrative imaginaries of 
Animal Farm, Nineteen Eighty-Four and what could be defined as Orwell’s positive 
programme for radical social transformation in his final years. This negation or 
desertion of the political is, properly speaking, the defining trait of the totalitarian 
situation: 36 a radical move towards an undifferentiated sphere in which the conventional 
distinction between public and private collapses and where modern conceptions of the 
social are brutally dismantled.  
As Seyla Benhabib has pointed out, “[t]otalitarianism has no spatial topology: it is 
like an iron band, compressing people increasingly together until they are formed into 
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one.”37 The process of extreme isolation from the social body to which the individual is 
subjected under totalitarianism (the paradigm of which is the camp – “the true central 
institution of totalitarian organizational power”) is correlated with a fundamental 
dismantling of autonomous (that is, extraneous to the control of the State) social 
activity. The consequence of this dual process is the rise of an amorphous “mass” whose 
functional status is, as a result, abjectly contingent on the specific organisational role of 
the State. Hannah Arendt identified the two experiential marks of totalitarianism as 
being “loneliness” and “worldlessness”: 
Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian 
government… is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness 
which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at 
the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and 
social traditions in our time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the 
world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to 
belong to the world at all.38 
Thus the operative principle of totalitarian rule is the destruction of the individual’s 
moorings in the community: first, through the radical shattering of its “being-in-the-
world” and second, through its reconfiguration within a disarticulated aggregate which 
can no longer recognise itself amongst the republican species of citizenship and peuple. 
In this particular sense, as Benhabib observes, “the mob” (that pre-political object of 
polemical representation) “is the precursor of the lonely masses of totalitarianism”.39 
The lack which these masses share with the pre-modern mob is one of public projection 
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and articulate common experience. Yet in the later situation, the privation arises from a 
thoroughly deliberate assault upon the fabric of political activity itself. In the words of 
Michael Halberstam, “[t]otalitarianism does not politicize all areas of life. It has no 
public sphere at all in which persons can encounter one another and, therefore, closes 
them off from a world of shared experience altogether.”40  
  This characteristically modern desertion or exhaustion of “experience” as such – 
a derivative, we could say, of totalitarianism’s renunciation of politics – is precisely 
what concerns Orwell in the passage from the didactic mode of Animal Farm to the 
eschatological universe of Nineteen Eighty-Four. For indeed the world of Oceania, 
Ingsoc and Big Brother, is characterised, primarily, by a radical renunciation of 
experience at both the individual and collective levels.41 The resulting effect has often 
been interpreted as one of “despair” or “disillusion” in a conditioned – and sometimes 
undiscriminating – reading of the author’s latter-day politics.42 However, this overall 
effect – even if granted – cannot be disengaged from the more general reflection on 
totalitarianism as a specific challenge to Orwell’s idiosyncratic conception of Socialism. 
The problem of experience features prominently in this conception as it centrally 
weaves the individual and collective dimensions of any possible blueprint for a liberated 
community. In that sense, the disabled life-world of Winston Smith and Julia (especially 
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that of Winston) is a condensation of features pointing in the direction of experiential 
deprivation and therefore signalling the human end-products of a completed (and 
therefore hypothetical)43 process of political, social, psychological and moral 
devastation.  
The question of affect as articulated in the novel is perhaps most interesting as a 
paradigmatic expression of this total devastation. It has also been one of the prime 
targets of critics who have discerned, in the barren human world of Nineteen Eighty-
Four’s interpersonal relations, a suspect exclusion of the more liberating alternatives 
inherent in ordinary affective attachments. Raymond Williams in particular has 
pinpointed this aspect of the novel as its deepest failure: “[i]t is strange that Orwell 
could oppose the controls and the perversions with nothing better than the casual affair 
between Winston and Julia… It is not the ordinary and continuing love of men and 
women, in friendship and in marriage, but a willed corruption or indifference…that is 
presented as opposed to… that joyless world”44 The mechanical ritual of sex between 
Winston and Julia becomes associated with an impoverished and essentially 
misogynistic conception of rebellion as debased compulsion. In this respect, the 
characterisation of Julia in particular is no doubt problematical: it suggests, even under 
conditions of extreme dehumanisation, a persisting sexual division of labour whereby 
the function of ideological opposition is placed under a gender differential. Cast in this 
light, Julia is essentially a rebel “from the waist downwards”, incapable of sustaining a 
discursive line of antagonism and eminently shallow in her generally “practical 
orientation”.45  
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It is nevertheless necessary to situate the particular elements of this broad 
characterisation within the purposive frame of the novel’s dystopian lesson. And in that 
sense, the moral frailty which is ultimately the defining trait of this human world 
amounts to the exhaustion of experience to which the Party subjects its outer members. 
The immediate effects of panoptical surveillance, linguistic distortion (through the 
“revolutionary” codification of thought in Newspeak), and the total deregulation of 
power – which becomes a tautological and self-serving aim – are channelled towards 
the complete annihilation of human experience qua moral intelligibility of the world.46 
Viewed in this light, Winston’s negative resistance is waged in the only terms available 
to those who have been rendered inhuman through the normalisation of the “state of 
exception”. Refusal of experience and abolition of the ordinary affects of interpersonal 
relations, in the sense suggested by Williams, seem to be the only remaining strategies 
of physical continuity (perhaps the word “survival” is excessive in this context) for the 
inhabitants of this desecrated social space (“We are the dead. Our only true life is in the 
future”).47 In the words of Giorgio Agamben: “[w]hen humankind is deprived of 
effective experience and becomes subjected to the imposition of a form of experience as 
controlled and manipulated as a laboratory maze for rats – in other words, when the 
only possible experience is horror and lies – then the rejection of experience can 
provisionally embody a legitimate defence.”48 
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The resilient consciousness which pits Winston against the colossal machinery of 
the Party – and which ultimately singles him out as the distinguished focus of O’Brien’s 
interest – is punctuated by the fundamental contrast between the caste of ex-humans to 
which he belongs and the allegedly unconscious mass of the proles:  
They [the people of previous ages] were governed by private loyalties which 
they did not question. What mattered were individual relationships, and a 
completely helpless gesture, an embrace, a tear, a word spoken to a dying 
man, could have value in itself. The proles, it suddenly occurred to him, had 
remained in this condition. They were not loyal to a party or a country or an 
idea, they were loyal to one another. For the first time in his life he did not 
despise the proles or think of them merely as an inert force which would one 
day spring to life and regenerate the world. The proles had stayed human. 
They had not become hardened inside. They had held on to the primitive 
emotions which he himself had to re-learn by conscious effort.49 
 By consigning hope (however vague and unrealised its promise in the final 
reckoning) to the proles as the legitimate representatives of an enslaved humanity still in 
possession of the moral ingredients of emancipation, the novel draws a dividing line 
between the projection of complete devastation (the finalised image of life after 
totalitarian victory) and the inexhaustible reservoir of potential inscribed in the living 
idea of equality. Again, equality provides both the redemptive horizon and the vehicle 
for a future resurrection of human life as obliquely suggested by the raw vital rhythms 
of the proles. Equality provides the élan for the final quoted passage of Goldstein’s 
book, posing the ever-recurring Orwellian question which, beyond the particular 
dynamics of Oceanian society as described in The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical 
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Collectivism, holds as a generally valid interrogation of principle: “why should human 
equality be averted? Supposing that the mechanics of the process have been rightly 
described, what is the motive for this huge, accurately planned effort to freeze history at 
a particular moment of time?”50  
Equality, moreover, has a direct physical expression in the wasted figure of a 
proletarian woman who can have no claim on consciousness (on “mind” in the sense 
ascribed by Winston’s own tortured mind) yet whose sheer corporeality indicates a 
continuity – indeed a continuity of experience – which contains the seeds of a future 
renewal:  
The woman down there had no mind, she had only strong arms, a warm 
heart and a fertile belly. He wondered how many children she had given 
birth to. It might easily be fifteen. She had had her momentary flowering, a 
year, perhaps, of wildrose beauty, and then she had suddenly swollen like a 
fertilised fruit and grown hard and red and coarse, and then her life had been 
laundering, scrubbing, darning, cooking, sweeping, polishing, mending, 
scrubbing, laundering, first for children, then for grandchildren, over thirty 
unbroken years. At the end of it she was still singing.51 
“Where there is equality there can be sanity”, claims Winston. The kind of sanity 
vindicated by Winston in the figure of the proletarian woman is the precise reverse of 
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the state of normalised exceptionality achieved at the end of the novel,52 as well as the 
basis for the final duality underpinning its notion of politics. Winston’s ultimate 
characterisation of himself as the “last man in Europe” is attached to a corporeal 
expression of bare humanity, a degree zero of sanity with an unequivocal physical 
dimension. Winston’s entry into the realm of naked power and normalised 
exceptionality – into the world of O’Brien’s total rule, and the singular juridical space 
of which he is made out to be the absolute guarantor – marks the completion of a 
process begun with the symptomatic acceptance of the unbridgeable gulf between 
“them” and “us”, between Party slaves (denizens of a new world without equality) and 
proles (the residual bearers of a common humanity).  
In his definition of the radical anomaly represented by this domain of 
exceptionality, Orwell approximates one of the paradigmatic theorisations of the 
modern condition – that of sovereignty understood as a state of exception, and that of 
homo sacer as the novel archetype of “exceptional” humanity.53 According to 
Agamben, under this new regime, “the norm becomes indistinguishable from the 
exception”.54 Hence, the camp – that natural habitat of the state of exception, that total 
space of political annihilation – is revealed as the new “hidden matrix and nomos” of 
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political space itself: “[t]hat is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at 
the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused 
with the citizen”.55 Or, in the “didactic” mode mastered by O’Brien as he presents 
Winston with his own bare humanity after prolonged torture: “[w]hat are you? A bag of 
filth. Now turn round and look into that mirror again. Do you see that thing facing you? 
That is the last man. If you are human, that is humanity”.56 
 Nineteen Eighty-Four draws a falling trajectory of political life from the raw 
materials of a totalitarian dismantling of politics to the actualisation of that dismantling. 
What is acknowledged in the process is the insoluble antagonism between “sovereign 
power”, understood as the normalisation or naturalisation of the state of exception, and 
equality as the conceptual basis of political activity as struggle and emancipation. It is 
worth conceding – at least partially – the point made by Williams in his overall 
characterisation of Orwell’s Socialism, when he claims that “Socialism was a general 
idea, a general name, against all these evils [fascism, imperialism and inequality].”57 
Yet it is necessary to stress, especially in a discussion of his later work, the positive 
content that this nominal commitment to Socialism actually had.  
The singularity of his politics resides in an overarching moral commitment – 
which, after Spain, becomes axiomatic and not merely hypothetical – to the egalitarian 
transformation of society – a prioritisation of collective possibilities in the face of 
conjunctural threats (the failure of laissez-faire capitalism and the rise of new 
bureaucratic oligarchies). This often resulted, as we have seen, in a tactical modulation 
of revolutionary or reformist emphases which typically led in apparently contradictory 
and opportunistic directions. Admittedly, the programmatic articulation of his political 
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ideas underwent, in the temporal arc we have covered, a substantive shift from semi-
Trotskyist positions to a more or less recognisably “Bevanite” or left-Labourite stance. 
But explanations of this evolution in terms of Cold War defection or even “hysteria” 
must be rejected instantly as they fail to pin down the actual imbrication of moral 
priorities and contextual limitations – both of which derive from a fundamental sense of 
experiential immediacy (ultimately harking back to the Spanish Civil War).  
Thus, the Socialist continuities in Orwell’s work must be mediated, crucially, by 
the circumstances of lived History. His later preoccupation with totalitarian realities – 
and with a less defined and more intuitive notion of “equality” (especially when 
compared to the paradigm developed in Homage to Catalonia) – is not post- or ex-
Socialist,58 but rather consistent with his recognition of transformative possibilities in 
the conjuncture of “1940”. The contextual exigencies of the post-war period, after the 
replacement of the Fascist menace with the Iron Curtain, necessarily required, in 
accordance with the moral prioritisation of equality, a retrenchment from revolutionary 
tactics along the lines of a Democratic-Socialist enfranchisement of the popular 
majority. The practical tensions of this conjuncture are evident and indisputable 
ingredients of the doctrinal make-up of the later Orwell. Thus the almost defensive tone 
of an article such as “The Labour Government After Three Years” (published in 
October 1948, at the critical moment of “consolidation” of Labour’s reforms after the 
radical moves of the three preceding years)59 contrasts with the irrepressible utopian 
content of a piece like “Towards European Unity” (July-August 1947), with its integral 
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Socialist vision premised on equality and committed, not to the surrender of the political 
language of alternatives and possibilities, but to its principled projection and realisation.  
 “The Labour Government After Three Years” is, as John Newsinger has pointed 
out, “probably the closest we get with Orwell to a full-blooded endorsement of British 
Labourism and its reformist politics”.60 In particular, it is an expression of obdurate 
“realism” – of politics as the “language of priorities” – deriving its strength of 
commitment from an overarching concern with the egalitarian fruits to be derived at 
every gradual step down the road towards Democratic Socialism. Yet if this provides 
the immediate practical horizon of social transformation in the Britain of the late forties, 
the position outlined in “Toward European Unity” offers a principled projection of 
Socialism as both a general characterisation and a particular counter to the totalitarian 
menace. The only way of avoiding the devastating imaginings of Nineteen Eighty-Four 
and of Burnham’s predictions, “is to present somewhere or other, on a large scale, the 
spectacle of a community where people are relatively free and happy and where the 
main motive in life is not the pursuit of money or power. It other words, democratic 
socialism must be made to work throughout some large area”.61  
 The historical limitations imposed upon an emancipatory project conjugated in 
the moral language of equality and possibility as partially realised in the “exceptional” 
circumstances of libertarian Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War are manifest in the 
Orwell of the late 1940s. An enduring loyalty to the said language is thus tempered by 
the strict constraints of the post-war British situation and crucially, by the unremitting 
onslaught of a menace “internal” to the Left – that of “oligarchical collectivism”.  
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The practical scope of this political realisation is thus, in a certain sense, 
fundamentally compromised (just as it had originally been fuelled) by its ascription to a 
narrow conjuncture. The resources of possibility – the imagination of radical social 
change – which had animated his initial engagement with Socialism are thus ultimately 
contained within topical forms (POUMism, the “spirit of Dunkirk”, Bevanism) which 
may potentially deprive them of a more general exploration of alternatives to the 
hegemonic system of relations. Thus, the alter-systemic possibilities inscribed even in 
the bleakest of “dystopian” narratives – Nineteen Eighty-Four – are ultimately 
subordinated to a contextual dependency on the affirmations of Labour’s reformist 
programme. In other words, the utopian “obverse” to the world of Oceania is not 
Burnham’s American Empire, but the “third road” represented by the Left of the Labour 
Party. And the limiting effects of this ascription are to be found in the narrowing-down 
of symbolic references to the reconstructive scope of a parliamentary option.62   
 Our next step will be to take up the genealogy of Socialism at a different, yet 
complementary point. For the vexed history of British Communism, over the same 
period when Orwell was constructing his negative paradigm of “oligarchical 
collectivism”, showcases an internal evolution of gathering dissidence whose range of 
political imagination, as we will see, extends the performative scope of Orwell’s 
emancipatory vision beyond the topical range of an institutional alternative.   
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1. Communism with a British Face: Politics, History and 
Culture 
 
The events of 1945 dawned upon British Communists as a remarkable opportunity 
for the international expansion of Socialism and for their Party’s consolidation as a 
beacon of progress within the Labour Movement. Even if the membership figures of 
1942-43 were to remain unmatched in later years, the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB) still managed to bask for some time in the reflected glory accrued by its Soviet 
mentor in the recent struggle against Hitler.1  
    Following a series of ineffectual attempts at affiliation with the Labour Party, 
Communists propounded (although to no avail) a broad electoral pact of all progressive 
forces on 2 October 1944. The General Election of July 1945 would nevertheless leave 
a bittersweet taste amongst Party ranks: despite the clear swing to the left signalled by 
Labour’s landslide victory, only two MPs – out of the 22 candidates put up by the 
Communist Party – were returned to Westminster: Willie Gallacher for the West Fife 
constituency and Phil Piratin for Mile End, while the Party General Secretary, Harry 
Pollitt, was narrowly defeated in East Rhondda.2 As Willie Thompson has noted, 
however, whatever the degree of their disappointment, “British communists did not 
doubt that the wider world, Europe and Britain were all set for an epoch of progressive 
social advance in which they would fully participate.”3 In this spirit, they continued to 
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seek affiliation with the matrix organisation of the British Labour Movement as it set 
out to implement its programme of radical reform. Pollitt wrote to Labour’s General 
Secretary Morgan Phillips requesting that their application be reconsidered. Despite 
significant support for this initiative from numerous constituency parties, the National 
Executive Committee remained determined to prevent Communist infiltration of its 
political structure. A denunciatory pamphlet by Harold Laski was released shortly 
before Labour’s 1946 conference, detailing aspects of the CPGB’s strategic 
opportunism (which Laski identified with the Comintern doctrine of class collaboration) 
and thus pre-emptively expressing official Labour views on any future attempts at 
affiliation.4 Phillips argued a similar line, presenting the case as a matter of survival for 
the Labour Party and its autonomous programme of “Democratic Socialism”: “[i]f the 
Communist affiliation was foolishly granted the position would be intolerable. There 
would be within our Party another highly organised Party working for its own 
supremacy. Every local Labour Party would become a battle ground for democratic 
socialism vs. communism.”5  
The Communist bid was eventually defeated by 2,675,000 to 468,000 votes in 
June 1946.6 Additionally, the annual conference passed a resolution permanently 
forbidding the affiliation of any organisation “with its own rules and constitution” that 
was not already affiliated by 1 January 1946.7 In spite of these organisational setbacks, 
which would indubitably condition Communist activity in years to follow, the Party 
could still boast a relatively strong position amongst the industrial workforce. This 
stemmed from a fundamental commitment to workplace economic struggles which 
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often went counter to the mood of co-operation and acquiescence between the unions 
and the Labour government. As Richard Stevens has pointed out, “Communist influence 
in the unions was primarily built on such struggles and the willingness of CP members 
to take on leadership roles and risk victimization. This explains the resilience of the CP 
in the unions during the sharpest phase of the Cold War from 1948 to 1953.”8 
During the early phase of the first Attlee government, between 1945 and 1947, 
the CPGB was faced with something of an identity crisis: its principled determination to 
support the government’s reforms as a “transitional period in the journey to socialism” 
contrasted with its repeated and failed attempts to affiliate with the Labour Party, 9 on 
the one hand, and with its particular project of Socialism (deemed ultimately 
incompatible with Labour’s), on the other. Thus, the question was asked: “[w]hat should 
be their own distinctive role? It could not be confined indefinitely to offering ‘critical 
support’ for the government. It was self-evident that the strategy outlined in For Soviet 
Britain [The Party’s 1935 programme] was obsolete but a good deal less clear what 
might replace it.”10  
A first step towards the redefinition of the post-war Communist project was 
already adumbrated in the 1944 pamphlet Britain for the People: Proposals for Post-
war Policy, which outlined a series of measures considered necessary for the ensuing 
process of reconstruction. Great emphasis was placed on the maintenance of wartime 
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controls and the securing of full employment, as well as on the extension of the welfare 
franchise in consonance with prevalent reformist sentiment on the broad progressive 
front. Thus, whereas revolutionary change on the Bolshevik model had furnished the 
strategic basis of the 1935 programme, Britain for the People consecrated the Party’s 
turn towards gradualism and acceptance of the constitutional “road to socialism”. While 
the need for extra-parliamentary action was still acknowledged, it was increasingly felt 
that Parliament could be enlisted, qua democratic institution, in the struggle against 
capitalism. To this effect, it would be necessary, as Phil Piratin pointed out in 1947, to 
bring it “closer to the people” or, in other words, to revolutionise its mechanisms of 
accountability and representation.11 An absolute priority for Communists in this respect 
was the introduction of proportional representation on the basis of a single transferable 
vote,12 in lieu of the much abhorred first-past-the-post system, which continued to 
hinder the Party’s hopes of attaining institutional visibility.13 
    This doctrinal shift away from prior formal aspirations rerouted Marxist-Leninist 
phraseology from its traditional revolutionary valences to a new supporting role in an 
overall reformist strategy. Harry Pollitt’s 1947 pamphlet Looking Ahead was to further 
articulate this conversion to constitutional methods, endowing it with a historical-
theoretical basis. In a chapter entitled “The British Road to Socialism”, Pollitt argued 
that: 
Communists have never said that the Russian Revolution of October, 1917, 
is a model which has exactly to be copied. Indeed, the whole work of Marx 
and Engels and Lenin and Stalin… has been to explain to the people how to 
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recognise the deep laws of development of society, and to show how the 
working class and the people can decide on correct slogans and correct 
programmes based on a study of the economic and social forces at a given 
time. Communists have always said… that the study of the Russian 
Revolution and of all previous revolutions… is pregnant with meaning and 
lessons for the working class. But this does not mean that these lessons must 
be learnt by heart, or initiated mechanically, or applied at different times 
and under different conditions. 14  
This change of approach to the question of the transition to Socialism was, in effect, 
coordinate with the renovated spirit of the Party which had emerged from the war. As 
Francis Beckett has noted, this “was very different from the Party which had been born 
out of the upheaval of the Great War. In 1920 its leaders were young men who thought 
the revolution was just round the corner.”15 By 1945, some of the early British crusaders 
of internationalist Communism, such as Gallacher (aged 63 at the time), or Pollitt 
himself, had been tempered into a radical reformulation of their revolutionary vision: 
“[i]t [still] meant a fundamental change in the way society was run – but it no longer 
necessarily meant violent overthrow of the state.”16 For their part, younger members 
such as Gallacher’s fellow MP, Piratin, derived their brand of Communism from the 
recent struggles against Fascism, both domestically (fighting Mosley’s Blackshirts) and 
internationally, through a fundamental association with the USSR and its distinguished 
contribution to the war.  
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Even if Labour’s reformist agenda was already stalling by 1947 and its 
programme of Democratic Socialism showing its first signs of weakness,17 the CPGB 
failed to capitalise on the governmental deadlock. The rising tide of the Cold War no 
doubt accounts for its increasingly marginal position in the political spectrum and 
society at large, turning the Party into a privileged target for anti-Soviet propaganda. 
The pace of international developments from 1947 onwards is worth examining in some 
detail for the particular effects it would have within the realm of British Communism. It 
will be noted that the Party’s programmatic distancing from the revolutionary model of 
1917, even if it signalled a major and creative attempt to reconcile Communist doctrine 
with British liberal institutions, was by no means independent from the Moscow line. 
 Stalin had already disbanded the International founded by Lenin, the 
Communist International or Comintern in 1943,18 heralding a new era and strategy of 
international Communist leadership for the Soviet Union. The Communist Information 
Bureau or Cominform was created in September 1947 “as an agency for co-ordinating 
the intransigent propaganda offensive against the West now judged to be necessary.”19 
The new agency was formed by Communist Parties already in power – with the 
exception of Albania’s – plus the PCI and PCF.20 Earlier that year, in March 1947, 
President Truman had outlined his policy of assistance to those governments threatened 
by “direct or indirect” Communist aggression, an announcement which was followed by 
the launching of the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Programme. Stalin’s response 
came as the Cominform thesis of the “two camps” into which the post-war world was 
now reportedly divided: on the one hand, the Soviet-led “democratic anti-imperialist” 
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and on the other, “the imperialist anti-democratic”. 21 This novel doctrinal direction had 
the immediate effect of heightening the Party’s sensitivity to Labour’s domestic 
shortcomings (as the increasingly censorious tone of official declarations confirmed),22 
as well as intensifying its commitment to Britain’s disengagement from the American 
sphere of influence. In the words of John Gollan: “the only possible policy open to us is 
genuine Three-Power co-operation, with the USSR and the USA.”23 Among other 
things, this implied boosting Britain’s industrial output without submitting to foreign 
control in the form of Marshall Aid.  
    The constitution of the Western European Union’s Defence Organisation in 
1948 and of its wider resultant, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 
1949, was perceived by British Communists as an unequivocal sign of the unrelenting 
“drift to war” in which the Labour Party had been caught, making it an urgent task for 
all committed “progressives” to resist this fateful turn of strategy and hence to defend 
the “lives and liberty of the British people”.24 The escalation of international tensions in 
1948 amounted to a series of disappointments for the CPGB and its doctrine of Three-
Power co-operation in a context of global peace and British independence. In February 
1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia staged a coup with Soviet backing, 
thereby ending a short period of national alliance between left and liberal democratic 
parties. Later in the same year, Berlin erupted into the first open crisis of the Cold War, 
with the Soviets blockading the Western sector of the city and Allied forces responding 
with an airlift which would last until the spring of 1949. However, perhaps the most 
severe crisis in terms of its symbolic and emotional charge for Communists would 
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arrive in the split between Stalin and Yugoslavia’s leader, Tito, soon after the 
establishment of the Cominform (whose original headquarters had been set up in 
Belgrade).  
Tito’s refusal to submit unquestioningly to Moscow’s diktat, in matters of 
economic organisation, for example, together with his determination to gain control 
over the Yugoslav area of influence (which included plans to merge the country with 
Bulgaria), unleashed a series of tense exchanges between the CPSU and the Yugoslav 
Party. The rift finally culminated in Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform, upon 
which the latter’s seat was moved to Bucharest, in June 1948.25 British Communists 
endorsed the official Moscow line, even if this sudden excommunication of Yugoslavia 
represented a bitter challenge to the faithful. This country’s mythopoeic standing in the 
wartime pantheon of British radicalism is only comparable to that of Spain in the late 
Thirties. Much of its prestige derived from the relatively unaided Partisan struggle 
against Axis forces during the war, which had resulted in the almost complete liberation 
of the territory by mid-1945. In contrast with the royalist Chetnik movement (which 
would change allegiances to the Axis halfway through the conflict), Partisans were 
largely characterised by a federation of loyalties – both ethnic/national and political – 
which in a sense prefigured the idiosyncratic nature of the resulting Yugoslav state.26  
As Stephen Woodhams has observed, following Basil Davidson’s account, part of 
the specific attraction exerted by the Yugoslav Partisans lay in their broad social make-
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up: “Communists… were never the dominant force in the movement. Rather the 
partisans were genuinely a popular front, both in the sense that they enjoyed the support 
of the majority of the population, the peasantry, and in the sense that they held within 
their ranks a range of ethnic and political differences”:27 
The twin processes of winning the immediate war and of building a new 
state should not, according to Basil Davidson, be separated, if the actions of 
the partisans were to be understood… Yugoslavia presented to socialists 
elsewhere perhaps the best example of a popular struggle organized and 
carried through by the people. It was a struggle designed not merely to 
liberate territory from foreign occupation, but to rid themselves of the 
corrupt pre-war rulers, and the social organization which they had 
maintained. Yugoslavia epitomized the post-war hopes for the creation of a 
new society and a new people from the ashes of war.28  
British leftwingers had been particularly captivated by this embodied promise of 
democracy and social transformation, as the creation of the British-Yugoslav 
Association and the official attachment of prominent CPGB members (such as James 
Klugmann) to the British Military Mission in Yugoslavia effectively attested. One of the 
last acts of the British-Yugoslav Association was, tellingly, the publication of a booklet 
entitled The Railway: An Adventure in Construction shortly before the Tito-Stalin split 
in 1948. This slender publication, edited by a young E.P. Thompson in his capacity of 
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Commandant of the British Brigade, recounted the participation of British volunteers in 
the building of an emblematic railway line (the Omladinska Pruga or “Youth Railway”) 
between Šamac and Sarajevo in 1947. As the preface to the volume explained: 
There is nothing very remarkable about this railway… [except for] the way 
in which it was built. It was not built by underpaid Irish navvies or by 
unemployed drawn from a pool of “labour reserves”. It was not built slowly, 
shoddily, and at great expense, by a foreign company, remaining as a 
tentacle to suck more wealth out of the impoverished peasantry… The 
construction of the Railway was conceived, executed and carried to a 
successful completion by the People’s Youth of Yugoslavia.29 
This “adventure in construction” epitomised the values which British radicals had 
customarily read, during the early post-war years, into Yugoslavia’s heroic war 
experiences. As Thompson remarked in his contribution:  
The workers on these projects [meaning the multiple voluntary projects of 
which the Youth Railway was a foremost instance] were the natural 
inheritors of the spirit of the partisans… The positive qualities won in those 
days – the comradeship, self-abnegation and conscious unity – instead of 
evaporating, as in some other countries, in the swamps of economic 
anarchy, black-marketeering and renewed disruptions, were carried forward 
intact into the days of peace.30 
The privileged position accorded to Tito’s Yugoslavia in British Communist 
imaginaries suffered a severe shock after the freezing of relations between Moscow and 
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Belgrade. As the Party conformed to the new official line, the Yugoslav experiment 
ceased to garner accolades as a distinguished exemplar of young and resilient Socialism, 
and came to represent instead – in what was often an uncomfortable doctrinal pirouette 
for recent adherents to the Yugoslav way – the supreme manifestation of late Stalinist 
demonology. The official codification in Britain of this latest heresy appeared in 1951 
as a Party tract by Klugmann (only recently a vocal supporter of Tito’s regime), entitled 
From Trotsky to Tito.31 Communist hysteria surrounding the phenomenon of Titoism 
reached nearly every corner of left-wing dissidence on the domestic and international 
fronts: 
The writings of the Yugoslavs Djilas, Kardelj and Pijade were described as 
a ‘hotch-potch of Trotskyist phrases’. Even Morgan Phillips and Sam 
Watson, two pillars of the orthodox Labour establishment were ‘implicated’ 
in a new world conspiracy by virtue of a five-hour meeting they had held 
with Tito and his Cabinet. Social democrats, right and left, Titoites, 
Trotskyists, fascists and American imperialists were all in league, it was 
alleged.32 
Anti-Titoist purges raged throughout the Soviet bloc, beginning with the show trial of 
Hungarian Communist leader Lászlo Rajk in 1949 and climaxing in the trial of Rudolf 
Slansky and other prominent members of the Czechoslovak CP in 1952. Klugmann’s 
notorious assessment of the latter was formulated under the title “Lessons of the Prague 
Trial”, a piece which certified the CPGB’s continuing endorsement of orthodoxy 
throughout the Eastern campaign.33 
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    It was against this backdrop of high-pitched tension and zeal in the Communist 
bloc that the British Party’s turn to gradualism was consummated. The British Road to 
Socialism, first presented as the Party Programme in January 1951,34 definitively 
revoked the “Class against Class” approach which underpinned its forerunner of 1935, 
calling instead for “the peaceful co-existence of socialism and capitalism”: “[t]he 
Communist Party brands as a lie the charge that Communism is to be imposed by 
aggression and conquest, and declares that social transformation can only come through 
internal changes in accordance with the actual conditions in each country.”35 The 
preservation of international peace was intimately connected to the safeguarding of 
Britain’s “independence”, resulting in a principled defence of Britain’s sovereign rights 
over imperialist (i.e. US) encroachments: “[w]e stand for a Britain, free, strong and 
independent. We want our country to be subordinate and subservient to no foreign 
power, but to stand in friendly association and equal alliance with all powers that 
recognise and respect Britain’s national interests.”36  
The British Road championed the Cominform doctrine of differing national 
approaches to the transition, ruling out the principle of universal applicability of the 
Soviet experience with which the Comintern had been associated. Instead, much 
attention was paid to the alternative model set forth by the young People’s Democracies 
of the Eastern bloc. It was claimed, for example, that Britain could, in pursuing her own 
national road, take a direct cue from this paradigm whilst enlisting its particular 
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constitutional arrangement in the service of social transformation.37 Thus, in spite of the 
paradox represented by Yugoslavia (where a truly “national road” to Socialism had been 
established beyond the tutelage of Moscow), the Soviet leadership seemed ready, by 
1951, to promote this notion of “differing” modulations of the Communist experience.  
    In the terse ideological climate of the Cold War, the possibilities opened up by a 
British national road included a central challenge to the growing influence of the USA 
and its alleged project of cultural “colonisation”. Much effort was devoted in 
Communist circles to analysing the extent of this threat and the radical potentialities 
inscribed in “national culture”. In summarising British achievements in this broad area, 
Communists could safely claim (without fear of courting an intrinsically reactionary 
chauvinism) that “our true heritage is the enemy of the anti-human outlook of Anglo-
American big business, and the dying culture they seek to foster.”38 By re-drawing the 
boundaries of Socialist criteria of acceptability, that is, by re-tuning progressive 
sensibilities to particular national heritages, the “democratic anti-imperialist” camp 
could conceivably secure for itself a potential grip on otherwise irreducibly alien 
political settings.  
The Cominform doctrine of the two camps was organically linked from the 
outset to a strict cultural policy associated with the name of the Soviet Central 
Committee’s General Secretary, Andrei Zhdanov. “Zhdanovism” reconfigured the 
ideological universe of Stalinism as actively antagonistic – that is, in constant and overt 
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opposition – to the capitalist world, whilst undercutting the class adversarial content 
suggested by an earlier Leninist notion of world revolution. Zhdanovism came to 
represent the Soviet bloc’s articulation of the Cold War impasse, combining high-
pitched ideological agonistics with a real – if tense – pattern of political coexistence. 
Culture and the arts became a privileged domain of strategic intervention, raising the 
standards of orthodoxy – as conceived of by late Stalinism – to a new confrontational 
level which would certify the solidity, resilience and, most importantly in these times of 
potential defection from both camps, homogeneity of the Socialist way.39  
As Antoine Baudin has pointed out, “Zhdanovism represented the realization of 
total artistic organization.”40 Aesthetically, it constituted a violent redeployment of the 
central tenets of Socialist realism as defined in the 1930s.41 The operative principles of 
this paradigm relied on the dynamic articulation of three concepts: “ideological 
commitment”, “party-mindedness” and “national-popular spirit”.42 The first of these 
categories emphasised the structurally central position occupied by the “idea” or 
political motivation which the artwork enveloped. “Party-mindedness” alluded to the 
explicitly militant outlook of the work, understood as a genuine contribution to the 
“construction of Communism”, while the “national-popular spirit” that the artwork must 
embody was defined against the bourgeois temptations of “nationalism” on the one 
hand, and “cosmopolitanism” on the other. 
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 The renovated virulence accorded to these principles derived from a strategic 
repositioning of Marxism-Leninism during a famous philosophical debate conducted by 
Zhdanov in 1947. The latter’s central claim (in a move which would constitute the 
theoretical horizon of the period) was that philosophy as such was a bourgeois category 
and therefore purely illusory, and that the true history of ideas was confined to the 
ongoing struggle between materialism and idealism: “[c]orrespondingly, Marxist-
Leninist aesthetics no longer meant the study of various aesthetic views and concepts, 
but rather the history of “struggle for a materialist aesthetics against idealist directions 
and theories””.43 According to this view, the radical disparity and opposition between 
the bourgeois and socialist worldviews – which the unfolding international situation 
made manifest – presented socialists with the challenge and responsibility to assert and 
enact a sense of moral superiority in every sphere of engagement. Zhadanovism 
proposed a broad “battle of ideas”, through which the theoretical and indeed moral 
ascendancy of the Marxist-Leninist camp would be universally asserted. It was the duty 
of Communists to engage in that battle and to continue to expose the “decadence of 
capitalist ideas”, tearing through the manifold cloaks which reaction may strategically 
choose to don.44 Thus, for example, the programmatic injunction that writers should act 
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as “engineers of the soul”, in charge of “the scientific care of reality” – in the words of 
Louis Aragon – rested on a characteristically “late Stalinist” or “Zhdanovite” 
conception of Marxism as an intellectual arsenal with a precise offensive function in the 
context of the Cold War.45 
 The XXth National Congress of the CPGB (held in February 1948) was 
particularly sensitive to the new strategy and therefore insistent on the intellectual tasks 
which lay ahead. The promotion and “full mastery” of Marxist theory was accorded 
pride of place in this struggle to gain the intellectual and consequently political upper 
hand. As George Thomson noted in a speech on the Centenary of the Communist 
Manifesto (during the aforementioned congress):  
To explain Marxism is to develop it. As professional workers, we must learn 
to apply Marxism in our special field… We must work in our branches as 
specialists – as teachers, doctors, journalists, writers, musicians, painters, 
poets. Only then shall we be making the distinctive contribution that we 
have to make, and by making it we shall enrich the life of the branch and of 
the whole Party.46 
The scientific interpretation of Marxism, which, as we have seen, reverberated in 
the socialist-realist prescription, generally offered a privileged theoretical standpoint 
from which to launch the campaigns and “battles” of the late Stalinist period. In Britain, 
“scientism” had been accepted as the Marxist orthodoxy of the 1930s, opposing its 
stringent epistemology to the relatively porous libertarian tradition of the Plebs League 
(which, according to Raphael Samuel, “combined a revolutionary outlook with a 
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speculative spirit of philosophical inquiry”).47 As Gerard McCann has noted, both 
formative Marxist lineages were active in the creation of the British Party in 1920, yet 
only the rational-scientific outlook/strain would survive into the critical 1930s and 
constitute itself as a theoretical orthodoxy. 48          
The year 1931 has been seen as a fundamental watershed in the history of British 
Marxism, as it inaugurates a fruitful period of interaction between dialectical 
materialism (in its more Soviet-influenced incarnation) and the proper epistemology of 
the natural sciences. An international Congress on the History of Science and 
Technology was held in London in the month of July, marking a new departure for the 
British scientific community with the unexpected arrival of a large delegation from the 
USSR.49 The papers read by the Soviet representatives opened up new avenues of 
interpretation and reconceptualisation of the specific social function accorded to science 
under different socio-economic formations. As the delegation’s chairman, Nikolai 
Bukharin, argued in his programmatic statement, “Theory and Practice from the 
standpoint of Dialectical Materialism”, capitalism was – because unaided by the 
totalising framework of dialectical materialism – wedded to the “division between the 
pure and the practical, that is, between theory and practice” and consequently inimical 
to the advance of science and technology and to the general expansion of knowledge. 50 
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The emancipatory potential of scientific inquiry could only be secured through the 
resolution and surpassing of bourgeois contradictions and dead-ends.51 
The shift of perspective which this encounter with Soviet science brought about 
was consecrated by the Social Relations in Science (SRS) movement, which established 
an enduring link between the traditional concerns of Cambridge “High Science” and a 
social sensibility grounded in the cultural forms and strategies of the Popular Front. For 
indeed, as Edwin Roberts has pointed out, the SRS was not an “exclusively Marxist” 
undertaking, but rather “a common cause of progressive forces” benefiting from the 
peculiar admixture of ideological influences which underpinned the new policy of left 
alliances in the mid to late 1930s.52 Typically associated with the names of J.B.S. 
Haldane, Lancelot Hogben, Joseph Needham and Hyman Levy, the SRS movement 
found its greatest theoretician and proponent in the figure of J.D. Bernal, and its most 
elaborate theoretical statement in his 1939 magnum opus, The Social Function of 
Science, which came to be regarded as the theoretical culmination of 1930s British 
Marxism.  
Bernal examines the relative position accorded to scientific inquiry under 
Capitalism, Fascism and Soviet Socialism, assessing the structural and ideological 
limitations and possibilities contained within each. In his evaluation of the first, Bernal 
concludes that the productive rhythms of capital are often detrimental to the consistent 
and homogeneous succession of practical discoveries and consequently, to the overall 
advancement of scientific knowledge. In a market economy, profitability is the 
exclusive criterion of validation for scientific development, relegating all non-
                                                          
51
 Thus, for example, the debate in evolutionary theory between vitalists and mechanists or idealists and 
materialists had been transcended by Soviet science, as B.M. Zavadovsky suggested in his paper on the 
“Interrelationships of the Physical and Biological Sciences”, Roberts, ibid., 150 
52Roberts, ibid., 153 
121 
 
commercial uses of technology to a secondary plane. Historic Fascism, for its part 
(Bernal focuses on the case of Nazi Germany), rehearses a virulent version of 
monopolistic Capitalism combined with “economic nationalism”, resulting in a 
particularly noxious subjection of science to the specific ideological ends of the regime. 
By contrast (and here, the limited vision of Anglo-Marxism in its High Stalinist 
incarnation becomes evident), the Soviet system was characterised as offering a leading 
model of “integrationism”, that is, a harmonious articulation of “research, experiments, 
application, and work all made into equal virtues with the separation of hand and brain 
being overcome.”53  
The attraction exerted by Soviet science during the 1930s and its consecration in 
a recognisably British embodiment of Marxist theoretical practice was to suffer 
dramatically from the disreputable phenomenon of Lysenkoism. Trofim Lysenko’s 
unorthodox ideas in the fields of biology and agronomy had promised to resolve the 
more pressing economic problems faced by the Soviet regime in the 1930s whilst 
concocting an appropriately Marxist rhetoric to suit his definitive “proletarian science”. 
Offering makeshift (and as it would turn out, radically unscientific) solutions to the 
growing difficulties by which Soviet agriculture was beset in the wake of the 
collectivisations, his practice of “vernalisation” – a fuzzy term covering a variety of ad 
hoc treatments which he applied to seeds – was elevated to the status of a paradigm shift 
with the personal sanction of Stalin himself. Lysenko’s “revolutionary” method was 
enshrined by Communist authorities as the ultimate expression of a genuinely Socialist 
solution to agriculture, and a definitive blow to the “old, metaphysical” biology which 
kept thriving in the West.54 The continuing official endorsement of Lysenkoism until 
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the 1960s was to have disastrous consequences for Soviet science as a whole, and not 
least, following the strict endorsement of this new “proletarian” orthodoxy by foreign 
Parties such as the CPGB, for the general understanding of Soviet-sanctioned “scientific 
Socialism”.55 This decline was nevertheless gradual, and the strong associations 
attached to the scientific outlook could be sensed in British Communist circles 
throughout the post-war years.  
The specific intellectual ferment upon which the British Communist Party 
Historians’ Group fed at the time of its formation in the 1940s was thoroughly informed 
by this scientific rationalist mindset, according to which historical progress was 
underwritten by a naturalist teleology modelled on technological development. For the 
Marxist historians working under the institutional aegis of the CPGB: “[t]he science of 
history was pivoted on laws of development: humanity moved forward in a progression 
from point to point until, with the achievement of socialism, pre-history ended and real 
history began.”56 Marxist historiography in the 1930s and 40s tended to concentrate on 
the social and political transformations of sixteenth and seventeenth-century England, 
with a specific focus on the English Revolution and its premature rehearsal of 
democratic ideas. This was reflected, as Raphael Samuel has noted, in the abundant 
scholarship produced by the Party Group in those years, as well as in the “gravitational 
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pull it exercised on Marxist scholars working in others fields” (including creative 
writers of a progressive inclination).57 
The Communist Party Historians’ Group was launched in 1946, following 
discussions about a revised edition of A.L. Morton’s A People’s History of England. 
Morton’s work, originally published in 1938, was genealogically connected to “a more 
broadly based, if theoretically less demanding” tradition of People’s History, whose 
intellectual roots lay in radical-liberal, rather than openly Socialist, ground. Thus, 
Morton credited J.R. Green’s Short History of the English People (1877) as having 
provided, not only a source of inspiration for his own title, but more generally, a solid 
interpretative model and epistemological framework. Other notable instances of this 19th 
and early 20th century democratic historical lineage included Thorold Rogers’ Six 
Centuries of Work and Wages (1884) and John and Barbara Hammond’s The Village 
Labourer (1911) – the latter of which would greatly influence Thompson in The Making 
of the English Working Class and Hobsbawm and Rudé in Captain Swing.58 
The Marxist historical tradition which crystallised around the Party Group was 
by no means restricted in its scope or homogeneous in its composition.59 Thus, in 
addition to the initial impulse lent by historians Hill, Hilton, Hobsbawm, Saville and 
Max Morris, the Group managed to attract the enthusiastic support of older scholars 
such as Dona Torr and Maurice Dobb. Torr’s influence upon British Marxist 
historiography in this context has been acknowledged as paramount. Born in 1883, she 
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was a founding member of the CPGB in 1920 and a leading Marxist scholar throughout 
her life, and her magnum opus, Tom Mann and His Times, was consistently hailed as a 
monument of precisely the brand of People’s History from which the Group’s activities 
derived.60 Torr was responsible for the general editorship of the series “History in the 
Making” – a co-ordinated display of the Group’s pioneering scholarship which included 
four monographs covering a wide chronological range, from the Civil War to the early 
years of the Labour Party.61  
The year of the formation of the Party Group, 1946, also saw the publication of a 
work which would exert a lasting influence on these historians: Maurice Dobb’s Studies 
in the Development of Capitalism.62 Dobb was, with Torr, the other luminary of an 
earlier generation towards whom the younger Party historians looked for intellectual 
and political inspiration. His approach to Marxist theory, in works such as On Marxism 
Today (1931) would to some extent pre-figure themes and concerns of the early New 
Left. Thus, for example, Dobb’s dynamic conception of History implied a rejection of 
deterministic models and a valorisation of concepts such as “agency” and “experience” 
– indeed concepts whose relevance to Thompson’s historical epistemology is, as we will 
see, crucial.63  
In Dobb’s words, “[h]istorical experience is a moving process in which man 
himself is an active agent. The “reality” of history, if it has a meaning, can only mean 
the totality of history itself: and precisely in activity – in making history – does man 
establish his relation to the objective world and learn what history is.”64 Historical 
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understanding, then, can only be gained from the analysis of History’s total relations: 
interaction, movement and conflict provide safer routes of access to this specific 
meaning than the generation and application of isolated and static categories. This 
dynamic conception of History (and in particular, of capitalism qua historical 
phenomenon) forms the theoretical core of his Studies. In this ground-breaking work, 
Dobb emphasises the developmental aspects of the capitalist mode of production, 
proposing an integrated view of its historical specificity. His analysis moves beyond the 
narrowly economistic perspective, focusing instead on the multi-modality which 
characterises each historical epoch. If the capitalist mode of production, argues Dobb, 
cannot be reduced to a narrowly mechanistic arrangement or set of determinations, the 
concept of class cannot in turn be produced as a static, purely economic category, and 
must be accounted for as a complex historical phenomenon.65 
In his studies on medieval society, Rodney Hilton expressed a similar concern 
for the dynamic aspects of History and, in particular, for those which thematised “the 
potentialities for resistance to exploitation of the subordinated classes.”66 Hilton posited 
conflict as the defining relationship between peasants and lords and as the “prime 
mover” of medieval society. This perspective problematised the static conception 
inherited from traditional historical accounts of the Middle Ages and resisted, in turn, 
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the economic determinism associated with a certain brand of Marxism in terms which 
expanded and applied Dobb’s understanding of historical agency.67 
Coupled with this determination in the work of the Marxist historians to present 
the subaltern of History as effectual agents and makers of their own destiny, was the 
didactic aspiration to articulate a genealogy of popular resistance in which present-day 
Communists and radicals may distinguish the seeds and sources of their own struggle.68 
Thus, Hilton and Fagan, in a book on the English Rising of 1381, stated that it was their 
aim to “present to the British people one part of their own tradition of struggle for 
popular liberties.”69 By reconstructing the “experience” of silenced historical subjects, 
that is, by drawing an analytical trajectory “from the bottom up”, the entrenched 
imbalances of traditional historiography would be overcome and a radical shift in the 
conventional geometry of empowerment, attained. Enduring notions of social harmony 
would thereby be questioned and a space of possibility and radical change, opened up 
within the studied conjunctures. In charting the dynamics of medieval rebellion, Hilton 
observed, for example, that: 
The lords and the peasant communities could not, in the nature of things co-
exist in a state of natural harmony. The lord’s ownership of his soil and its 
villein occupants was firmly established in law too recently to be accepted 
without question. The aristocratic structure of society, the institution of 
lordship, and the ownership of great estates were of course accepted as if 
they had existed since the beginning of time. But within this aristocratic 
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framework, ancient peasant communities still doubted the legality of the 
absolute disposal by the lord of the commons, still doubted whether any 
men except slaves could be treated as unfree, still doubted whether lords had 
the right to increase or change rents and customary services.70    
In this attempt to press past conjunctures for a new realm of emancipatory 
potential with practical relevancy to contemporary challenges, the English Civil War 
presented a privileged scenario pregnant with characteristic lineages of radicalism. In 
the days of the Popular Front, this area of inquiry had been engaged by numerous 
historians on the left, including E. Meyer, D.M. Wolfe, J. Lindsay and Montague Slater, 
while the publication of volumes such as A.S.P. Woodhouse’s Puritanism and Liberty 
(1938), which reproduced verbatim the Putney Debates of 1647, made the political and 
ideological context of the Revolutionary period widely available and immediately 
relevant to the socio-political situation of pre-war and wartime Britain.71  
The ideological context in which many of these debates took place, namely the 
Communist or Communist-influenced intellectual circles of the Popular Front days, was 
in turn genealogically involved with or affected by a tradition of Nonconformity which 
found in the Civil War its primal scene and discursive matrix.72 As Raphael Samuel has 
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noted, “[t]he vanguard Party envisaged by the Comintern failed to materialise: what 
remained instead was a rather Calvinist notion of the elect, and it is perhaps indicative 
of this tendency that the Party leadership, then as at all times, contained a quite 
disproportionate number of Scots.”73 Moreover, “[t]he historians recruited to the Party 
in the period of the Popular Front seem to have come, quite largely, from a background 
of ‘liberal dissent’”.74 It was the moral stock of radical Protestantism, whose roots could 
be traced to the climacteric of the 17th century, which animated in several ways the 
drive and commitment of many of these Party activists. As Thompson would tellingly 
claim after his break with the Party in 1956: “[w]e are a protestant people, distrustful of 
system-building: we have not suffered under an ideological orthodoxy, backed by the 
power of the state, for several hundred years.”75 
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2. The Making of English Socialist Humanism 
 
The work carried out by the British Marxist Historians during the period of 
activity of the Party Group and after, has been hailed as a distinguished and peculiar 
contribution, not only to the particular areas of engagement in which these authors 
excelled, but also to the broader field of Marxist theory itself. Their characteristic 
endorsement of an epistemology from “the bottom up” reinforced a particular 
understanding of “class” and “class struggle” as determinate yet dynamic interpretative 
horizons for historical inquiry.  
The influence of the French “history of mentalities” as practised, for example, by 
the Annales School, and of the work of scholars of the French Revolution such as 
Georges Lefebvre (who popularised the notion of “history from below”) and Albert 
Soboul, was paramount.1 These historians’ collective contribution towards a dynamic 
conception of class was perhaps taken to its most developed expression in the work of 
E.P. Thompson: The Making of the English Working Class constitutes a paradigmatic 
elaboration upon the formative specificities of the working class in the period between 
1790 and 1832. In this rendition, class does not emanate from a purely structural 
determination, but is played out in a series of contingent elements which can be 
identified as part of a historical process.2 In the preface to the book, Thompson defined 
class as a “historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly 
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unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness.”3 It is 
through the concrete, immanent articulation of a relationship (a community of interest 
leading to a community of experience) which crystallises in consciousness that class 
effectively “happens”. Class is thus not a pre-given category to be apprehended before 
or outside real eventuation: “[l]ike any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades 
analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomize its structure.”4 
This dynamic articulation of historical concepts essentially repudiated the high 
theoretical gesture implied by Marxists of continental provenance or influence (notably, 
at the time of publication of The Making of the English Working Class, Anderson and 
Nairn)5 and the fundamental disregard this entailed for a genuinely emancipatory and 
anti-authoritarian recuperation of past conjunctures. Thus, for example, the abstraction 
of a totalising “mode of production” from the immanent complexity and “fluency” of 
historical phenomena represents, for Thompson, an unjustified and noxious tampering 
with the radical productivity inscribed in the actual historical process. As Ellen 
Meiksins Wood has pointed out, the concept of “mode of production” as rehearsed by 
Marxist theorists in the structuralist tradition, does not seek to account for or 
empirically explicate any real “formation” in society:  
It is as if “real, concrete” historical social formations are composed of 
elements whose inner structural logic is theoretically determined, while 
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historical processes simply break up and recombine these elements in 
various (arbitrary and contingent?) ways. Historical analysis can then do 
little more than describe and classify the combinations of modes of 
production and fragments of modes of production that constitute any given 
social formation.6 
Through this analytical prism, the tangible matter of History is rendered irrelevant by 
virtue of a focal shift towards a superior and theoretically “purer” concern with 
structure. As Wood goes on to observe: “[t]here is in these theoretical principles both 
too much rigid determinism and too much arbitrariness and contingency – that is, too 
much abstract, almost idealist, theoretical determination and not enough historical 
causality.”7 As Gerard McCann has noted:  
The method which [Thompson] employed [in The Making of the English 
Working Class] to chart the development of the working class was intended 
to be a deliberate denial of the methodological rules and laws of social 
historians, historical sociologists and conservative historians, who had 
persistently created “stratification systems” to convey what they interpreted 
to be the structure of a class. Against this, Thompson attributed the 
historical to the human. Class became a historical phenomenon and no 
longer the rigid, objective category of “the sociologist”.8 
In this bold intervention, Thompson thrust his analytical weight and political pathos 
against the ritual dominance of a number of “prevailing orthodoxies”. Notably, the 
epistemological orientation of the book and its central emphasis on process and 
experience from below sought to counter the various distortions propagated by Fabian 
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historiography, a certain brand of empirical economic history and finally, a 
retrospective adherence (“the ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’ orthodoxy”) to figures and moments 
of the past in an attempt to identify “forerunners” and “pioneers” of contemporary 
institutions.9  
While this latter orthodoxy chose to ignore the particular historical substance of 
the studied moments and protagonists, the first two were specifically faulted for their 
recognisable disparagement of a very real human “agency” (of labouring, suffering and 
desiring men and women) which the passive image of victimhood or, alternatively, pure 
statistical objectivity projected by these schools, could hardly accommodate. In contrast, 
Thompson’s approach sought – in some of his most famous words – “to rescue the poor 
stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, 
and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension 
of posterity.”10 This opposition to the smug arrogance of latter-day analytics is perhaps 
the main driving force behind Thompson’s anti-theoretical agenda (which we shall 
discuss at greater length in the next section) and original understanding of historical 
materialism. His definition of class emanates from a detailed engagement with the 
observable subjects of History rather than from a pre-conceived or axiomatic set of 
premises. This basic reformulation – or qualification, rather – of Marxist historical 
method was to accompany Thompson as a central insight towering over the empirical 
wealth of The Making of the English Working Class and subsequent works and 
providing an unending source of controversy with fellow socialists.  
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Fifteen years after the momentous publication of the book, Thompson revisited 
some of his ongoing emphases with fresh theoretical self-reflexivity.11 The notion of 
class which transpired from his archaeology of the English formative moment of 1790-
1832 (and which the preface made explicit, as we have noted) was again redeployed as 
part of a consequential engagement with Marxist conceptuality. The utilisation of the 
concept of “class” as an organising category, as a heuristic means of organising 
historical data cannot be viewed independently of the general notion, in historical 
materialist epistemology, of “class struggle”. It is not that the latter expresses, with the 
utmost empirical accuracy the specific dynamics of all historical processes, but that no 
alternative mode of heuristic description is available. Thus, “class struggle” is a means 
of identifying general dispositions of forces which actually precede the particular 
formation of empirical agents. The theoretical consequence of this assumption, for 
Thompson, is that, however objectively determined, the moment of “class” is always 
consequent upon – and not anterior to – that of “class struggle”. In other words, 
antagonisms can be defined structurally as part of heuristic descriptions (even if the 
particular, empirical details of the descriptions vary), but classes cannot. Classes are not 
to be interpreted as static givens or projections of an immobile conception of the mode 
of production. Rather, they constitute the derivative moment and end-product of 
particular antagonisms (while “class consciousness” alludes to the predicative 
knowledge of that constitution).12  
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The critical point in Thompson’s position is that any notion of structure or 
determination, understood as “the setting of limits” (in a sense which brings him very 
close to the Williams of Marxism and Literature),13 is necessarily second to the rich 
reconstruction of the studied history, its idiosyncratic textures and peculiar hues.14 In 
other words, the principal task of a historical epistemology concerned with the 
democratic recuperation of silenced voices is, precisely, the reconstruction of 
experience. Hence, an appropriate characterisation of Thompson’s approach is that 
which, surpassing the flawed label of “culturalism” (or even the sterner accusations of 
“voluntarism” and “subjectivism”)15 emphasises this latter preoccupation in terms of a 
full-blown “experientialism”.16    
Thompson’s mapping of the formative stages of the English working class 
brings this analytical commitment to experience and empirical detail to an engagement 
with the English equivalent of the menu people of the French Revolution and hence, to 
the particularities, triumphs and failures of an immature (but for that matter, fully 
active) set of proto-political agents.17 Thompson’s bid is to recapture the internal 
rhythms of the multitude and thus to reconstruct its internal development and self-
constitution into the industrial working-class of the nineteenth century. In this process, 
full account is taken of the assumptions and mentalities (however flawed or failed) 
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adopted in the course of this organic evolution. Thompson’s starting point is thus not a 
structuralist definition of objective givens (the developmental stage of capitalism in the 
1790s, for example), but “the tradition of Dissent, and its modification by the Methodist 
revival: the tradition made up of all those loose popular notions which combine in the 
idea of the Englishman’s ‘birthright’; and the ambiguous tradition of the eighteenth-
century ‘mob’”.18 
The revolutionary Protestantism concocted in the various of sects and doctrinal 
formulations of the 1640s and 50s reached the late 1700s radically modulated by the 
experience of political defeat and by the corresponding gentrification of a significant 
part of its epigones (as can be detected in the increasing respectability of eighteenth-
century Quakerism, for example).19 A symptomatic disjunction occurs at the level of 
popular religion in this period, as the theologically advanced resultant of an earlier 
radicalism embraced by the masses came to be regarded as increasingly distanced or 
removed from the immediate social “experience” of the lower strata. Throughout the 
vicissitudes of the eighteenth century, the “Baptists, perhaps, showed the greatest 
consistency: and they remained most Calvinist in their theology and most plebeian in 
their following.”20 Bunyan is singled out as a connecting link between the revolutionary 
mood of the Civil War, the Jacobin moment of the 1790s and the nineteenth-century 
outbreaks ahead. In this light, Pilgrim’s Progress can be read “with Rights of Man, [as] 
one of the two foundation texts of the English working-class movement.” The 
“experience” it tells – crowned by the promise of “an inheritance incorruptible, 
undefiled, and that fadeth not away” – combines “the other-worldly millennium of the 
Saints, who must ‘patiently suffer from this world’” with “‘the lamentable cry’... of 
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those who lost at Putney, and who had no share in the settlement of 1688.”21 In the 
popular reception of the book, Bunyan resumed and rehearsed for present generations of 
“Christ’s poor” the bitter yet hopeful realisations of a century of radical projections. It 
also reaffirmed a vision of the “reward” which had been reserved for the humble and of 
the revenge which the afterlife would mete out to their temporal oppressors in the form 
of eternal punishment.22  
The history of Dissent in the eighteenth-century is nevertheless – and this will be 
a crucial point in the development of Thompson’s argument regarding Methodist 
revivalism – fraught with the tensions of “opposing tendencies, both of which led away 
from any popular appeal: on the one hand, the tendency towards rational 
humanitarianism and fine preaching – too intellectual and genteel for the poor; on the 
other hand the rigid Elect... who stood apart from the ‘corrupt mass’ predestined to be 
damned.”23 Against this backdrop of purity and disconnection from the social language 
of a disenfranchised people, John Wesley’s Methodist Church, with its emphasis on 
evangelism – the motto being “you have nothing to do but save souls” – was to lay the 
foundations of a highly paradoxical channel and milieu for the early formative impulses 
of the nascent working class. Its genealogical ties with the radical theology of the 
preceding century were at their most expressive in the emphasis placed on belonging 
amongst the lower social groups: “the poor man’s Dissent of Bunyan, of Dan Taylor, 
and – later – of the Primitive Methodists was a religion of the poor; orthodox 
Wesleyanism remained as it had commenced, a religion for the poor.”24  
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This direct bearing on the lived experience of the underdog contrasted – and here 
resides the shaping paradox of early Methodism – with the hierarchical organisational 
forms instituted by Wesley. Thus, at “one level the reactionary – indeed, odiously 
subservient – character of official Wesleyanism can be established without the least 
difficulty.”25 Yet on a different level, Methodism led the way in the consolidation of 
“alien democratic tendencies within itself, while at the same time it was serving...as a 
model of other organizational forms.”26 Thompson refers in this context to the 
Kilhamite schism of 1797, which represented, with the establishment of the Methodist 
New Connexion, a condensation of some of the more radical opinions within the 
movement.27 Yet it is among the orthodox and reactionary ranks of the Wesleyan 
faction – especially during the great wave of anti-Jacobin agitation after 1795 – “that 
Methodism made the most headway amongst working people”.28  
Thompson reads the patterns of revivalism which punctuated the period of 
consolidation of the Methodist Church between 1790 and 1830 as a direct function and 
catalyst of popular sentiment in the face of broader political oscillations. Thus the 
characteristic emotionalism of Methodist and Baptist revivals, with their hysterical 
theatrics and “enthusiasm” (“swooning, groaning, crying out, weeping and falling into 
paroxysms”) signals a popular metabolisation of tangible defeat in a context of 
widespread reaction and counter-revolutionary war.29 This political background 
contextualises the otherwise perceptive analyses of Weber and Tawney regarding the 
propinquity of the emergent capitalist ethos and the Puritan ethic.30 In particular, the 
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notorious cult of sublimation fostered by Methodism (“[i]t is difficult to conceive of a 
more essential disorganization of human life, a pollution of the sources of spontaneity 
bound to reflect itself in every aspect of personality”) must be countenanced in the light 
of a general condition of class-antagonism experienced in proto-political terms.31 Thus, 
observes Thompson, “the morbid deformities of ‘sublimation’ are the most common 
aberrations of the poor in periods of social reaction; while paranoiac fantasies belong 
more to periods when revolutionary enthusiasms are released.”32 It is in this precise 
sense that the rise of Methodism must be adjudged: “as a ‘reactive cultural pattern’” 
whose emphasis on chiliasm, rewards in the afterlife and mortification in the temporal, 
are inseparable from the social experience of hopelessness.33 
Compounded with this sublimatory tendency, the formative moment of the 
English working class is inextricable from a deeply ingrained assumption of liberty 
(which often takes the form of a foundational image in the notion of the “freeborn 
Englishman”), whose oscillating trajectory – between defeat and resurgence – provides 
a general background to the 1790-1832 period: 
Liberty of conscience was the one great value which the common people 
had preserved from the Commonwealth. The countryside was ruled by the 
gentry, the towns by corrupt corporations, the nation by the corruptest 
corporation of all: but the chapel, the tavern and the home were their own. 
In the ‘unsteepled’ places of worship there was room for a free intellectual 
life and for democratic experiments with ‘members unlimited’.34 
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This ideological breeding ground – preserved, as we have seen, in the conventicles of 
Dissent and in a coextensive popular culture – was finally let loose, in the early 1790s, 
by the example of the French Revolution. Yet the English agitation of these years, 
Thompson insists, cannot be seen as a mere transposition of French developments: “[i]t 
was an English agitation, of impressive dimensions, for an English democracy.”35 The 
massive impact of Tom Paine and his Rights of Man is inseparable from this native 
ebullience of the popular classes resulting from a native development of Radicalism.36 
In that sense, Thompson argues, “[t]hese English Jacobins were more numerous, and 
more closely resembled the menu people who made the French Revolution, than has 
been recognized. Indeed, they resemble less the Jacobins than the sans-culottes of the 
Paris ‘sections’, whose zealous egalitarianism underpinned Robespierre’s revolutionary 
war dictatorship of 1793-4.”37  
The experience of popular Radicalism, adapted to the political climate and 
international circumstances of the 1790s, was therefore a thoroughly internal growth of 
the nascent working class rather than an external inheritance or imposition. This 
peculiar inflection and idiosyncratic development of English Jacobinism, Thompson 
emphasises, made it reach beyond the often timid pronouncements of radical 
figureheads such as Paine himself.38 Thus the history of one the foremost Jacobin 
groups in England, the London Corresponding Society, provides telling instances of an 
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evolution which cannot be attributed to superior example or to analogy with the French 
context. The Jacobinism of Thomas Spence, for example, or later, of his follower 
Thomas Evans, “took up Paine’s arguments against hereditary aristocracy and carried 
them to their conclusion”, a form of agrarian Socialism: “‘we must destroy [writes 
Spence] not only personal and hereditary Lordship, but the cause of them all, which is 
Private Property in Land.”39This radical and internal development within the 
experiential range of English popular Jacobinism (a development leading from Paine’s 
own “moderate” revolutionism40 to an embryonic doctrine of agrarian Socialism) 
suggests an endogenous potential for self-fashioning which both paternalist and 
excessively objectivist interpretations tend to obfuscate.41  
Thompson’s experientialism, which the historical narrative of The Making 
consistently belabours for over 900 pages, is given overt, and even programmatic, 
expression in passages such as the following:        
The making of the working class is a fact of political and cultural, as much 
as of economic, history. It was not the spontaneous generation of the factory 
system. Nor should we think of an external force – the ‘industrial 
revolution’ – working upon some nondescript undifferentiated raw material 
of humanity, and turning it out at the other end as a ‘fresh race of beings’. 
The changing productive relations and working conditions of the Industrial 
Revolution were imposed, not upon raw material, but upon the free-born 
Englishman – and the free-born Englishman as Paine had left him or as the 
Methodists had moulded him. The factory hand or stockinger was also the 
inheritor of Bunyan, of remembered village rights, of notions of equality 
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before the law, of craft traditions. He was the object of massive religious 
indoctrination and the creator of political traditions. The working class made 
itself as much as it was made.42 
In other words, the objective “determinism” which constitutes the target of Thompson’s 
polemic against, first, Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn, and later Althusser and his brand 
of structuralist Marxism, cannot be projected into a subject-less vacuum and thereby 
cleansed of its experiential marks. The structural developments of capitalism in this 
period are effective “determinants” in the sense that they establish real historical limits 
to the processing of subjective experience,43 but on that account, they do not, of 
themselves, exhaust the formative range of the intervening agents. As a result, both the 
impositions and exertions of a rapidly changing system of production and the hopes and 
responses evinced by the workers generate a “structure of feeling”, in Williams’ 
formulation (as opposed to a deterministically conditioned “reflex”), of its own. In the 
devastation of the moral economy of domesticity and in the corresponding repositioning 
of the role of women, which Thompson analyses to great effect, a richly subjective 
world of working-class life insinuates itself beyond the raw facts of the technological 
revolution.44 Consequently, “[t]he working-class community of the early nineteenth 
century was the product, neither of paternalism nor of Methodism, but in a high degree 
of conscious working-class endeavour. In Manchester or Newcastle the traditions of the 
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trade union and the friendly society, with their emphasis upon self-discipline and 
community purpose, reach far back into the eighteenth century.”45  
 The shift from a prevalent mode of collective response to socio-economic 
transformations of an “objective” nature in the form of “mob” riots to a rather more 
sustained and structured series of “quasi-insurrectionary” expressions, suggests an 
internal evolution and conscious growth of this kind. Against the tide of anti-Jacobin 
reaction around the turn of the century (which culminated in the Combination Acts of 
1799-1800),46 the watershed marked by Luddism (1811-13) cannot be disengaged or 
isolated from a continuous tradition of resistance which builds on past experience whilst 
looking forward to future possibility. An evolutionary line which is not structurally 
dependent on economic change must be respected in this historical reconstruction: 
“Luddism must be seen as arising at the crisis-point in the abrogation of paternalist 
legislation, and in the imposition of the political economy of laissez-faire upon, and 
against the will and conscience of, the working people. It is the last chapter of a story 
which begins in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and whose greater part has been 
told in Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.”47 The interpenetration of 
objective “determinants” and subjective conditions is most eloquent in the case of 
Luddism, which emerges “as a violent eruption of feeling against unrestrained industrial 
capitalism, harking back to an obsolescent paternalist code, and sanctioned by traditions 
of the working community.”48  
Thompson argues against the hasty understatement or systematic relegation, in 
standard historical analysis, of this movement to a pre-revolutionary position without 
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major consequences or relevance to the mature development of the nineteenth-century 
Labour movement. On the contrary, he claims, the significance of Luddism must be 
recognised in the specific combination of backward- and forward-looking features, 
which made it “continually tremble on the edge of ulterior revolutionary objectives”. In 
that sense: 
The Luddites were some of the last guildsmen, and at the same time some of 
the first to launch the agitations which lead on to the 10 Hour Movement. In 
both directions lay an alternative political economy and morality to that of 
laissez faire. During the critical decades of the Industrial Revolution, 
working people suffered total exposure to one of the most humanly 
degrading dogmas in history – that of irresponsible and unlicensed 
competition – and generations of outworkers died under this exposure. It 
was Marx who saw, in the passage of the 10 Hour Bill (1847), evidence that 
for “the first time... in broad daylight the political economy of the middle 
class succumbed to the political economy of the working class.49       
The complexities of a lived mode of resistance, however assailed by contradictions and 
limitations of a historical-objective kind, thus supply the analytical key to a whole way 
of struggle from which the formal cast of class can then (and only then) be deduced.50 A 
native language of independence and anti-authoritarianism grew along the tracks of an 
imposed situation or condition, thereby moulding it into a total experience of resistance 
informed by self-generated notions, hopes and frustrations.  
Throughout The Making of the English Working Class (and particularly in the last 
chapter, significantly entitled “Class Consciousness”), Thompson emphasises the 
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traditions of autodidacticism which more often than not informed the immediate 
background and intellectual substance of working class notions. The libertarian 
corollary to the argument is inescapable. However complicit or coterminous with a 
received Radicalism of patrician provenance, the self-fashioned heritage of popular 
oppositionality incurred a radical anti-hierarchical tone:   
The autodidact had often an uneven, laboured understanding, but it was his 
own. Since he had been forced to find his intellectual way, he took little on 
trust: his mind did not move within the established ruts of a formal 
education. Many of his ideas challenged authority, and authority had tried to 
suppress them. He was willing, therefore, to give a hearing to any new anti-
authoritarian ideas.51 
This certainly accounts for the fluidity – and indeed, instability – of the movement in its 
early formative stages, especially between 1825 and 1835, but it also grants a surer 
understanding of the possibilities generated within a culture whose worldview and 
ideology was not static but rather malleable, and coloured by its “indiscipline” and 
plurality of sources. Thus, for example, the paternalistic model of cooperation 
developed by Robert Owen – despite its own genealogical alienness to the working-
class structure of feeling and intellectual sources –52 could easily find accommodation in 
a variegated tradition composed of fragments (“mob” action, sporadic insurrection, 
Jacobinism, proto-socialism) and yet totalised in a dynamic response to the changes 
brought about by industrial capitalism.  
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 The fact of a “collective self-consciousness” was the indisputable gain of a 
consolidating Industrial Revolution, but this acquisition cannot – once again – be 
written off as an external consequence of material processes beyond the range of lived 
experience. By way of summary, Thompson produces an evocative condensation of the 
meandering and extensive narrative (spanning some forty years of crucial 
transformations) which transacts, principally, as the sympathetic survey of a “heroic 
culture” drenched in the accents and vibrations of fully participating, conscious agents: 
Enriched through the experiences of the seventeenth century, carrying 
through the eighteenth century the intellectual and libertarian traditions 
which we have described, forming their own traditions of mutuality in the 
friendly society and trades club, these men did not pass, in one generation, 
from the peasantry to the new industrial town. They suffered the experience 
of the Industrial Revolution as articulate, free-born Englishmen. Those who 
were sent to gaol might know the Bible better than those on the Bench, and 
those who were transported to Van Diemen’s Land might ask their relatives 
to send Cobbett’s Register after them.53  
 
In the subsequent debate between the first wave of the New Left and the group led 
by Perry Anderson (who would take over the editorship of the New Left Review in 
1963), Thompson was taken to task for what these younger critics regarded as an 
excessively voluntaristic – and hence, insufficiently Marxist – interpretation, and 
consequently, for an overly sanguine portrayal of a working class which their historical 
analysis branded as essentially anomalous and inadequate. Lin Chun, in his history of 
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the New Left, has captured the substance of the charges levelled against the standard of 
labour history raised by The Making of the English Working Class: “Thompson ha[d] 
missed the fatal weaknesses, the defensive character, of the English working class 
which are of vital importance in understanding the problems of the contemporary labour 
movement... This is a major point on which the two New Left generations radically 
divided.”54  
The opening intervention in a debate which would transpire as the “first 
vigorous theoretical engagement by the British New Left” was Anderson’s “Origins of 
the Present Crisis” (followed by a number of developments of its central contentions by 
Tom Nairn and Anderson himself), an important dissection of the problems which in his 
opinion, and that prevalent amongst the second New Left, crippled the British historical 
and social debate.55 Anderson began by pinpointing the “uniqueness” of the British 
situation in the fact that “not one single structural study of our society” was available, 
and further, that “no attempt has even been made at even the outline of a ‘totalizing’ 
history of modern British society.”56  
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The bulk of Anderson’s ensuing argument concentrated on the impossibility of 
constructing a genealogy of modern British history amenable or analogous to the 
paradigm offered by continental (especially French) models. The study of the English 
Revolution and of the subsequent development undergone in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in particular revealed the structural anomaly of a class – the 
bourgeoisie – which failed to attain a position of dominance according to the standard 
schema of capitalist evolution as encountered elsewhere. The dramatic consequences of 
this subordination could be felt, not only in the abnormal social pre-eminence retained 
by the aristocracy (which thereafter managed to impose its cultural and ideological 
outlook upon the rest of society as the universal class), but most symptomatically, in the 
dysfunctional development of a proletariat deprived of an ordinary transition to 
capitalist relations of production and hence subordinately entrenched in backward and 
piecemeal habits of opposition. Furthermore, the English proletariat was, in a very 
definite sense (just as the Revolution had been, in the 1640s), premature. Thus, 
“England experienced the first industrial revolution, in a period of international 
counter-revolutionary war, producing the earliest proletariat when socialist theory was 
least formed and available”.57 And it was, paradoxically, in this early formative stage – 
covered by Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class – when the working 
class managed to evince its “maximum ardour and insurgency”. 58  
 Anderson’s assessment of Britain’s development since the Revolution 
modulated the historical appreciation of such notions as “agency” and “resistance” (so 
central, as we have seen, to Thompson’s epistemology) in a sharply distinct direction. 
The end-balance of a historical survey of the (in Thompson’s words) “sub-political” 
traditions of resistance which underpinned, in their multiple idioms and fragmentary 
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emphases, the oppositional subject and experience of insubordination – from 
Jacobinism, through Luddism to Chartism – was, according to Anderson, nil. The roots 
of this notorious insignificance can be traced directly to the Revolution itself which, on 
account of its very prematurity, its “primitive” and “pre-Enlightenment character”, 
proved incapable of generating a “universal tradition”. Consequently, the revolutionary 
exertions of 1640-1660 came to nothing and were rapidly dispelled in a settlement (that 
of 1688) whose prime beneficiary was not the bourgeoisie but the landed aristocracy: 
“Never was a major revolutionary ideology neutralized and absorbed so completely. 
Politically, Puritanism was a useless passion.”59   
Anderson and Nairn’s terms of analysis of this allegedly anomalous and 
paralytic situation were derived from the Gramscian stock. In “Origins of the Present 
Crisis”, Anderson analyses the relative position of the classes in terms of the notion of 
hegemony:  
Hegemony was defined by Gramsci as the dominance of one social bloc 
over another, not simply by means of force or wealth, but by a social 
authority whose ultimate sanction and expression is a profoundly cultural 
supremacy... The hegemonic class is the primary determinant of 
consciousness, character and customs throughout the society. This tranquil 
and unchallenged sovereignty is a relatively rare historical phenomenon. In 
England, however, the unparalleled temporal continuity of the dominant 
class has produced a striking example of it.60 
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The hegemony wielded by the English dominant bloc is not the unified, and developed 
ideology of a “mature” bourgeoisie, but rather a slapdash mass of “commonplace 
prejudices and taboos.” The critical historical watershed remained that chronological 
abyss between the moment of the Commonwealth and that of French Jacobinism. 
Unlike in the evolution of 1789-95, English social structures were stabilised under the 
political weight of a recognisably feudal élite which subsequently managed to co-opt 
the bourgeoisie as an adjunct to its own interests and worldview.  
“Traditionalism” and “empiricism” were, according to Anderson, the inevitable 
ideological by-products of this situation.61 And it was in the blinkered perspective of 
these traditions that the English proletariat (thereby bereft of solid rationalist 
constructions in the continental mould) was steeped for its own exertions. Utilitarianism 
in particular, was “transmitted” as ever so many “deadly germs... from which the 
Labour Party has so manifestly sickened in the twentieth century.”62 As a result, 
Fabianism – typically adorned with “[c]omplacent confusion of influence with power, 
bovine admiration for bureaucracy, ill-concealed contempt for equality, bottomless 
philistinism” –63 represents the most advanced ideology of a native English tradition 
which, for the most part, remained immune to the enlightened complexities of Marxism. 
 Thompson’s riposte in “The Peculiarities of the English” confronted Anderson’s 
arguments with a wealth of historical detail, whilst re-inscribing the terms of debate 
within the ethical and political idiom of The Making of the English Working Class. 
Against Anderson’s theoretical compression of English capitalist development into a 
schematic model derived from the French experience, and in particular against the 
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problematical reluctance of both Nairn and Anderson to credit a predominantly agrarian 
class with the defining traits of a representative bourgeoisie, Thompson argued with 
characteristic panache and polemical vigour that: 
It is a strain on one’s semantic patience to imagine a class of bourgeois 
scattered across a countryside and dwelling on their estates, and it is easier 
to see in mercantile capital “the only truly bourgeois kernel of the 
revolution.” But if we forget the associations with the French model which 
the term introduces, and think rather of the capitalist mode of production, 
then clearly we must follow Marx in seeing the landowners and farmers as a 
very powerful and authentic capitalist nexus.64   
The mechanistic conceptualisation of classes which suggests itself in Anderson’s 
“Origins” appears to neglect the specific conditions under which English capitalism was 
adumbrated. Most crucially, argues Thompson, these authors’ refusal to acknowledge a 
clear line of capitalist development in the English countryside during the early 
nineteenth century effectively overlooks a specifically English (or rather British, one 
should say) contribution which certainly reaches beyond the imputed obscurantism of 
native ideologies: laissez faire. In this regard, Thompson claims, it is important to 
remember that the productive conditions underpinning Adam Smith’s doctrinal 
breakthrough were intimately connected with the requirements of an emergent agrarian 
capitalism: “we persistently forget that laissez faire emerged, not as the ideology of 
some manufacturing lobby, not as the intellectual yam turned out by the cotton mills, 
but in the great agricultural corn-belt.”65  
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The emergence of a coherent and unified capitalist ideology in laissez faire 
moreover represents the fundamental dismantling of the preceding “moral economy” of 
“provision”, in whose wake the formative expressions of working-class antagonism 
traced in The Making were concocted. The latter actively responded to “an anti-political 
economy whose harsh profit-and-loss purgatives voided the body politic of old notions 
of duty, mutuality, and paternal care” and which had little to do with the aristocratic 
Weltanschauung branded by Anderson as hegemonic in the English development.66 By 
summarily reducing the position of the bourgeoisie to that of a corporate class – without 
the empirical sanction sought by Thompson – and in consequently defusing the 
historical value of working-class resistance (on account of its pre-Marxist 
ineffectiveness), Anderson and Nairn perform an exercise of theoretical closure with 
pervasive – and notorious – avatars, as we will see, in Thompson’s polemical oeuvre.  
These authors’ analysis of the intellectual heritage of the British tradition entails 
a singularly crippling limitation to their argument. As Thompson argues, “after skipping 
over the entire phase of the heroic annunciation of bourgeois individualism, in which 
the English contribution, if somewhat late, was by no possible account negligible”,67 
Anderson and Nairn’s criticism of the nation’s intellectual insularity (resumed in the 
alternate poles of “traditionalism” and “empiricism”) goes on to blur and deprecate 
those native traditions by an exercise of extraction from their specific historical 
contexts. Notably (and we shall see the significance of this point for Thompson’s own 
historical and political appreciation of the Puritan revolutionary tradition), “to ignore 
the importance of the protestant and bourgeois-democratic inheritance” is, patently, to 
ignore the “historic strengths” of a particular conjuncture.68 The object of Thompson’s 
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rebuke is obviously Anderson’s foregoing claim that the “ideological legacy of the 
Revolution was almost nil”:  
All those sermons and pamphlets, all that prayer before battle, all that 
wrangling about oaths and altars and bishops, all that sectarian 
fragmentation, which Anderson finds so unenlightened, so sadly distanced 
from real economic motives, was in fact part of an epochal cultural 
confrontation. The English Revolution was fought out in religious terms, not 
because the participants were confused as to their real interests but because 
religion mattered... A man’s right of property in his own conscience and 
religious allegiances had become just as real, and momentarily more real, 
than economic property rights. At this point in the growth of the human 
mind, the psychic crisis between old modes and new was exactly here.69  
Moreover, the contributions of this “premature” revolutionary outbreak were not 
necessarily structured or organised on a centralised or unitary model – as “an 
independent intellectual enclave” – but rather scattered across a “multiplicity of 
initiatives” and visions of systemic transformation which, in their particular (and 
assuredly, sometimes deluded) ways, all nurtured the imaginaries and intellectual 
universes of the English working class.70 
Anderson and Nairn’s utilisation of the concept of hegemony in the context of 
this historical evolution is, according to Thompson, a scarcely useful attempt to 
reformulate old terms of description – and more often than not, commination – long 
brandished by the Left. Thus the terms “hegemonic” and “corporate”, as these authors 
deploy them, can be rendered as the traditional distinction between “revolutionary” and 
                                                          
69
 Thompson, ibid., 331-332 
70
 Thompson, ibid., 332, 335 
153 
 
“reformist”.71 Far from dispensing with the theory altogether, however, Thompson 
confronts the central term itself – Gramsci’s egemonia –, wresting it from the 
unhistorical formalisation to which Anderson and Nairn subject it: “it would be 
unfortunate if this man-handling of the concept were to distract attention from 
Gramsci’s deeply cultured and original (if frequently ambiguous) insights. Gramsci 
wrote, not about hegemonic classes but the hegemony of a class”:72    
By ‘hegemony’ Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political situation, in his 
terminology a ‘moment’, in which the philosophy and practice of a society 
fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and 
thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout 
society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its 
spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all 
social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation.73  
The danger implicit in Anderson’s description of hegemonic and corporate classes in 
the context of British historical development is that it “fails to give adequate weight not 
only to the sociological strengths of British reformism but also to its real 
achievements.”74 These strengths, even taken within their objective historical 
limitations, are nevertheless undeniable. But these authors’ corollary is, in the sense 
suggested by Thompson, the natural outcome of a ritual formalisation of theory (an 
excessively static and mechanistic application of the “model”) which fails to account for 
processes in their actual dynamic complexity. This theoretical snare, claims Thompson, 
is by no means an intrinsic consequence of the notion of hegemony as defined above, 
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but a crippling derivative of an axiomatic tendency in certain Marxisms.75 Thus 
“[n]othing is more easy than to take a model to the proliferating growth of actuality, and 
to select from it only such evidence as is in conformity with the principles of 
selection.”76  
This dangerous proclivity, warns Thompson, was notoriously characteristic of 
Marxist orthodoxy in the bleakest years of the Communist movement. It is an insistent 
tendency in economism and those theoretical reductionisms which fail to account for 
the inherently complex distributions of non-economic phenomena in human history. It 
is therefore crucial to “remember that social and cultural phenomena do not trail after 
the economic at some remote remove: they are, at their source, immersed in the same 
nexus of relationship”; and moreover, that much historically significant opposition to 
capitalism is articulated as an overt “resistance to capitalism’s innate tendency to reduce 
all human relationships to economic definitions.”77 Although Thompson refrains from 
explicitly linking Anderson and Nairn’s variety of Gramscism (or pseudo-Gramscism) 
to the extensive notion of “Stalinism” which consistently informs his polemical 
arsenal,78 the basic outline of his famous engagement with Marxist “high theory” and of 
his identification, in the work of Louis Althusser  and his School, of precisely the sort of 
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intellectual rigidity which stood behind the break of 1956, is already laid down in this 
famous exchange with the younger New Left.  
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3.  History, Utopia and the Limits of Theory  
 
Thompson’s The Poverty of Theory (1978) was a late vindication of the 
foundational urge which had animated the Party Historians’ Group as well as an 
idiosyncratic refutation of a theoretical lineage which, in its dogmatic commitment to 
orthodoxy, was seen as inimical to the epistemological specificity of its historical 
object. According to Thompson, Theory’s assault upon the matter of History 
(capitalisation is Thompson’s) implies a renunciation of historical materialism and a 
reification of Marxism’s political horizon and logical terminus (human emancipation). 
As he puts it early on in the essay: “Althusser and his acolytes challenge, centrally, 
historical materialism itself. They do not offer to modify it but to displace it. In 
exchange they offer an a-historical theoreticism which, at the first examination, 
discloses itself as idealism.”1  
A central aspect of Thompson’s indictment of Althusser and his brand of 
Marxism is the claim that the latter’s epistemology lacks a necessary – for the specific 
tasks of historical inquiry – category of “experience” (which, as we have seen, plays a 
fundamental practical role in his more historiographic work), that is, a dynamic 
understanding of “social being’s impingement upon social consciousness”.2 As a result, 
his conclusions “falsify” the “dialogue with empirical evidence” (the productive 
condition of historical knowledge) confusing method with epistemology (i.e. the 
empirical confrontation of analytical categories with “empiricism” as a specific 
ideological formation).  The peculiarity of historical endeavour resides, according to 
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Thompson, in the intrinsic mobility of its object and in its irreducibility to the inertia of 
a philosophical given. For the historian, a daily engagement with social processes – with 
the ever shifting mass of stirrings and mutations in “social being” – compels an 
awareness of the radical impermanence of its associated consciousness. “Experience” 
introduces a medial function in the organisation of social consciousness, acting as a 
determining factor in its constitution and responding, in the first instance, to social 
transformations of an objective kind. Historical experience is then, in a sense, 
inextricable from the provision of “raw materials” upon which intellectual or scientific 
elaboration subsequently builds. However, and this is the critical point which misses the 
structuralist eye, experience “does not arrive obediently in the way that Althusser 
proposes”.3 Rather, it “walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths, 
crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide”.4  
 Althusser’s approach to History consists of a series of self-validating and 
notoriously “a-historical” logical steps: first, Theory posits the “existence” of an 
external – material – world of social reality whose determination is “in the last instance” 
economic. This claim is supported, not by any demonstrative footwork of its own, but 
by authoritative reference to Marx’s mature work – that is, by recourse to a received set 
of conclusions constituted as “knowledge”, which it is the specific philosophical task of 
the historical materialist to confirm and enhance in their self-referentiality. Thus, 
Marx’s work reaches the Althusserian laboratory as “raw material” – in what is called 
Generalities I –; it is then scrutinised by the analytical apparel of the philosopher 
“according to principles of ‘science’ derived from its mature apercus, unstated 
assumptions, implicit methodologies, etc.” – at the level denominated Generalities II – 
only to be reinvested as “concrete knowledge” in a basic restatement of the preliminary 
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Marxian postulates in Generalities III.5 The logical articulation of this epistemology is 
thus exemplary of a marked strand in philosophy committed to the obfuscation of its 
declared object of study through the production of self-serving thought-processes. This, 
according to Thompson, is best described by the term “idealism”: “[s]uch idealism 
consists, not in the positing or denial of the primacy of an ulterior material world, but in 
a self-generating conceptual universe which imposes its own ideality upon the 
phenomena of material and social existence, rather than engaging in continual dialogue 
with these.”6 
All throughout his polemic, Thompson is concerned with the loss of historical 
relevancy (of context-specific rapports) at the hands of philosophical formalism, which 
he perceives to be a looming temptation, throughout the Marxist tradition commencing 
with Marx himself, to gradually obfuscate the historically informed critique of Classical 
Political Economy (as consecrated by Smith, Ricardo and Malthus) into a static system 
of immutable categories and laws. 7 This is precisely the solipsistic gesture replicated by 
Althusser: a gesture, however, for whose inception he cannot be held exclusively 
responsible. Thus, in Thompson’s opinion, Marx himself: 
[W]as caught into a trap: the trap baited by ‘Political Economy’… he had 
been sucked into a theoretical whirlpool… Value, capital, labour, money, 
value, reappear again and again, are interrogated, re-categorised, only to 
come round once more on the revolving currents in the same old forms, for 
the same interrogation.8  
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The inevitability or theoretical necessity of this immanent bent is disputed on the 
grounds that Marx’s absorption into the ideational system of Political Economy was 
consequent upon his entry into that conceptual universe. Before that moment, this 
“structure” (Political Economy) “appeared to Marx as ideology, or, worse, 
apologetics”.9 Once “inside” the system, however, the epistemological hierarchies of his 
critical target became the conceptual boundaries within which he was constrained to 
operate. Thus, “the economy” or “the economic” – the cornerstone of this discursive 
structure – supplied the parameters and the limits of his inquiry. The leap from Capital 
to capitalism – according to Thompson, the a-historical transgression initiated by and 
consummated beyond Marx – reveals the intrinsic idealism of a strategy which lacks the 
resources to account for a reality (essentially mobile, fluid and complex) beyond its 
scope. It purports to extend a restricted conceptuality (the province of Political 
Economy) to the whole of society “conceived as an ‘organic system’”. And yet, “the 
whole of society comprises many activities and relations (of power, of consciousness, 
sexual, cultural, normative) which are not the concern of Political Economy, which have 
been defined out of Political Economy, and for which it has no terms.” 10             
The question of agency is very much at stake in the conceptual ratio between 
structure and process, between a disembodied yet determining sphere of rational 
mechanisms and the irreducible fluctuation of historical events. For Althusser, “what 
makes such and such an event historical is not the fact that it is an event, but precisely 
its insertion into forms which are themselves historical”.11 In other words, historical 
process is subsumed within overarching structures (modes of production, social 
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formations) whose genesis as historical eventuation is altogether unclear and whose 
nominal exclusion of measurable – empirical – human agency qua determining factor is 
complete. This “eviction” is central to the conceptual articulation of Althusser’s 
structuralism, which is, “like all structuralisms, a system of closure”: “[i]t fails to effect 
the distinction between structured process, which, while subject to determinate 
pressures, remains open-ended and only partially-determined, and a structured whole, 
within which process is encapsulated”.12 The latter inevitably reduces the role and scope 
of particular human agents to a negligible accident in the determination of historical 
events, and confines historical conjunctures to an eminently anti-historical stasis of 
“multiple subordinate and dominant determinations” rather than rendering them as the 
fluid and ever dynamic substance which transpires from concrete historical analysis. 
From this latter perspective, each moment, each particular “now” transacts as a 
“moment of becoming, of alternative possibilities, of ascendant and descendant 
forces”.13 As Thompson remarks, between these two conceptions of History – one 
privileging process as an irreducible dynamic and the other projecting structural 
determinations over agency – lies the “unbridgeable gulf” separating “Necessity (or 
Vico’s divine will) and Morris’s ever-baffled but ever-resurgent human agents.”14 
The notion of class is (here and, as we have seen, everywhere in Thompson’s 
oeuvre) a precise locus in which the dynamic ontology of historical process is played 
out. In a conceptual elaboration which takes up the better part of Thompson’s 
intellectual engagement, class is articulated “at the intersection of determination and 
self-activity”, a fundamental premise of historical materialism combining the 
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determinate profile of given material conditions and the open structure of “becoming”.15 
Class cannot be deduced “from a static ‘section’ (since it is a becoming over time), nor 
as a function of a mode of production, since class formations and class consciousness 
(while subject to determinate pressures) eventuate in an open-ended process of 
relationship – of struggle with other classes – over time.”16 The term “becoming” 
acquires a specific relevance in this context, as the touchstone of an epistemological 
reversal (of Theory) on the basis of which a distinctive articulation of the Marxist 
heritage may be achieved. This notion of “becoming” is furthermore invested with a 
dense referential content derived from an alternative, “possibilistic” stock of philosophy 
(notably from the contemporaneous work of Deleuze and Guattari),17 and to whose 
outer remit Thompson’s thought is unlikely to have remained immune.                
Althusserian structuralism, in its obstinate assault upon historical dynamics, 
reproduces a general paralysis of thought which earlier brands of Marxism had 
systematically turned into practical-political rigidity. “Stalinism” functions in this 
particular context, and in the ensemble of Thompson’s work, as a category of political 
and epistemological censure denoting an adherence to crippling orthodoxy. The term 
becomes synonymous with any active production of theoretical obfuscation substituting 
conceptual stasis for the supple forms of socially and politically relevant analysis and 
parading a stale rhetoric of “Science” against a background of human devastation. 
Thompson’s conflation of a specific historical constellation (Stalinism) with the 
philosophical developments of the Marxian tradition found in Althusser’s work has 
been strongly criticised by Perry Anderson in his book Arguments Within English 
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Marxism on account of its alleged disregard for context and, especially, for the 
particular historical background against which Althusser’s intervention must be 
placed.18 Anderson makes a fair point of this silencing or overlooking of a crucial 
conjuncture which should not have escaped the attention of a historian concerned with 
empirical verification. However, the validity of Thompson’s imputations – and 
generally, of his capacious notion of Stalinism – must be assessed within the parameters 
of his own experience and of the historical process with which it is involved – if this 
analytical category is to be granted the epistemological and ethical prominence it claims 
within his work. So here we begin to divine the lineaments of Thompson’s overall 
strategy, as being less concerned with exposing a vitiated philosophical paradigm in The 
Poverty of Theory than with promoting a utopian vision whose ethical, political and 
epistemological continuities are firmly rooted in and evolved from the foundational 
moment of his political “awakening” in 1956 – the year of the “double exposure” of the 
Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution.  
This principled indictment of Stalinism as an expansive phenomenon of noxious 
political practice and crippling intellectual construction had its first full-scale 
formulation in an article published in The New Reasoner in 1957.19 This early 
articulation of Thompson’s long-term political agenda announced some of the terms 
which would subsequently accommodate his scathing critique of structuralist 
“idealism”, including a rejection of “the dogmatism and abstractions of the heart” and 
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an advocacy, in their stead, “of a warm, personal and humane socialist morality.”20 The 
language of morality so ardently invoked by Thompson in 1957 and then resumed with 
such vigour in 1978 must be envisaged as the central constituency of his approach to 
Marxism. As we are told in the final pages of The Poverty of Theory:  
There are two traditions, whose bifurcation and disengagement from each 
other has been slow, and whose final declaration of irreconcilable 
antagonism was delayed – as an historical event – until 1956… Libertarian 
Communism, and the socialist and Labour movement in general, can have 
no business with theoretical practice except to expose it and drive it out.21  
The events of 1956 brought lingering assumptions concocted in the Stalinist 
mode to an abrupt end. The proven inability to process internal dissent and the abject 
submission to Soviet dictate cast the British Communist Party in the dim light of 
unregenerate dogmatism. As we have noted, historians were at the forefront of protest 
and opposition to official policy in a relatively solid front of internal resistance. The 
Soviet crushing of the Hungarian Revolution prompted a letter – signed by Hobsbawm, 
Hill, Hilton and Kiernan, among others – in which the Party’s consistent manipulation 
and repression of dissidence was acerbically denounced as an “undesirable culmination 
of years of distortion of fact, and the failure by British Communists to think out political 
problems for themselves.”22 A searching commitment to moral thinking – in other 
words, to the avoidance of “tactical” falsity as practised by official Communism – 
similarly lay at the root of the most remarkable venture in intellectual dissidence to 
emerge out of the CPGB in the 1950s: E.P. Thompson and John Saville’s The Reasoner.      
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This editorial undertaking was preceded by clamouring denunciations, by both 
Saville and Thompson, of Party intransigence. In a notorious article submitted to World 
News and Views (a leading forum of Party debate), entitled “Winter Wheat in Omsk”, 
Thompson made no effort to disguise his vexation at what he considered, quoting 
Milton, the Janus face of “rigid external formality” and “gross conforming stupidity”, as 
displayed by Party strategists: 
Comrade John Saville, in a recent letter, referred to the weakening tradition 
of controversy in the Party in recent years. This is true. How often has the 
routine of the unanimous vote, the common front against the class enemy, 
the search ‘for the correct formulation’, inhibited the development of sharp 
controversy. 
 Year after year the Monolith, from its cave somewhere inside For a 
Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy, has droned on in a dogmatic 
monotone, without individual variation, without moral inflexion, without 
native dialect.23 
The article sparked immediate controversy within the Political Committee and was 
consequently “edited” from its original word count of 1,700 to a bare 1,000, in an 
unequivocal gesture of censorship. Thompson’s argument was self-styled as a re-
connection with the ancestry of British radical discourse, with the moral militancy of 
Lilburne, Winstanley, Cobbett, Ernest Jones, William Morris and Tom Mann – a 
committed invocation, in sum, of those native forbears of the British anti-capitalist 
tradition of whom the CPGB claimed to be the rightful successor.24 An earnest and 
passionate adjuration which, predictably, fell on deaf ears as the Party’s Executive 
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Committee “droned on” in a characteristic disregard for “native dialect”. Saville and 
Thompson’s response to the Party’s obduracy came in July 1956, with the publication 
of the first issue of their “Journal of Discussion”. This remarkable editorial venture – 
thirty-two mimeographed pages produced between Halifax and Hull, where Thompson 
and Saville lived, respectively –25 borrowed its title from an early nineteenth-century 
Jacobin publication by John Bone and stamped its combative rationale with a telling 
epigraph by Marx: “[t]o leave error unrefuted is to encourage intellectual immorality.”  
The declared aim of The Reasoner, as stated in the first issue, was to “perform a 
practical service in loosening up the constricted forms within which discussion between 
Communists has taken place in recent years.”26 In other words, the journal sought to 
take issue with Stalinism in all its width and breadth, not only as a “political 
philosophy” of arid theoretical resources, but most critically, as an “organisational 
logic” designed to stifle the free expression of intellectual liberty.27 So-called 
“democratic centralism”, the strategic cornerstone of Communist organisation, was 
therefore attacked on the argument that a basic incompatibility existed between the 
policy of submission to “majority” rule (that is, to the hierarchical imposition of 
executive dictate) and respect for alleged “freedom of discussion” as encapsulated in the 
formula of democratic centralism itself: “freedom of discussion, unity of action”.         
In all, a total of three issues appeared, in July, September and a final number 
intended for October, which finally appeared in November. Disciplinary action was 
immediately taken against the editors, and a District meeting was held with the 
Yorkshire branch in August. Both Saville and Thompson, present at the said meeting, 
refused to comply with instructions to cease publication of The Reasoner. The editors 
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were subsequently called to the Party Headquarters in London, where the demand made 
by the District Committee was reiterated. By 5 September, however, as a letter 
published in World News specified, a second issue was “in active preparation”.28  
The events of late October in Hungary precipitated the resolution of a tense 
series of exchanges between the journal editors and the Party Executive. A third and 
final number of The Reasoner appeared on 4 November, which clearly revealed the 
stalemate reached by dissidents and Party officials: the slim phrasing of the planned 
version for this last issue – drafted in October – underwent last-minute changes to 
include an article, “Through the Smoke of Budapest”, in which Thompson expounded 
the qualitative leap implicitly rehearsed by the international situation – the 
consequential passage from Stalinist checks on freedom to Stalinist tanks in the streets: 
I had intended in this article to attempt some definitions of Stalinism, to 
enter into some questions of theory which our British leadership refuses to 
discuss, and to consult with readers upon the best way to rid our party of 
Stalinist theory and practice. 
But these points of theory have now found dramatic expression in the great 
square of Warsaw and amid the smoke of Budapest. It is difficult to speak at 
all in the teeth of a whirlwind. And if we have helped, in some small degree, 
to sow the wind, do we have the right to speak?29    
The breach had been consummated and temporal suspension from militancy ensued. 
However, by the time of publication, both Thompson and Saville had reached the 
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conclusion that the Party was unreformable, and presented their resignation in writing 
on 14 November.30 
With this departure from institutional Communism, Thompson and Saville 
embarked upon a new editorial project which would ultimately lead to the constitution 
of a reformulated brand of radicalism. The New Reasoner – significantly subtitled A 
Journal of Socialist Humanism, first appeared in the summer of 1957.31 It arose directly 
from the stem and the substance of debate conducted by its forerunner, whilst 
expanding the scope of thematic engagement with a wide range of interests, from art 
and literary criticism to creative writing and political argument proper. Doctrinally, 
Thompson and Saville steered the new publication firmly in the direction of de-
Stalinisation, in a double operation of theoretical definition (of the Stalinist 
“phenomenon” as such) and critical veering towards a “native” idiom of Communism. 
  The political and intellectual co-ordinates of The New Reasoner were situated, 
according to its first editorial, between the “traditionally pragmatic and anti-theoretical 
bias of the British labour movement” and the parallel fossilisations of international 
Marxism secured by the “state orthodoxy” of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, on the one 
hand, and by “dogmatic Trotskyism”, on the other. The editors justified their 
intervention as a necessary bridge between the “intuitive” logic of left-wing Labourism 
(consecrated in Tribune and buttressed by the “robust intuition of Mr. Bevan”) and “that 
great body of socialists who desire not only to act but also to understand the context and 
aim of their actions.”32 
In his inaugural intervention, “Socialist Humanism: An Epistle to the Philistines”, 
Thompson offered a systematic analysis of Stalinism and a vindication of the 
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“humanism” intrinsic to the socialist tradition. His polemic begins with a 
characterisation of Stalinism as an ideology in the classic Marxist sense, that is, as “a 
constellation of partisan attitudes and false, or partially false, ideas.”33 Stalinism 
originated as a fossilisation of certain tendencies already present in the international 
working-class movement – in particular, a propensity to rely on the collective institution 
(the union, the party) in defiance of characteristically middle-class expressions of 
“individualism”. Thompson sees the vitiated base/superstructure model in its 
mechanical Stalinist inflection as providing the theoretical template for a calculated 
flourishing of dogma. Under its conceptual sphere, the free, dynamic and creative flow 
of ideas which consciously intervene upon social phenomena, are reduced to pallid 
reflections of a “semi-automatic” mechanism:  
Thus, conscious processes of intellectual conflict were seen not as agencies 
in the making of history but as an irritating penumbra of illusions, or 
imperfect reflections, trailing behind economic forces. The ideas of critics 
or opponents were, and are, seen as symptoms of bourgeois conspiracy or 
penetration, targets for abuse, or fear, or suspicion.34 
This anti-intellectual inertia gravitates towards a fetishistic concern for impersonal 
abstractions and partisan generalisations, a manic adeptness at “iron laws” and 
processes in opposition to the free agency of concrete, situation-bound, human beings.   
The deficient “reflection model” fails to account for the fluid emergence of new 
ideas in any given historical situation: “it is of first importance that men do not only 
“reflect” experience passively; they also think about that experience; and their thinking 
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affects the way they act.”35 Thompson goes on to concede that the theoretical construct 
of base and superstructure, even if it was never intended as a mechanical gauge by Marx 
and Engels, is nevertheless constitutionally flawed, even in its didactic-metaphorical 
sense, lending itself to the sort of deterministic misappropriation deployed by Stalinism: 
“In fact, no such basis and superstructure ever existed”, for the only real, observable, 
unit in historical social relations (however linked to the “development of the productive 
forces”) remains concrete human agency.36 It is this conscious engagement in specific 
actions which effectively makes up the economic base, as the latter is ultimately 
composed of relations from which human experience (concrete, measurable, 
experience) is by no means absent. Stalinism turned a mechanistic reflex into a 
convenient form of control: seen through the narrow prism of economic determinism, 
the free flow of ideas inherent to intellectual activity was unequivocally interpreted “as 
the last desperate rallying of an old “superstructure””.37 Ideas were thus evicted from 
the realm of agency and consigned to the sphere of symptoms – mirror-images in a pre-
determined system of precise correspondences.  
Sins in theory were not, however, without consequence in the plane of morals. 
Anti-intellectualism (a deeply ingrained prejudice against “ideas”) coalesced in practical 
terms as moral “partisanship”, as an organic dependency on the bureaucratic apparatus 
of Party and State. Theoretical dogma paved the way for a radical dehumanisation of 
moral judgements, turning concrete human beings – again – into the impersonal tools of 
abstract historical processes.38 Totalitarian practices were thus aided by an ideology 
which had first managed to exclude life from its framework, laying the foundations of a 
vicious edifice of self-deceit and manipulation. For there is a very real sense, claims 
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Thompson, in which Stalinist ideology, “like all ideologies”, functioned as a form of 
“self-alienation”, deriving inhumane rules of action (such as those consecrated by 
“democratic centralism”) from the lifeless inertia of abstractions and quasi-natural laws 
(“it is far easier to be inhumane if one takes a non-human model”).39 
Thompson’s renunciation of Theory and dogma (in an often insinuated 
identification which connects the direct political concerns of the late 1950s to his later 
scholarly polemics) and his resulting postulation of Socialist commitment as an 
inherently “libertarian” endeavour need not be seen, however, as a dangerous retreat 
into irrationalism.40 The moralistic fibre of his polemical thrust is principally developed 
from William Morris and a native English utopian tradition whose intellectual 
credentials and resulting conceptuality (however “voluntaristic”) thoroughly shape his 
epistemology and political vision (whereby the categories of “experience” and “agency” 
join forces to offer an integrated dynamic of social and historical process).41  
In effect, the inescapable locus of Thompson’s oeuvre remains his enduring – 
and evolving – engagement with Morris, commencing at (or shortly before) the time of 
his “socialist humanist” prise de conscience in 1956. William Morris: Romantic to 
Revolutionary, a massive volume of literary and social history, was originally published 
in 1955 and it both heralded and pre-dated by a number of years the great cultural 
breakthrough associated with the publication of Raymond Williams’s Culture and 
Society and Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy. It has been suggested that, for all 
its originality and intellectual prescience, its failure to make an impact and rise to 
emblematic prominence as a landmark of the emergent concern with culture is directly 
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related to its historical conjuncture (which inevitably informs its argument) and 
genealogical position as a pre-56 Communist book.42  
Thompson’s principal aim in William Morris is to salvage a specifically 
Morrisian heritage from the debilitating fixations of an intellectual posterity bent on 
trimming his politics of any uncomfortable trace of revolutionary commitment. 
According to Thompson this tendency had been on the rise virtually since the time of 
Morris’s death in 1896, only reaching a contextually-motivated climax under the 
particular exigencies and circumstances of the Cold War. In the intervening years 
(especially the 1920s and 30s), “[h]is Socialism was generally understood to be little 
more than advanced democratic sentiments, given unusually practical expression, 
combined with medieval nostalgia and a Ruskinian hang-over.”43 Thompson is 
particularly critical of contemporary (that is, Cold War) attempts to normalise/stabilise 
Morris as an iconic referent for Labour’s ideological project, turning him into a virtual 
proponent of social democratic moderantism and the Welfare State, and even, by 
implication, of Britain’s Atlanticist policy of alliances. One such (mis)leading 
contribution to the anti-revolutionary reception of Morris (one which Thompson takes 
to task with characteristic vitriol) is Lloyd Eric Grey’s William Morris: Prophet of 
England’s New Order.44 Grey’s book, conveniently publicised in Britain at a time of 
consolidation yet increasing self-questioning of Labour’s reformist programme gave the 
lie, with a rising tide of official approval and canonising gestures, to Morris’s 
Communist leanings  in any sense which may suggest a deviation from the path pursued 
and enshrined by the Attlee government. Thus, in Grey’s estimation, “Morris was a 
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Socialist only in the etymological sense of believing that man must become a social 
animal.”45 
   With regard to an alternative, yet equally reifying version of Morris’s “true” 
programme of social transformation, namely his alleged medievalism, Thompson was 
emphatic in pointing out the lines of divergence between an initial Ruskinism and the 
fully-fledged and consequential Socialism towards which his work progressed:  
Where Ruskin had jabbed an indignant finger at capitalism and had often 
(guided by Carlyle’s wrath at the “cash-nexus”) indicated, in the worship of 
Mammon, the source of its degradation and horror, Morris was able in page 
after page of coherent and detailed historical exposition to reveal in the very 
processes of production, the common economic root both of capitalist 
exploitation and of the corruption of art. Where Ruskin had proceeded by 
intuition… Morris was able to lay bare the actual truth.46 
Thus Morris’s was not a contingent or aestheticising indictment of industrialism’s 
forms, but a principled critique and condemnation of capitalism as a particular historic 
formation in which production was conceived of “primarily for profit and not for 
use”.
47
 
In considering this first important work by Thompson one should note the 
simmering yet unstated antagonism contained in the text: that is, precisely, the 
vindication of Revolutionary Socialism concocted in an older and eminently anti-
bureaucratic fashion, far removed in programme and temperament from the prevalent 
Communist logic of Zhdanovism and democratic centralism (with which his own 
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militancy and intellectual practice would soon clash with irreparable consequences). 
The Morrisian semblance offered by Thompson is composed of a deeply utopian and 
highly topical articulation of community and individuality, reaching beyond the 
conceptual stalemate of late Stalinism and Cold War liberalism. “This is important”, 
claims Thompson, “because (as Morris never ceased to repeat) true individualism was 
only possible in a Communist society, which needed and valued the contribution of 
each individual to the common good.”48  
All in all, the political opening which the events and experiences of 1956 would 
propel is embryonically contained in this 1955 pronouncement. A proto-programme for 
“socialist humanism” (beyond the stifling and, at best, uninspiring projects of official 
Communism) can be sensed in his appreciation of Morris’s anti-statist bias: 
Thus Communist society implied the re-establishment of the personal and 
voluntary bonds of society and the disappearance of the impersonal and 
compulsive relations based on the ownership of property and the 
maintenance of class rule… The “withering away of the state” assumed 
great importance to Morris, not… as the absence of all social bonds, but in 
the positive sense of the re-establishment at a higher level than known 
before of the truly human and personal bonds existing even within a class 
society.49 
This “withering away” implied a pre-emption of the bureaucratic menace which, in 
Morris’s time, was principally associated with Fabian socialism. However, this 
imputation, when restated in 1955, cannot be restricted to the avowed Fabian target and 
its top-down conception of social transformation. The abstract machinery of State, 
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which the mass defection from the Party ranks a year later would fix in the new radical 
imaginaries as part and parcel of the Stalinist edifice, was already recognised, in 
abstract fashion, as intrinsically antinomical to the full and effective realisation of any 
Socialism worthy of the name. The “humanism” implicit in this anti-bureaucratic 
gesture of the Morris book is, as we have seen, an organic function of Thompson’s 
epistemology, as well as a defining political strategy with practical consequences all the 
way from the New Reasoner project to his polemic with Althusser.  
In his discussion of Morris’s News from Nowhere, this humanism, whose many 
guises we have encountered in presumably inconsistent or impressionistic formulations, 
is made explicit as a particular “quality of life”: “Morris is not concerned with the 
mechanics of society but with the people – their relationships, their morality, their 
pleasure in the details of life.”50 It is not the structural arrangement of a particular 
society which conceals the key to a redeemed life, but the specific density of desire with 
which that interpersonal texture is woven. What Morris’s craft reveals (coupled with a 
“scientific mastery of historical process”)51 is precisely the “realistic” ratio between a 
knowledge of degradation and a reckoning of possibility and emancipation.   
A revised edition of William Morris was issued with a substantial postscript in 
1977, inevitably catering for a radically different political atmosphere. As John Goode 
has noted, “this later text is in many ways a great improvement, shorter, less dogmatic, 
less strident, less given to covering its own doubts with colourful metaphor and 
rhetorical demolitions of easy targets”.52 Moreover, it constitutes, according to this 
author, a reduction of the initial problematic with which Morris was aligned, namely the 
“dialectic of necessity and desire”: “Morris, and News from Nowhere especially, is now 
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concerned with the “education of desire”, and desire itself is strongly activated against 
necessity. Thus Morris’s writing is about what “Marxism” fails to be, what lies beyond 
its power of rational explanation.”53 In this light, Morris stands firmly on the side of a 
libertarian tradition inimical to the stifling routines of a static so-called rationalism and 
its attendant set of evictions from the plane of historical eventuation (agency, 
experience, morality etc).54  
The role accorded to desire in this update of the Morrisian heritage is 
fundamentally a reinscription of social phenomenality within the ontological margins of 
“becoming” (which, as we know, provided a dynamic antidote to Althusser’s anti-
historicist stasis). The tenor of this new mobilisation of radical life (“germinal life”, one 
is tempted to say)55 as against the paralysis of dogmatic anti-humanism projects a fresh 
problematisation of Morris’s status as a Marxist author according to the terms of 
definition laid down in 1955. Thus, in the important postscript which Thompson 
appended to the 1977 edition, he repudiates the simple equation Morris=Marx which 
many commentators had identified as the principal claim of the book: 
The point was, rather, that Morris was an original Socialist thinker whose 
work was complementary to Marxism. And in repeated emphases, and in 
particular in the stress upon Morris’s genius as a moralist, it should not have 
been difficult for a sensitive reader to have detected a submerged argument 
within the orthodoxy to which I then belonged.56  
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One of the key points in Thompson’s argument (which makes him critical, for example, 
of an otherwise “weighty and often helpful” Morris study by Paul Meier)57 concerns the 
role accorded to the Romantic tradition in relation to a radical materialist agenda. A 
disabling association of the old Romantic critique of industrialism with “idealism” in 
the derogatory Marxian sense privileged by orthodoxy impels Thompson to a rejection 
of this duality and a recognition of the limitations generated within the Marxist camp 
(from the 1890s onwards): “Morris’s “conversion” to Marxism offered a juncture which 
Marxism failed to reciprocate”.58 Miguel Abensour’s defence of Morris’s utopian 
legacy – to which Thompson is largely sympathetic – contains a critical assessment of 
this enduring failure as it crystallises in the pronouncements of a certain brand of 
contemporary Marxism (the target is still Paul Meier’s La Pensée Utopique de William 
Morris): “[w]hat Meier offers as a sympathetic appreciation of Utopianism is in effect 
an exercise of closure, confining the utopian imagination within textually-approved 
limits. Meier has been guilty of an exercise of theoretical repression.”59 An enabling 
reading of Morris’s utopianism would therefore involve a rejection of received 
orthodoxies (such as Engels’ scientific/utopian antinomy) and a radical revision of his 
Marxian premises in relation to the history of utopian forms after 1850.60 
The modalities of utopian imagination deployed by Morris are “deliberately 
evasive as to “arrangements”” and systematic elaborations or projections of achieved 
societal models: 
Exactly for this reason he drew upon his Romantic inheritance of dream and 
of fantasy, accentuated further by the distancing of an archaic vocabulary… 
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His intention was to embody in the forms of fantasy alternative values 
sketched in an alternative way of life… And what distinguishes this 
enterprise is, exactly, its open, speculative, quality, and its detachment of 
the imagination from the demands of conceptual precision.61  
In short, the avoidance of “closure” – which is, in this context and as we have seen in 
The Poverty of Theory, Thompson’s shorthand for an often reifying tendency in 
speculative thought – demands a measured re-claiming of Morris’s utopianism as an 
integral (and by no means subordinate) part of his revolutionary programme. This 
utopianism is intimately connected to the “education of desire” or, in other words, to the 
latter’s disengagement from the syntax of necessity in which the historical forms of 
oppression keep it ensnared.  
The apparent opposition between “rational explanation” (or “knowledge) and 
“desire” in Thompson’s reconstruction of Morris’s Communism has also been criticised 
by Perry Anderson as an insinuation “in Thompson’s blameless text” of “a fashionable 
philosophy of Parisian irrationalism” and “a candid invitation to obscurantism”.62 
However, the larger context provided by Thompson’s work since the early publication 
of his William Morris all the way through his bitter polemic against Althusser’s 
“orrery”63 clearly points in a conceptual and ethical direction for which the post-1968 
constellation of “desire” provides a supplementary mode of articulation yet no 
substantial tampering with the fundamental premises. On the contrary, we observe that 
the ontological language of “becoming” makes an apposite contribution to his long-
standing promotion of a fluid – and genealogically Morrisian rather than Marxian – 
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materialism. Thus, for example, the axiomatic assumption from which Deleuze and 
Guattari deploy their programme for “desiring machines” in their collaborative work 
(especially in Anti-Oedipus)64 is, as Manola Antonioli has observed, “the great identity 
between social production and desiring production.”65 The notion of “machine” is 
deployed in the Deleuzo-Guattarian canon as a tool of opposition to all contemporary 
structuralisms: it is, as they claim, a “non-discursive concept”, a productivity whose 
operative principle is the flux and whose rationale is consequently antagonistic to the 
hierarchical articulation of, for example, Althusser’s model of Science.66. Thompson’s 
project of “socialist humanism” is precisely situated at the juncture of social and 
desiring production, an intensely context-bound discursive surface which would bear 
the characteristic inflections of his voice and commitment ever since 1956.  
 We could therefore conclude that this “machinic” eruption in the William Morris 
of 1977 is fundamentally coordinate with his anti-structuralist polemic of 1978. Both 
respond, in a characteristically Thompsonian idiom, to the pressing contextual 
challenges of theoretical dogma, on the one hand, and to the political urge to revitalise 
the discourse of utopia, on the other. Thompson’s stature as a radical public intellectual, 
even if initially marked by his brief association with the Communist Party Historians’ 
Group, was singularly defined by the momentous conjuncture of 1956 and the political 
and intellectual lessons derived from it. It we are to heed Thompson’s recommendations 
on historiographic method for a moment (and in particular that privileged object of his 
attention, “experience”), we may do well to revisit the doctrinal, epistemological, moral 
and psychological by-products of that fateful date as they shape and haunt the totality of 
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his work – from his engagement with the formative stages of the English working class 
to his late surge of antinomian enthusiasm.  
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4. Humanism Revisited: Antinomians and Aliens in 
Thompson’s Later Work 
 
Witness Against the Beast constitutes Thompson’s last recapitulation of oppositional 
themes and practices. If William Morris had served as an initial springboard and source 
of inspiration for a topical derivation of revolutionary ideas and sentiments, the late 
antinomian poetry of William Blake provided a final distillation of native English 
subversion and a propitious summation of core elements in Thompson’s distinctively 
libertarian brand of Socialism.  
 Thompson’s affinity with the various moments of doctrinal insurrection traced 
throughout the English Revolution and beyond is actualised and asserted to the point 
that it effectively redefines, in his later years, the tone and pitch of his political idiom: 
I have already suggested, in discussing justification by faith, that the 
antinomian position was consciously anti-hegemonic. That is, if we accept 
the view that in most societies we can observe an intellectual as well as 
institutional hegemony, or dominant discourse, which imposes a structure of 
ideas and beliefs... a structure which serves to consolidate the existent social 
order, enforce its priorities, and which is itself enforced by rewards and 
penalties, by notions of ‘reputability’, and (in Blake’s time) by liberal 
patronage or by its absence – if we accept this large mouthful, then we can 
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see that these antinomian sects were hegemony’s eighteenth-century 
opposition.1    
A relatively simplified definition of hegemony (which contrasts with the Gramscian or 
near-Gramscian debate with Anderson and Nairn) emerges from this description of 
dominant and oppositional practices in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English 
culture. Thompson turns, in this late statement of principle, towards a decidedly a-
theoretical brand of programmatic “humanism” which he no longer feels in need of 
justifying within the parameters of Marxian conceptuality. Characteristically, the Blake 
book is a militant redeployment of the values of “1956”, a compelling confirmation of 
his organising themes, which the intervening years of struggle and commitment to the 
peace movement appear to have liberated of the epistemological burdens of self-
definition.2 Most tellingly, Witness Against the Beast, in joining the emphases and 
adopting the accents of some of the more libertarian strands in British Marxist 
historiography – the “productive conditions” of his own emergence as a Communist 
intellectual in the mid-Fifties – re-locates Thompson in an “old dissenting” lineage of 
radicalism which ends up informing the “utopian” approach, choice of subject and 
ethico-political corollary.      
The precise ideological location of the dissident sects and creeds in the power 
structure of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was unmistakably interpreted 
(by Thompson and others) as that of an internal systemic contradiction endowed with 
varying indices of utopian referentiality. Thompson draws a common line of doctrinal 
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opposition to the dominant role accorded to the “Mosaic” or “Moral” Law in the 
Protestant orthodoxy (or orthodoxies). What this antinomian challenge performed was a 
radical interpretation of the Lutheran doctrine of the priesthood of all believers and a 
full extension of the logic of predestination. In some extreme variants, such as that 
represented in the 1650s by the Ranters, predestinarian beliefs resulted in a wholesale 
rejection of the concept of sin.3 
 The ebullience of radical ideas during the Revolutionary period of the 1640s had 
given rise to an oppositional escalation against clerical control and intervention in 
religious affairs at the behest of the Presbyterian majority within the Parliamentary 
party. The moral discipline exerted by this dominant clergy was experienced as a severe 
recrudescence of pre-1640 ecclesiastical controls.4 This institutional redeployment of an 
old adherence to the Mosaic Law generated, among radical Protestants, a bitter sense of 
disaffection and an increasingly overt antagonism towards the clerical remnants of the 
Elizabethan period. Congregationalist feeling among many of these radicals implied that 
social control could no longer be exercised by reference to an external, heteronomous 
magistracy and thus, that only the self-appointed communion of the elect could suffer to 
mete out penalties against the deviant. This gathering hostility towards clerical and legal 
mediation built consistently upon the earliest teachings of Protestantism. As Christopher 
Hill  has pointed out, “Calvin had opened a wide door when he wrote that since 
believers “have derived authority from Christ not to entangle themselves by the 
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observance of things in which he wished them to be free, we conclude that their 
consciences are exempted from all human authority””.5  
In the more “heretical” readings of this Protestant line of interpretation, the 
Moral Law was divested of all binding effectivity in favour of an autonomous flowering 
of the Gospel. This idea recurs frequently, and in various forms, in doctrinal writings of 
the 1640s and 50s. One fundamental derivation of this opposition to the Moral Law is 
the consequential problematisation of the doctrinal and social value of sin. Sin becomes 
associated, throughout the turbulent years of the Interregnum, and in the midst of this 
complex proliferation of theological thinking, with the more conservative sections of 
the Puritan movement and especially, with Presbyterian attempts, in the face of 
“republican” and “democratic” outbursts, to re-impose a backward-looking social and 
ideological order. In this context, antinomianism – or the wholesale rejection of 
submission to the Moral Law – proved a resilient alternative, especially among the 
popular classes, to the strictures of orthodox Calvinism.6 The main political problem 
posed by the Protestant doctrine of the priesthood of all believers – as the radical sects 
of the mid-seventeenth century came to understand it – was that of determining the 
exact membership of the elect. For indeed, if external coercion could only be imposed 
upon the unregenerate, it was a matter of theological but also political urgency to 
determine precisely who fell without the boundaries of definition.  
With the rapid radicalisation of ideas undergone in this period, older yet already 
well formed critical stances on these issues began to gain renewed currency. Tyndale’s 
heretical pronouncements of the sixteenth-century (in which he had declared a similar 
disavowal of the law and of the doctrine of sin) became fashionable again, as did a 
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certain critical awareness – already circulated in the late Elizabethan period – that sin 
merely provided an excuse for the establishment of modern institutions such as the 
family, private property and the State.7 Understood in similarly materialist terms, the 
Fall revealed itself as the real outcome of ignorance and greed. In open defiance of the 
Calvinist thesis, humanity was therefore not corrupt at the root and thus inextricably 
bound to condemnation (except for a regenerate minority), but rather susceptible to 
temporal redemption. Francis Bacon, in a direct line of inheritance from magico-
alchemical ideas, had argued for the perfectibility of man and for the possibility of re-
creating the lost Eden on Earth.8 This non-transcendental doctrine of redemption 
became increasingly popular, in a variety of declensions, during the years of the Civil 
War. The universalist implications of the radical assault upon sin multiplied amid the 
social and political convulsions. Thus the fundamental tenet of predestination could be 
adapted to an all-inclusive definition of saintliness. Richard Coppin went as far as 
declaring that, in effect, predestination did not concern a set of individuals against 
another, but a set of qualities (good and bad) within each man.9 The “True Leveller” or 
“Digger” Gerrard Winstanley could confidently assert, in 1648, that salvation was a 
universal destiny for all of humanity. In a germane emphasis, the Quaker leader George 
Fox announced that the light of God shone equally in every man and woman.10 
 The abolition of sin (and correspondingly, of damnation according to the 
orthodox definition) and the embrace of divine universalism, compounded with a belief 
in the temporal perfectibility of man, could sometimes approach the extremity of an 
atheistic, or more exactly, pantheistic corollary whereby the transcendental Christian 
God would be relocated in an extensive immanence, in all of Nature. Ranterism 
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supplied a notorious instantiation of such immanence, whose logical terminus – via the 
negation of sin and the existence of Hell – was the actual celebration of any and every 
“sinful” or counter-normative conduct (especially sexual excess).11 As the Ranter 
Lawrence Clarkson expressed it: “sin hath its conception only in the imagination... what 
act soever is done by thee in light and love, is light and lovely, though it be that act 
called adultery.”12 Thompson pertinently notes in this respect that the Ranters’ 
“dispersed pantheism may flow logically into mortalism or even materialism, in which 
all life returns to a common source as streams to a sea. Or, in a more literal and intense 
variant, the essential presence of God is to be found only in men and women... hence 
these are God.”13  
Gerrard Winstanley’s theologico-political ideas (which represent the egalitarian-
communitarian zenith of this radical Puritan moment) are in direct conversation with 
this thesis. Thus, clearly, “God is not to be found ‘without you’, ‘at a distance’” but 
rather as an internalised manifestation – an inner principle branding each and every one 
of us as godly and therefore inherently regenerate.14 The “anointing” is the crucial 
concept. It signifies the union of Christ with the saints (or believers) – the union of 
“Christ in the saints”: “[w]hen the anointing hath made a oneness... God dwells and 
rules in man, and man lives in God.”15 Thus the individual lives a shared communion 
with the divine, turning the angst-ridden logic of predestination into an egalitarian and 
proto-materialist condition of universal redemption. For indeed, to “expect Christ to 
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“come in one single person” is to “mistake the resurrection of Christ.””16 The latter 
must be experienced as a function of the anointing – a resurrection within. 
Consequently, as Hill points out, “[i]f the significant Christ is the Christ in us, then the 
Christ who died at Jerusalem diminishes in importance.”17 Similarly, the Scriptures and 
the Commandments become secondary in relation to the internal rise of Christ in sons 
and daughters. These are increasingly regarded, in the antinomian tradition, as 
interfering with the actual spiritual growth – with the mystical union that must occur 
within.  
Winstanley’s more famous social-egalitarian conclusions are therefore part and 
parcel of a broad radical dedication to the idea of perfectibility and to the possibility of 
eradicating sin from the temporal world. The common ownership of the land upheld by 
the Digger experiment is a natural corollary to the doctrine of “Sonship”. The shared 
freedom of the Second Coming – the rise of Jesus Christ in all sons and daughters – 
must be extended to a common right to God’s creations: “[t]he message that Winstanley 
received in his trance was that men should break bread together and work together, and 
that they should not take hire. They should live and work in community, rejecting wage 
labour.”18 Winstanley identified the internal and mystical Second Coming of Christ 
within Man with the rise of Reason, and the establishment of the Kingdom of God with 
the extensive application of this divine Reason through the universal acceptance of 
community. The Digger God is thus, as Hill suggests, one of humanist immanence 
rather than of theistic transcendence – and indeed one very apposite to Thompson’s 
radical projections.19  
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Thompson’s analysis of the antinomian tradition and its influence upon Blake 
locates the egalitarian emphasis (of which Winstanley constitutes perhaps the most 
advanced social instance) in a plurality of moments throughout the radical decades of 
1640 and 1650. The radical egalitarianism of the antinomian conjuncture (or 
conjunctures) generated a deep-seated resistance to any legalistic/moralistic conception 
of spiritual life. In particular, the “ranting impulse” – as Thompson calls it – became 
pacified, after the suppression of the more extremist versions of theological rebellion in 
the central decades of the seventeenth century, into the sober religiosity of Quakerism, 
with its characteristic emphases on plainness (of speech, dress and manner), simplicity, 
universal salvation and the inner actuality of Christ’s Second Coming, as an ever-
present, unfolding process.20 As Thompson emphasises, “the interpenetration of Ranting 
and Quaker notions is incontrovertible.” Thus, for “many early Quakers, God was ‘an 
infinite Spirit, that fills Heaven and Earth, and all Places and all things’”.21 In other 
words, the radical quasi-pantheism of some antinomian trends – those seeking to 
undermine the more anti-democratic contents of the Calvinist notion of predestination – 
did not disappear after the defeat of the Old Dissenting sects.  
Thompson’s Blakeian focus – in the attempt to construct an intellectual and 
theologico-political lineage connecting the 1650s to the 1790s – falls upon the small 
group of Puritan radicals gathered around Ludowick Muggleton and John Reeve: the 
Muggletonians. The emphatically anti-legalistic/moralistic accent of this group signifies 
a characteristic survival and continuity of the antinomian tradition, as well as a notable 
development of the same, into the intellectual climes of the following century. The 
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Muggletonian embodiment of the radical Christian tradition is centrally revealed in its 
emphasis on the opposition between the “Everlasting Gospel of Love” and the outward 
institutionality of the Moral Law. In its subsequent doctrinal development, 
Muggletonianism was to align this basic duality with a symptomatic antagonism 
towards the rationalistic hegemony of the eighteenth century, thereby representing a 
bulwark of core resistance to the civilising dynamics of the Enlightenment period: 
The old seventeenth-century sects which survived into the new century 
faced the choice of submission to the rationalism and civilising modes of the 
time, with an accompanying upwards drift in the social status of their 
following – and this was the trajectory of Old Dissent in general, including 
those old opponents of the Muggletonians, the Quakers; or else of 
maintaining their original doctrinal integrity (and a diminishing familial and 
perhaps plebeian following) by ever-fiercer resistance to rationalism, to the 
polite theology of biblical criticism and to accommodation with Newtonian 
physics, and by ever-stronger insistence upon the virtues of faith, grace and 
purity of heart.22 
For the Muggletonians, the Moral Law was antagonistic to the gospel of faith and thus 
partook of human arrangements of a necessarily corrupt nature: “‘[t]he moral law was 
written in the nature of reason, and so had death written in it’”: “‘[t]he law is not written 
in the seed of faith’s nature at all, but in the seed of reason’s nature only. Therefore the 
seed of faith is not under the law, but is above the law’”.23 According to Thompson, this 
position carries the essence of radical antinomianism into the hostile heartlands of the 
Age of Reason.  
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By opposing the “basest and most oppressive of human codes” (“the laws of the 
Jews” to which official Christianity still held on), the “true saints” offered a final 
“remnant of the seed of faith” – a living testimony to the Gospel of the Lord. Cast in the 
light of the Christian Message of Love (the said Gospel), the Moral Law is revealed as 
the intrusive appurtenance of priests and temporal powers. The anti-hegemonic tenor of 
this opposition is intensified by Thompson’s contextualisation of theological 
antinomianism within the larger framework of a strengthening capitalist ideology. Thus 
the Muggletonian rebellion against Reason and external justification in the name of 
faith is juxtaposed to the “rationalising” dynamics of the dominant social order. As 
orthodox versions of Protestantism advance towards an increasingly beneficial 
accommodation with the political and economic hegemony, antinomian radicalism 
comes to epitomise an alternative stance penetrated by opposition values:  
[A]ntinomianism’s intellectual doctrines (the suspicion of ‘reason’, 
justification by faith, hostility to the Moral Law) constituted in quietest 
periods a defence against the reigning hegemony, in more active periods a 
resource for an active critique not just of policies or personalities but of the 
deep assumptions of the social order.  
 And we can take this argument a little further. For what the antinomian or 
Muggletonian declaimed against as ‘Reason’ we might today prefer to 
define as ‘Ideology’, or as the compulsive constraints of the ruling 
‘discourse’. Antinomian doctrine was expressive of a profound distrust of 
the ‘reasons’ of the genteel and comfortable, and of ecclesiastical and 
academic institutions, not so much because they produced false knowledges 
but because they offered specious apologetics (‘serpent reasonings’) for a 
rotten social order based, in the last resort, on violence and material self-
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interest. In short, the antinomian stance was not against knowledge but 
against the ideological assumptions which pretended to be knowledge and 
the ideological contamination of the rest.24     
This sweeping characterisation of the precise political topology of antinomianism in the 
changed intellectual landscape of the eighteenth century brings Thompson’s long-
awaited engagement with Blake (and his general understanding of the English 
Revolution and its doctrinal offshoots) to bear on a more topical crusade of the 
contemporary Left. Thus the “true” Gospel of humanism had been mobilised in his 
polemical writings since his “Epistle to the Philistines” all the way to The Poverty of 
Theory in a vigorous attempt to counter a rising tide of “serpent reasonings” and 
theoretical manoeuvres to constrain and congeal the emancipatory imagination into a 
ready-made function of Ideology.  
 In his reading of Blake’s poem “London”, Thompson detects a “conjunction 
between the old antinomian tradition and Jacobinism”, a confluence of radical strands 
bringing together two distinct idioms of oppositionality which enjoy a provisional – if 
precarious – alliance in the poem: 
For while ‘London’ is a poem which a Jacobinical Londoner might have 
responded to and accepted, it is scarcely one which he could have written. 
The average supporter of the London Corresponding Society would not 
have written ‘mind forg’d’ (since the manacles would have been seen as 
wholly exterior, imposed by oppressive priestcraft and kingcraft); and the 
voice of indignation would probably have drowned the voice of compassion, 
since most Painites would have found it difficult to accept Blake’s vision of 
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humankind as being simultaneously oppressed... and in a self-victimised or 
Fallen state. One might seem to contradict the other.25  
The analyses and solutions derived from the enlightened stock of Jacobinism would 
consequently fall short of the old antinomian commitment to justification by faith alone 
and its doctrine of Love. A fundamental resistance to outward control – handed down 
from the more libertarian quarters of the Dissenting tradition – is transmuted into a 
general distrust of the institutionality of positive power, however externally redeemed 
or reformed by the tools of Reason. For it is precisely the planted seeds of rational 
legislation – as opposed to the unconquerable and “saintly” domain of the inner faith – 
which continue to uphold the extant hierarchies and impositions of the temporal world: 
“[s]o that if Blake found congenial the Painite denunciation of the repressive institutions 
of State and Church, it did not follow that humanity’s redemption from this state could 
be effected by a political reorganisation of these institutions alone. There must be some 
utopian leap, some human rebirth, from Mystery to renewed imaginative life.”26 
 The quasi-anarchistic implication of this emphasis, combined with the specific 
position accorded to Blake in Thompson’s later years (notably, the fact that the 
posthumously published Witness Against the Beast was several decades in the making) 
has led some commentators to stress Blake’s towering importance for Thompson. Thus, 
David Goodway writes: “I would therefore even go so far as to say that of the influences 
on Thompson’s career, Blake was more significant overall than Morris, and of equal 
importance to – probably even of more importance than – Marx.” And to that effect, he 
quotes Thompson’s 1973 remark that if “I devised my own pantheon I would without 
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hesitation place within it the Christian antinomian, William Blake, and I would place 
him beside Marx.”27  
The validity of these claims can be easily tested by a brief – even cursory – 
acquaintance with Thompson’s only incursion into the realm of fiction. As Perry 
Anderson wrote in Thompson’s obituary, The Sykaos Papers represents “the most 
complete single statement of his thought, giving imaginative form to ideas that find 
comparable expression nowhere in his work.”28 Bryan Palmer has likewise described 
the book as “perhaps the single richest elaboration of E.P. Thompson’s refusals.”29 
Published in 1988, The Sykaos Papers presents a near-future scenario of growing Cold 
War tension and eventual escalation between the Blocs. The arrival from the planet 
Oitar of poet/astronaut Oi Paz performs the double function of exposing the 
irrationalities (the “serpent reasonings”) of a consolidated Earth culture of 
“exterminism” and of accelerating the self-destructive process of human societies as 
they prove hopelessly unable to unite in the face of an external threat. 30  
Thompson’s often comical portrayal of the Oitarian-human encounter offers a 
topical defamiliarisation of the cumulative absurdities of late capitalist hegemony (and 
its Communist counterpart behind the Iron Curtain). Oitarian culture is gradually 
construed and decoded through the medium of Oi Paz’s acculturation, most notably 
after the latter’s internment in a specifically designed – and secret – military station 
(Martagon Hall) where he becomes the object of study of anthropologist Helena Sage. 
In the midst of nuclear war preparations following a toughening of political positions 
after the Reagan-Thatcher years and after the defeat of Gorbachev’s liberal reforms in 
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the Soviet Union, the group of researchers and caretakers around Oi Paz and Helena 
become insulated in an area of exemption – a “zone of Eden” – within Martagon Hall 
which eventually acquires symbolic immunity to the soaring bellicosity induced by the 
Oitarian determination to colonise the Earth.  
The series of transfers and exchanges which constitute the main body of the 
novel reveal an irreconcilable polarity of cultural determinations between Oitar and 
Earth. This juxtaposition of mutual aliens constructs a set of mirror-images through 
which Thompson belabours his radical oppositional point. The culture of Oitar is 
presented as fully programmed and lacking in notions of freedom and choice – an 
enacted script characterised by social harmony and a blind subservience to a superior 
principle of rational order with deistic overtones (the Wheel). Seen through Oi Paz’s 
prism, the culture of Sykaos (Earth) is blatantly inscribed with self-threatening 
irrationalities, the most notorious of which is the Sykotic drive to war. As Oi Paz 
confides in his notebook, Oitar’s colonising “mission has arrived at Sykaos a generation 
too late”: 
For in the past generation or two their scientists have fallen upon the secrets 
of primitive nuclear fission... In several great regions of the planet segments 
of the species are already preparing ‘wars’ against other segments, and plan 
to detonate huge nuclear explosions upon the other parties. This will fulfil 
the logic of the evolution of the species, and will perhaps be the apt 
terminus of its self-extinction.31          
His conclusion is unambiguous: before making plantation effective, Oitarians must 
ensure that nuclear war is averted or, in other words, that Sykotic (or “beastly”, as Oi 
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Paz typically refers to Earthly) history does not arrive at its logical terminus. The 
Oitarian account of this history singles out war as the particular irrationality which best 
defines the species. “There are”, as Oi Paz explains: 
[T]wo large patches of lichens now (or empires) which are called ‘blocks’, 
since it is their business to block all rational intercourse between fellow-
creatures on either side. The means of blocking is called a ‘cold war’. A ‘hot 
war’ (which is the normal condition) is when each seeks utterly to destroy 
the other, by killing its citizens, burning its cities, poisoning its crops, & c., 
according to the most advanced technology available to the species. The 
citizens of one empire or nation are named as ‘enemies’ by another, which 
signifies a general licence to kill them without further pretext. But in a cold 
war this licence is temporarily suspended. This is an interval in which both 
empires or blocks advance all possible preparations to attain superiority for 
the next hot war, and meanwhile by fraud and insult seek to weaken and 
intimidate the other, and stir up within them ‘civil wars’ or insurrections.32  
The underpinning “block” from which the logic of Blocs stems is the Sykaans’ 
“beastly” irreducibility to the Rule of the Wheel – an intrinsic refusal to embrace a 
notion of order and harmony. This lack of principle which fundamentally distinguishes 
Sykotic “mortals” from Oitarian humans is nevertheless compensated for by a surrogate 
devotion to the Rule of Property – and its messenger, Money: 
Be it known that the entire society of Sykaans is controlled within a code 
whose name is ‘property’. Property is a no-thing. Property cannot be 
touched or smelled or weighed. Nor is property an invisible element or pulse 
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as radio or vibal transfer. It is invisible and it has no physical composition. 
Yet property governs all their intercourse from birth to dead-line, and, were 
property to be removed, no one would know how to come or how to go.33 
Oi Paz’s sense of programme permanently clashes with the arbitrary logic of Earthly 
“freewheel” and egoic projection. Oitar’s radical alterity also comes to embody a 
paradoxical double-bind exposing both shortcomings and possibilities in human history. 
If Oitar’s alienness to the concept of freedom is palpable, what is the effect of a semi-
acculturated Oitarian pointing up the hidden programmatic instincts of late capitalist 
society? How is the human concept of freedom itself to stand the test of 
defamiliarisation through non-human (that is, non-Sykotic) analysis and description? As 
Oi Paz observes, in one his most incisive moments:  
On Oitar there is ordering of all. It is clear. Each programme-change is in 
the daily print-out. A space is left for each freewheel. You mortals live 
without the Rule, in promiscuous disorder, without assigned times or 
designated days. Yet on Earth there is programming also. But the 
programmers are hidden and the programmes are secret. Your lives are a 
great play in which you pretend there are none... On Earth the great 
programme is Property and Money.34 
Helena concedes that, indeed, a “culture can be seen as a programme”, yet she remains 
stubbornly firm, even as she witnesses the fatal self-destruction of her species, in her 
belief that there “has never been a programmer, only a flux of wills and egos, bonds and 
choices. There is still time for us to choose.”35 
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 For Helena, the “light of freedom” (in Winstanley’s revolutionary formulation) 
shines amid the landscapes of dehumanisation harboured by Oitar and Earth as an 
evanescent, yet unrelinquished, horizon of human possibility. In spite of growing 
difficulties, humankind remains under the inward rule of bonding (the antinomian 
“Gospel of Love”) and in resistant defiance of external imposition. Out of the dire 
predicament of nuclear war and alien invasion, only regenerate humanity can spring 
forward with a testimony of essential continuity. Helena and Oi Paz’s son, the aptly 
named Adam, are the emblematic representatives of a hopeful subversion against the 
destructive alliance of “exterminism”. The seed of this intergalactic union symbolises 
the awaited Second Coming of radical Protestantism: Christ, as the antinomians 
claimed, “risen within” as an immanent rebirth of Man.  
 The close thematic and moral affinity between The Sykaos Papers and Witness 
Against the Beast is evident in the novel’s conclusion. Unable to agree on a common 
defence strategy against Oitar’s invasion, Earth destroys itself in a nuclear Holocaust 
leaving Helena a captive in the Oitarian colony on the moon. Her final resolve is 
outspoken in its assertion of human freedom, a determined gesture of antinomian 
rebellion against both the programme of actually existing human ideologies and the 
Moral Law of a “cured” world deprived of choice and the liberty to err. Thus, as the last 
centralised instruction concerning her person comes along (the Oitarian executive order 
to “discard” her and bring her to a “dead-line”), she opts out, taking her own life. 
Helena’s last will is an unabashed declaration of antinomian principle: 
I go out, leaving Curses upon Power and Abstract Enmities and Public Lies. 
I go out through the gate of my flesh, carrying with me, like a basket of 
flowers, my memories of love and of friendships and natural joys 
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  Accepting the Knowledge of Good and Evil 
  Sorry that the Good lost out (it was a near thing) 
  RENOUNCING MY CONSCIOUSNESS NOT AT ALL 
  REFUSING THE LEAST TRIBUTE TO THE RULE OF NIHIL 
  I leave my life of my own free will36     
The novel concludes on yet a further note of oppositionality, with the subversion of 
Helena’s half-human son in early adulthood. Adam/Ho Mo (that is, Adam/Homo, Man, 
the first man) takes upon himself the duty of post-human totalisation, of summing up 
the fate of his mother’s lineage and of projecting a vision of hopeful (if unclear) 
continuity. As he “declaims” to a stunned audience of programmed Oitarians: 
“I have read these mortal sayings among my hostess, or mother’s, papers: 
“Reason, or the ratio of all we have already known, is not the same that it 
shall be when we know more. The same dull round, even of a universe, 
would soon become a mill with complicated wheels.” Do you wish to exist 
as crystals performing your patterns before an audience of ice? Our ratios 
must always be in flux. We must search always for the perfect ratio: but 
even as we reach out to grasp it, we have become changed through 
searching, and the ratio is no longer ours but it has become our own 
alienation, and we must begin the search again. My species destroyed itself 
in the search, but they might have reached out to new ratios far beyond your 
circinate programmes. They failed because they became too much like you. 
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They fell into your binary logic-paths and feedback-loops. They feared their 
identity, and hung themselves round with the dead.37 
The radical emancipatory thesis of this final insurrectionary move places Ho Mo in a 
clear line of descent from a “conscious” if theoretically piecemeal and essentially 
“empirical” tradition originating with seventeenth-century revolutionary theology, and 
reaching through the “humanist” conjunctures of Muggletonianism, popular Jacobinism, 
Luddism, Owenism, Morrisian Socialism and ultimately, in Thompson’s own lifetime, 
the anti-ideological continuities of “1956” and its heritage of struggle and anti-
authoritarian virtue for the latter contexts of the century.  
Thompson’s abundant elaboration of these humanist points in his later work 
attests to a growing confluence and unwitting rapprochement with some characteristic 
positions in Orwell. The brutal world of Nineteen Eighty-Four is significantly apposite 
to the stratified and impersonal dynamics of Oitar (with obvious parallels: Big 
Brother/Gracious Goodnesses, proles/butlers etc.), and its “post-totalitarian” landscape 
of permanent war among blocs is a prefiguration of the Sykotic escalation in an 
imagined post-Reagan/Gorbachev decade. These obvious similarities in the fiction are 
equally extended – as hostile Orwellian critics have noted –to the trenchant anti-
theoreticism of their respective Socialisms.38 And yet, the apparent alliance of ideas 
which a comparative reading of Thompson and Orwell may well suggest, is ultimately 
cancelled out by the retrospective animosity which Thompson distilled apropos of the 
Orwellian rhetoric of disillusion (as he reads it) and its allegedly foundational 
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contribution to what he terms the “Natopolitan” culture of the Cold War West.  
 Thompson consigned his repudiation of Orwell to a single essay published in 
1960, “Outside the Whale”. He chastised the writer for allegedly feeding his 
temperamental refusals into the nascent machinery of cynicism which began to gather 
momentum after the setbacks of the Thirties. In this perspective of withdrawal, writes 
Thompson:  
Disenchantment ceases to be a recoil of the responsible in the face of 
difficult social experience; it becomes an abdication of intellectual 
responsibility in the face of all social experience. And, in the context of the 
Cold War, and of exhausted imperialism, the withdrawal or despair of the 
disenchanted was twisted – often by lesser men – into an apologia for 
complicity with reaction.39  
Thompson concedes that “this pessimism was [not] without adequate cause. Homage to 
Catalonia gives a part of the background; the collapse of the Popular Front gives the 
rest.”40 However, Orwell’s assumption that Communism was “a Bad Thing, driven 
forward by the mainspring of its own bad will”, suppresses all recognition of the 
particular contexts (especially the rise of Fascism) and essential contents of 1930s 
radicalism – including an irreducible commitment to humanism itself in the way in 
which Thompson understands it: 
Orwell was blind to all such discriminations; and in this he anticipated the 
wholesale rejection of Communism which became a central feature of 
Natopolitan ideology. And this failure was important, not only because it 
helped to blind a later generation to the forces within Communism making 
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for its transformation, but because it denied the possibility of hope within 
the pattern of social change whenever Communist influence could be 
detected. This denial of hope had the force of an irrational taboo... In this 
case the taboo contaminated all confidence in social man and imprisoned 
Orwell in the negations of 1984.41 
In this critical assessment, Thompson himself remains blind to the more nuanced 
intricacies of Orwell’s politics as we have tried to unravel them. As James Hinton, and 
David Goodway after him have suggested, it was Thompson’s “sentimental loyalty to 
pre-1956 Communism” which to a great extent blocked the way to a fruitful recognition 
of political affinity.42 The antinomianism which flourishes, as a latter-day call to action, 
in his book on Blake is temperamentally coordinate with the utopian egalitarianism 
informing the Orwellian corpus, with varying degrees of intensity but a steady 
consistency – from his reflections upon the Spanish militia to the still irrepressible 
insinuation of hope in the physical continuity of Oceania’s “proles”. 
 Humanism in Thompson’s oeuvre acquires the symbolic efficiency of a utopian 
call to action, immune and resistant to the reifications and devastations of a “fallen” 
history and therefore hopeful – through the unremitting experience of oppositionality – 
for humankind’s native languages and resources of redemption. The logic of equality 
espoused by Orwell, as well as the antinomian faith in human agency championed by 
Thompson, find their necessary echo and strategic complement in Raymond Williams’ 
crucial revision of the concepts of culture and community, which, as we will see, 
represents a fundamental triangulation and practico-theoretical climax of this “anti-
ideological” tradition of British Socialist thinking.   
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1. An Ordinary Process: the Politics of Culture 
 
The publication of Culture and Society in 1958 has been customarily seen as one of 
the milestones of the Copernican Revolution brought about by Cultural Studies – 
together with Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy and Thompson’s The Making of the 
English Working Class – as well as a fundamental development in the intellectual 
history of the post-war British left.1 Fred Inglis has described it as: 
 [An] astonishing hybrid of a book mingl[ing] expository primer, practical-
critical study of practical critics, anti-English polemic of the discipline of 
English, and a ponderous but moving political prose poem. It was a life-
changer for youngish readers in 1960 or so (including me). Its large, never-
quite-grasped purpose was to find and recharge the lost veins of English 
romantic socialism, to make them glow again in the body politic. And it 
was to tear away the appropriation made by some thinkers of a history they 
turned to a reactionary cause not even their own.2  
The book’s primary and initial aim, however, was to chart the difficult discursive space 
governed by the term “culture” as a specific repository of critical and oppositional 
values and stances generated in response to the emergence of industrial capitalism and 
its peculiar set of social relations.  
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According to the initial analysis rehearsed by Williams in his 1953 article “The 
Idea of Culture”, the term had been first identified with “the intellectual side of 
civilization”, that is, with the complex of abstract thinking functions of a given society 
(including philosophy, religion, science etc.), and only in a secondary, narrower sense, 
with “the general body of the arts”. A third meaning of “culture” was later developed 
which problematised, according to Williams, the stabilising tendencies associated with 
the two prevalent definitions: “[f]or culture is used in sociology and social anthropology 
in the sense of ‘a whole way of life’, and the impact of these studies upon general 
thinking has led to similar uses in history and in criticism.”3 Williams went on to 
observe that this wide-ranging inflection of the concept was concomitant with a solid 
English tradition of criticism: the attempt to reconnect apparently discrete functions and 
expressions of a social totality remained central to the intellectual project of – to cite 
Williams’ preliminary list – Ruskin, Arnold, Eliot, Read and Leavis: “[t]his extension of 
a critic’s activities in the judgement of works of art to the study and thence the 
judgement of “a whole way of life”, had been a marked element of the English 
tradition.”4  
A further development, singularly grounded in the ideological specificities of the 
mid-nineteenth century, came to rehearse a powerful identification of “culture” with a 
certain standard of “perfection” – thereby stabilising as a moral absolute what had 
hitherto pulsated as a process or motion of amelioration (in authors such as More, 
Hobbes or Johnson):5 “[t]he word which had indicated a process of training within a 
more assured society became in the nineteenth century the focus of a deeply significant 
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response to a society in the throes of a radical and painful change.”6 Williams locates 
the original semantic fixation of the term “culture” as an abstract condition with a moral 
content in the pages of Coleridge’s On the Constitution of Church and State. In this 
context, “cultivation” – which later uses and idioms would give as “culture” proper – is 
offered as a guarantee against “corruption”, a standard of “health” against the combined 
aggression of Liberalism qua new “habit of mind” and Industrialism “in its sense of the 
reshaping of values consequent upon economic and social change.”7  
The rising tide of Benthamite Utilitarianism stands out in this ideological 
horizon as a synthesis of the corrupting trends against which “cultivation”/”culture” was 
called upon to direct its principled resistance. In the face of a base “materialism”, “the 
amassing of fortunes and the proposition of utility as the source of value”, 8 this 
“standard of perfection” was offered as a superior moral order, a reassertion of pre-
existing traditions and values against the structural and ideological solvents of the new 
economy and its associated social forms.   
The adumbration of the modern sense of culture, which, in Williams’ historical 
reconstruction is associated with a specific nineteenth-century development, was 
fundamentally concerned with the new available modes of sociality. In that sense, 
culture was not merely expressive of a topical engagement with Industrialism and its 
immediate, psychosocial, by-products, but was in many ways a radical response to the 
“new political and social developments, to Democracy.”9  
Williams acknowledges a further strand of signification in culture, which he 
comes to privilege and raise above the level of multiple competing or coexisting 
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meanings, and towards which the bulk of his inquiry in Culture and Society inevitably 
draws. This is the sense which identifies culture, beyond the reductive or specialist 
parcellations of intellectual or artistic commitment, with a “whole way of life”. A plea 
for the integral repositioning of culture in the service of a democratic vision, of a 
politically significant programme of social transformation, is garnered from this 
genealogy of critical thinkers, surfacing in the programmatic conclusion to the book as a 
topical and vocal call to action.10  
Williams’ survey of the “culture and society” tradition opens with the figures of 
Edmund Burke and William Cobbett, respectively branded as “the first modern 
Conservative” and “the first great tribune of the industrial proletariat”.11 Despite their 
politically divergent trajectories, and the consolidated antagonism of the intellectual 
traditions to which they gave rise, Burke and Cobbett “attacked the new England from 
their experience of the old England, and, from their work, traditions of criticism of the 
new democracy and the new industrialism were powerfully begun: traditions which in 
the middle of the twentieth century are still active and important.”12  
Edmund Burke laid the foundations of a characteristic nineteenth-century strategy 
of resistance and opposition to the societal model propounded by the liberal paradigm. 
His anti-democratic polemic, waged in particular against the emergent governmental 
forms of the French Revolution, suggests a radical indictment of the new bourgeois 
subjectivity and its associated political and social mannerisms. The rise of individual 
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man, as deprived of the “natural” checks imposed by the historical community, of its 
trans-individual wisdom and traditional security, threatens to dissolve the very bonds 
and continuities which vouchsafe political freedom.13  
Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human 
wants… Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, 
of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that 
the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass 
and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should 
frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into 
subjection.14 
Only by securing a superior instance of control and restraint – as Burke says “out of 
themselves; and not… subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to 
bridle and subdue” – can man rise from the state of dependency and debasement of 
which contemporary political events were but a characteristic expression. Burke’s 
critical dissection of the revolutionary process in France emanates, according to 
Williams, from the “relative stability” of the eighteenth century, offering an urgent 
redeployment of traditional political language, but also an acutely perceptive reaction to 
“those rising doctrines which the eighteenth-century had produced, and which were to 
become the characteristic philosophy of the change itself.”15 Thus, the Burkean critique 
provided, in a well-nigh proleptic gesture, the basic elements of an ideological 
formulation which, throughout the ensuing century and well into the next, would make 
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of liberalism and industrialism two privileged targets in its general assessment of 
contemporary – modern – society.  
Williams’ juxtaposition of Burke and Cobbett at the opening of Culture and 
Society functions as both a methodological and programmatic caveat outlining the 
working argument of the book, namely that “we can only understand this tradition of 
criticism of the new industrial society if we recognize that it is compounded of very 
different and at times even directly contradictory elements.”16 This strategic alliance of 
nominally opposing figures is also rehearsed in the binomial formed by Robert Owen 
and Robert Southey – the former representing one of the foundational moments of 
British Socialism and the latter, a new mode of Conservatism in line with Burkean and 
Coleridgean teaching.      
The writings of Thomas Carlyle represent a vital moment in the development of 
this critical lineage, as it reveals an early yet profound understanding of the enduring 
changes which industrial capitalism would naturalise, in the course of the century, as a 
basic appurtenance of modern British society. Carlyle’s diagnostic characterisation of 
the general process focuses on the “mechanical” quality of the age (which he terms the 
“Age of Machinery”) as expressed and embodied in the new methods of production and, 
by extension or structural contagion, in the wider sphere of thought and feeling. The 
pragmatic eviction of the artisanal mode in favour of some “cunning abbreviated 
process” set the standard and the new operative logic of social functioning. A novel 
concern with productive efficiency, with the technical control of natural forces and 
generally, with the “external” or “outward” extension of combined human powers, was 
produced as further proof of the radical reconfiguration which both the physical and 
metaphysical realms of man had undergone: 
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Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the 
internal and spiritual also. Here too nothing follows its spontaneous course, 
nothing is left to be accomplished by old natural methods. Everything has its 
cunningly devised implements, its pre-established apparatus, it is not done 
by hand, but by machinery. Thus we have machines for Education: 
Lancastrian machines; Hamiltonian machines; monitors, maps and 
emblems. Instruction, that mysterious communing of Wisdom with 
Ignorance, is no longer an indefinable tentative process, requiring a study of 
individual aptitudes, and a perpetual variation of means and methods, to 
attain the same end; but a secure, universal, straightforward business, to be 
conducted in the gross, by proper mechanism, with such intellect as comes 
to hand.17  
Mechanisation could be observed at a multitude of social levels and planes of 
interaction as a definitive evisceration of the organic links which had traditionally – in 
the language of Burke – held society together. As Williams points out, Carlyle “sees, 
with a terrible clarity, the spiritual emptiness of the characteristic social relationships of 
his day”.18 With “Cash Payment” acting “as the sole nexus” between one person and the 
next, the once pristine realm of spiritual life and individual endeavour was fatefully 
deserted for an impersonal – that is, mechanical – system of collective being and 
exchange. Thus, “[n]ot for internal perfection, but for external combinations and 
arrangements, for institutions, constitutions, – for Mechanism of one sort or other, do 
they hope and struggle.”19 This general critique of the social and moral offshoots of 
industrialisation, which according to Williams, characterises Carlyle as “without 
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argument, a radical and a reformer”, also provides a firm intellectual basis from which 
subsequent appeals to “culture” qua oppositional reservoir of superior value and 
insurance against the depredations of “mechanism”, will be articulated (in Arnold, most 
notably).20  
In Carlyle’s view, what the laissez-faire doctrine had been promoting through the 
age of the great upheavals – the eighteenth century –,21 the present moment saw 
transformed and adapted as a fresh rash of vicious political responses stemming from 
the same root of spiritual devastation. “These Chartisms, Radicalisms, Reform Bill, 
Tithe Bill, and infinite other discrepancy” rehearse a native version of the French 
Revolution whilst announcing a set of deeply entrenched forces in society for which 
execrable political violence is but one natural corollary:22  
Carlyle sees democracy, in fact, as in one sense an expression of the same 
laissez-faire spirit: a cancelling of order and government, under which men 
can be left free to follow their own interests. Any such criticism of 
democracy, read now, is only too likely to meet immediate prejudice… Yet 
the criticism has a certain justice, and is, indeed, a most relevant criticism of 
that kind of democracy which, for example, reached its climax in the 
Reform Bill of 1832. Whenever democracy is considered as solely a 
political arrangement, it is open to Carlyle’s charge. A large part of the spirit 
of democracy in our kind of society is in fact the spirit of laissez-faire, 
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extended to new interests and creating in consequence new kinds of 
problem.23  
In this key interpretative gesture, Williams reveals the precise political significance of 
an intellectual tradition placed at the heart of social change, yet sufficiently distanced 
from the ideological milieu of the emergent forms – through an often conservative or 
openly reactionary stance – to bring about a salutary “estrangement effect” and expose 
the nascent contradictions within the liberal edifice. Carlyle’s political outsiderness 
marks a strategic position from which the critical exposure and indictment of the new 
social and relational standards of industrial capitalism (as “dictated by the ‘laws’ of 
political economy”) are enabled. The traditionalist sources of his conception of society, 
of government, order and value, facilitate the construction of a compelling catalogue 
(according to Williams, the first of modern significance) of the moral and physical 
fragmentations characteristic of the new, industrial society. “The idea of culture as the 
whole way of living of a people” acquires a contextual pregnancy and a radical political 
expressivity in the face of a hegemonic mode of sociability governed by the “cash 
nexus” and its attendant rationale.  
In this context also, “the idea of culture as the body of arts and learning, and the 
idea of culture as a body of values superior to the ordinary progress of society” gather a 
specific relevancy in the elitist Carlylean conception of a “spiritual aristocracy” – a 
body of sages not dissimilar from Coleridge’s “clerisy” – which would preside over and 
secure society’s horizon of attainment qua integrated and organic venture. The basic 
point of contention:  
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[W]ith Carlyle as with Coleridge, and as with Matthew Arnold after them, is 
that the then existing organization of society, as they understood it, offered 
no actual basis for the maintenance of such a class. The separation of the 
activities grouped as ‘culture’ from the main purposes of the new kind of 
society was the ground of complaint.”24  
The vexed recognition of a process of fragmentation or separation within nineteenth-
century society supplied one of the standard arguments against the “spirit of rapacious 
covetousness” underpinning the liberal idea of progress. As Benjamin Disraeli put it in 
Sybil, or the Two Nations, in a diagnostic observation which would enduringly resonate 
throughout the century and beyond: “[t]here is no community in England; there is 
aggregation, but aggregation under circumstances which make it rather a dissociating 
than a uniting principle… It is a community of purpose that constitutes society … 
without that, men may be drawn into contiguity, but they still continue virtually 
isolated.”25 Against this fundamental devastation at the core of the social body, culture 
would come to signify a necessarily militant position and a radical performative 
instance from which reconstruction – that is, the rearticulation of society’s atomised 
provinces – may be undertaken, and a future in common, effectively imagined. 
With the publication of Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy in 1869, the 
standard of “perfection” raised by authors such as J.H. Newman as a salutary counter to 
the Utilitarian aims of Victorian education finally attained a terminological fixation, as 
Williams says, “giv[ing] the tradition a single watchword and a name”.26 Arnoldian 
“Culture” is thus in a direct line of descent from Burkean sentiment and Coleridgean 
“Cultivation” and “health”, prescribing through the study and acquisition of knowledge 
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– of “the best which has been thought and said in the world” – a horizon of attainment 
which would involve “all sides of our humanity”.27 Culture in this particular inflection 
is, as Williams insists, a fundamentally general as opposed to partial or specialised, 
process of development. The historical experience of hegemonic nineteenth-century 
liberalism gave Arnold a penetrating critical edge to his conception of “general 
perfection” through culture. Readily evoking the language and colour of Burke’s 
analysis, Arnold applied the tag of “Jacobinism” to the abstract imagination of social 
blueprints in a mechanical programming of the soul: “[v]iolent indignation with the 
past, abstract systems of renovation applied wholesale, a new doctrine drawn up in 
black and white for elaborating down to the very smallest details a rational society for 
the future – these are the ways of Jacobinism.”28 
Against this impervious and debased rule of abstraction erected upon the 
intellectual heritage of the eighteenth century (as Carlyle had observed, a heritage no 
longer valid for the nineteenth), Arnold would invoke a guided awakening of the “best 
self” latent in the community, past the immediate obfuscation and pettiness of the 
existing social classes. The role reserved for the State in this grand design of cultural 
transmission – as he recommended, through the combined powers of education, poetry 
and criticism – was paramount. The State, conceptualised as a “centre of authority and 
light”, was to secure the continuity and survival of a standard of perfection which the 
current modulation of class interests neglected.29  
Opposition to “Jacobinism” in this context signified the principled substitution 
of moral orientation as against the “external”, disembodied, dirigisme of an “abstract” 
intellectual machine. The insurmountable historical obstacle for Arnold was, however, 
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that the “State which for Burke was an actuality” – that is, the organic totality which 
sustained the cohesive notion of society underpinning his critique of the French 
Revolution – had “become for Arnold an idea” deprived of real, experiential 
validation.30 To the threat of abstraction (of “Jacobin” blueprints and social 
“machinery”) was added the fresh ideological fear of an emergent class (the proletariat) 
equipped with idiosyncratic grievances and a peculiar vision of social re-ordering: the 
symptom-formation of a society which had long departed from the actual experience of 
Culture/Cultivation in the old Coleridgean sense of an integral relationship. Faced with 
this real fracture in the social, Arnold’s doctrine of culture, for all its programmatic 
articulation as a dynamic process of individual and collective amelioration, runs at times 
the risk of fetishisation: “his emphasis in detail is so much on the importance of 
knowing, and so little on the importance of doing, that Culture at times seems very like 
the Dissenters’ Salvation: a thing to secure first, to which all else will then be added.”31  
The secular, post-traditional basis on which Arnold’s notion of Culture was 
premised exposes the limitations of this historical conjuncture: “Culture was a process, 
but he could not find the material of that process, either, with any confidence, in the 
society of his own day, or, fully, in a recognition of an order that transcended human 
society. The result seems to be that, more and more, and against his formal intention, 
the process becomes an abstraction.”32 Bereft of the theological dimension which had 
anchored Newman’s notion of perfection, and of the direct experience of traditional 
social bonds which animated the integrated vision of a Burke and – more residually – of 
a Coleridge, Arnold’s notion of Culture could not elude the contradictory position of 
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presenting itself as an abstract blueprint rather than as a harmonious, organic, growth of 
concrete perfection. 
Williams’ exploration of the idea of Culture in the nineteenth century reaches a 
new climax in the socially-inflected art criticism rehearsed by Pugin, Ruskin and 
Morris. Ruskin’s aesthetic ideas are characterised as also tributary to the general 
conception of society in this tradition. The artistic process and the notion of artistic 
value in particular are here predicated on a sense of “wholeness” which is directly 
accountable for the quality of the art being produced and generally, for the quality of the 
society in which it is produced. In a civilisation mediated by the “external” workings of 
industrialism and the “mechanical” regulations of the market, “Beauty” – in particular, 
the universal evidence of “Divine attributes” which he terms “Typical Beauty” and 
makes applicable to proper aesthetic judgement – is fatefully impaired and disabled. 
The hegemonic spirit of laissez faire, with its fundamental dissolution of stable social 
relationships and its surrender of value to the extrinsic law of exchange, made the 
expressive dynamic of a whole way of life (as variously conceived of under the sign of 
art, social design or cultural ideal) increasingly elusive and immaterial. Thus, for 
Williams, the historical conjuncture shared by these nineteenth-century thinkers is 
characterised by temporal dislocation and an antiquarian instinct awaiting its proper 
transformation into revolutionary zeal: 
Burke was perhaps the last serious thinker who could find the ‘organic’ in 
an existing society. As the new industrial society established itself, critics 
like Carlyle and Ruskin could find the ‘organic’ image only in a backward 
look: this is the basis for their ‘medievalism’, and of that of others. It was 
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not, in this tradition, until Morris that this image acquired a distinctly future 
reference – the image of socialism.33  
 
Williams’ concluding chapter in Culture and Society attempts both an analytical 
recapitulation of the historical meanings attached to the word culture, the diverse and 
evolving conjunctures under which it was tentatively pressed into service through the 
rise and consolidation of industrialism, as well as a programmatic call for a 
redeployment of its integral sense as a collective experience and ideal. The political 
horizon into which the idea of culture is here inserted takes the notion of community as 
its operative social principle and that of democracy as the crucial historical dynamic to 
which it variously seeks to respond. Williams’ concern with the strengthening discourse 
of “mass civilisation”, “mass democracy” and “mass communication” announces the 
terms of his engagement with the contemporary valuation, in late industrial Britain, of 
democracy itself.  
In Williams’ view, the blanket indictment of mass society and its by-products, 
including, fundamentally, its direct political manifestation as “mass” democracy, often 
conceals a prejudiced condemnation of majority rule. The key resides, now as before, in 
the ideologically loaded notion of “the masses”, which genealogically links – in a 
characteristic gesture of closure common to numerous conservative thinkers in the 
studied tradition – the evolution of a new collective subject to a general law of social 
degeneration: “with universal suffrage, majority rule will, if we believe in the existence 
of the masses, be mass-rule. Further, if the masses are, essentially, the mob, democracy 
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will be mob-rule. This will hardly be good government, or a good society; it will, rather, 
be the rule of lowness or mediocrity.”34   
The new collective subject in question, during the historical period which 
commences with the first social symptoms of the Industrial Revolution is, unmistakably 
for Williams, the working class. Consequently, the reticent reference to the masses 
betrays, whenever pressed for its ultimate consequences, a rejection, not so much of a 
degraded incarnation of democracy but, rather, of democracy as such, understood as the 
possibility of social transformation through full political participation.35 The 
fundamental contention here is resonant with Priestley’s “populist” argument in Out of 
the People: 
The people are not the masses. These are two different conceptions. Indeed, 
they are opposed. One rejects the other. When I say to myself “the people,” 
I have a confused but lively vision of a hundred faces and a hundred voices, 
as if a picture by old Breughel had suddenly come to life. In short, I think of 
persons. But when I say to myself “the masses,” I see at once a grey 
featureless horde, and hear nothing but a muttering and murmuring... We 
never belong to the masses. We are always distinct, separate and fairly far 
removed. Once any person has for us achieved a name, a face, a voice, a real 
individuality, then he or she is no longer merely one of the masses.36 
In a similar vein, Williams asserts: 
I do not think of my relatives, friends, neighbours, colleagues, 
acquaintances, as masses… The masses are always the others, whom we 
                                                          
34
 Williams, ibid., 288 
35
 Williams, ibid., 288 
36
 J.B. Priestley, Out of the People (London: Collins, 1941), 18 
217 
 
don’t know, and can’t know. Yet now, in our kind of society, we see these 
others regularly, in their myriad variations; stand, physically, beside them. 
They are here, and we are here with them. And that we are with them is of 
course the whole point. To other people, we also are masses. Masses are 
other people.37 
The known predicament of advanced industrialism (as prophetically intuited by critics 
in the aforementioned tradition) revolves around this paradox: togetherness, that is, 
physical community is overlaid with the proper distortions and fractures of interpersonal 
estrangement. And this shared alienation which pulsates in the notion and in the 
contemporary experience of the masses is both the limit and the condition for any future 
realisation of the democratic promise.  
The notion of “mass communication” therefore exposes the inherent contradiction 
of advanced industrial society. Since “any real theory of communication” is ultimately 
premised on a theory of community, the “techniques of mass-communication will be 
irrelevant… to the degree that we judge them to be conditioned, not by a community, 
but by the lack or incompleteness of a community”.38 The organisational principle 
which supports this particular society fosters a conception of communication which is 
exclusively identifiable as domination. This principle is, in Williams’ analysis, an 
“inequality of being” which brands society in the totality of its relations, and which the 
new media rely upon in their disconnected chain of transmission, thereby maintaining 
an essential uncommunity whose instinctual response is often political “inertia and 
apathy”. For Williams, the urgent political task for a committed culture to undertake is 
precisely to contain the flood of this rising inequality. The restitution of genuine 
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communication demands the provision of “an effective community of experience”, a 
sense of participation, “active reception, and living response” beyond the customary 
fracture of existing social relations.39  
In this respect, Williams’ militant call for equality undergoes a fundamental 
qualification which places his bid in direct conversation with the charted tradition. 
Equality is not to be interpreted or pursued as a substantive levelling or qualitative 
smoothing over of existing differences in a community – in a culture – but avowedly, as 
a living assertion of “the fundamental equality of being”.40 In this particular respect, 
Williams falls back on his optimistic assessment of Lawrence’s writings on equality a 
few chapters earlier:  
One man is neither equal nor unequal to another man. When I stand in the 
presence of another man, and I am my own pure self, am I aware of the 
presence of an equal, or of an inferior, or of a superior? I am not. When I 
stand with another man, who is himself, and when I am truly myself, then I 
am only aware of a Presence, and of the strange reality of Otherness… 
There is no comparing or estimating. There is only this strange recognition 
of present otherness… Comparison enters only when one of us departs from 
his own integral being, and enters the material mechanical world. Then 
equality and inequality starts at once.41   
From this idiosyncratic logic of equality (Williams writes “[t]his seems to me to be the 
best thing that has been written about equality in our period”), Williams’ 1950s 
Socialism derives a commitment to the ethical conditions under which a post-
mechanical freedom – that is, the sort of freedom on which full, uninhibited or 
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undistorted democracy is predicated – may be conceived. Again, a Lawrentian 
definition, to which Williams is clearly sympathetic, may be in order: “[m]en are free 
when they belong to a living, organic, believing community, active in fulfilling some 
unfulfilled, perhaps unrealized purpose.”42 Thus, a community of experience of the sort 
which enables real communication is the absolute condition for freedom itself, and 
consequently, for any lived and effective understanding of democracy beyond the ritual 
application of a dominative and impersonal logic of government.  
This community of experience requires an assertion of the basic equality of being 
which, as Williams insists, does not imply any disregard for the fruitful “inequalities” 
(or differences, by another name) which a complex community of culture necessarily 
involves. The hierarchical (or “dominative”) schema of transmission is, on the other 
hand, radically incompatible with actual communication and the living realities of a 
common culture. In a clear departure from the elitist assumptions of the tradition 
(whether in their Arnoldian-liberal or Fabian-socialist versions), the conclusion is 
reached that “[n]obody can raise anybody else’s cultural standard. The most that can be 
done is to transmit the skills, which are not personal but general human property, and at 
the same time to give open access to all that has been made and done.”43  
This argument generates, in Williams’ early articulation of culture, an axiomatic 
principle which will subsequently coordinate the discrete elements of the charted 
tradition into an operative conceptualisation: namely, the crucial idea that “culture is 
ordinary”.44 This, again, presupposes a fundamental derivation of concepts and 
formulations from processed – yet all the same, immediately lived, directly accessible – 
experience. In moving along the pathway of biographical reference, and in extracting a 
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rationale with political consequences from this experiential hub, the “vision of a free 
homeland” punctuated by Lawrence as a paradoxical, yet highly symptomatic 
elaboration of the communitarian response to social change, acquires a fresh relevancy 
to the democratic project of “culture”.45 Thus, the “close quick relationship” which both 
Lawrence and Williams acknowledge – in their different ways – as an unsung asset of 
working-class life, provides a functional key to the holistic interpretation of the idea of 
culture as pursued and developed in the tradition. As the argument goes, the “making” 
and “finding” of “common meanings and values” gives sustenance to the primary mode 
of expression of culture in any given society. It is precisely the “commonality” and the 
“ordinariness” (that is, the spontaneous, trans-individual or collective, and processual 
manner in which such meanings and values are evolved) which first constitutes the 
material setting for the ulterior, derived and specialised, sense of the term culture as 
creative, individual endeavour: 
The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions, 
and its growth is an active debate and amendment, under the pressures of 
experience, contact, and discovery, writing themselves into the land. The 
growing society is there, yet it is also made and remade in every individual 
mind. The making of a mind is, first, the slow learning of shapes, purposes, 
and meanings, so that work, observation and communication are possible. 
Then, second, but equal in importance, is the testing of these in experience, 
the making of new observations, comparisons, and meanings.46     
The collective tenor of this “active debate and amendment” is alive in the notion that 
culture is first and foremost, a “whole way of life”. As T.S. Eliot expressed it, in a 
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formulation which, as we have seen, Williams takes up and adapts to his own idiom, 
culture, not unlike religion, should be regarded as “the whole way of life of a people, 
from birth to the grave, from morning to night and even in sleep.”47  
This unconscious dimension suggested by Eliot is central to the real genesis of 
“common meanings and directions” in the making of a society. Thus the conscious 
crafting of new meanings must necessarily coexist with the experiential immediacy of a 
global process, with the unconscious aspects of a culture which inevitably pulsate 
within it. As Williams in turn observes: “[n]o community, no culture, can ever be fully 
conscious of itself, ever fully know itself. The growth of consciousness is usually 
uneven, individual, and tentative in nature.”48 In a context of increasing social 
specialisation or complexification, the task of bringing a “genuinely common culture” 
into existence is only realisable under conditions of “material community and by the full 
democratic process”.49 However obscure and tentative, this recommendation is fully 
consonant with a communal vision of the kind articulated by Lawrence. The “close 
quick relationship” of the proletarian household, the undivided nature of a collective 
mode of existence in which the “material processes of satisfying human needs are not 
separated from personal relationships”,50 provides the model and the strategic horizon 
for the shift which must occur from defensive to active solidarity in the culture: 
To any individual, however gifted, full participation will be impossible, for 
the culture will be too complex. Yet effective participation is certainly 
possible. It will, at any time, be selective from the whole culture, and there 
will be difference and unevenness in selection, as there will be in 
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contribution. Such selection, such unevenness, can be made compatible with 
an effective community of culture, but only by genuine mutual 
responsibility and adjustment. This is the conversion of the defensive 
element of solidarity into the wider and more positive practice of 
neighbourhood.51 
Working-class culture cannot be defined in the narrow terms suggested by notions of 
“proletarian culture”, as a closed set of features or trends:52 “it is, rather, the basic 
collective idea, and the institutions, manners, habits of thought, and intentions which 
proceed from this… The culture which it has produced, and which it is important to 
recognize, is the collective democratic institution, whether in the trade unions, the 
cooperative movement, or a political party.”53 Thus, the body of culture organically 
adumbrated by the working class through its collective experience of industrial 
capitalism prefigures a historical starting point for the deployment and vindication of a 
common strategy beyond the hegemonic abstractions of the “bourgeois idea of society”. 
This alternative to the “idea of society as a neutral area within which each individual is 
free to pursue his own development and his own advantage as a natural right” offers a 
rallying point for the antagonistic representation of culture as a social antidote to 
atomisation.54  
For Williams, the negotiation of tensions and possibilities arising from this 
encounter between a distinguished critical tradition (the “culture and society” tradition) 
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and a biographical experience of “close spontaneous living” demanded a repositioning 
of community as the moral and political basis of any future programme for democratic 
social transformation. The community, thus theorised, was first and foremost an 
immediacy of loyalties, a deep consciousness of collective answerability dictated by the 
relative stability of relations, and by the spatial continuity and permanence of subject 
positions within the social configuration. This is, unmistakably, the strong sense of 
community represented by Williams’ own native background in the Welsh borders, in 
the Black Mountains village of Pandy, and in the broad formative experience which 
then nourished the concept with a deep sense of mutual recognition and obligation. It is, 
likewise, the deep organicism which informs his valuation of Lawrence’s relevancy, and 
which provides, in turn, a measure of their shared ground and biographical parallel.55 
Williams’ early work is haunted by a looming sense of displacement from the 
native community – from “close, quick relationship” – and by an enforced 
compensation through radical politics. Thus, his early years in Cambridge as a 
“scholarship boy” combined the profound alienness of class discrimination and elitism – 
in a clear rehearsal of the reductive and discriminatory sense of the term “culture” –56 
with the politically conscious reproduction of a communal solidarity and identity. As he 
would later remark to the interviewers of the New Left Review, “I had to dine in Hall 
and the class stamp of Trinity at that time was not difficult to spot. But it did not have to 
be negotiated as the only context at Cambridge. The Socialist Club was a home from 
home.”57      
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His first fictional/autobiographical intervention, Border Country, marks an 
initial exploration of this personal trajectory as well as an intense mediation of the 
overarching intellectual concerns addressed in Culture and Society. As Stephen 
Woodhams has noted, “Border Country had begun to be written in 1946 as Brynllwyd, 
and represents the most immediate means by which Williams pursued his own passage 
through these years.”58 It seems that the conceptual profile of the reflection, articulated 
through the personal trinity of “culture”, “community” and “Wales” (“in which “Wales” 
serves to frame the other two”, according to Dai Smith),59 required a strategic move 
beyond the resilient academicism of the critical essay, and that only the signifying 
fluidity of the novel form could capture and engage with the experiential complexities 
of a lived culture in common. 
Border Country is a vital instance of reflective self-interrogation – a critical 
scrutiny of the general historical moment which frames his initial incursion into the 
field of cultural theory (the “affluent” 1950s), and a penetrating account of the complex 
negotiation of personal and general loyalties which directly concerned Williams’ 
generation of “scholarship boys”. The narrative of upward mobility which provides the 
background to the novel and to Williams’ own trajectory is permanently destabilised, 
mediated and significantly reconfigured by the prominence of a fundamental notion – 
that of the border – which informs both the title of the novel and the bulk of Williams’ 
historical understanding of the term “culture”. 
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The border to which the novel alludes is, in that sense, the ontological condition 
inhabited by Williams himself and by his fictional alter ego, Matthew Price. It provides 
the spatial context of a personal dislocation (from rural Wales to metropolitan London); 
it entails the social dimension of a cross-class transition (from working- to middle-
class); it involves a temporal margin or historical separation between the heroic moment 
of the 1926 General Strike and the “meretricious society” of the Fifties. And most 
importantly, it balances the permanently unresolved in-betweenness of his moral world 
(Welsh and English, working- and middle-class, collectivist and atomist).  
Border Country is an account of intellectual and material exile from a firm sense 
of primary, original attachment (from the Lawrentian world of “close, quick 
relationships”) and a quest for common meanings and values (a quest for “culture” in 
the broadly encompassing sense of Williams’ theorisation). It is, in other words, a 
reawakening to “identity” through a renovated experience of community. 
Matthew Price’s return to the native community, to the Welsh border village of 
Glynmawr, as his father falls terminally ill, paves the way for an emotional pilgrimage 
back to the common sources of selfhood and belonging, revealing, in the process, a 
complex set of relations and alliances. An economic historian by training, Price’s 
research deals with “population movements into the Welsh mining valleys in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century”.60 His own lived experience of a similar movement 
confronts him with the limitations of measurement – of the means and techniques of 
measurement required by the scientific approach of his particular discipline and the 
basically inaccessible – ungraspable, unfixable – essence of the measured object: 
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The techniques I have learned have the solidity and precision of ice-cubes, 
while a given temperature is maintained. But it is a temperature I can’t 
really maintain; the door of the box keeps flying open. It’s hardly a 
population movement from Glynmawr to London, but it’s a change of 
substance, as it must also have been for them, when they left their villages. 
And the ways of measuring this are not only outside my discipline. They are 
somewhere else altogether, that I can feel but not handle, touch but not 
grasp.61  
Only the immanent trajectory of a psychological journey back to the native milieu, only 
an internal reconstruction of the experience of displacement, loss and recovery, can 
successfully bridge this change of substance. Only, as the novel sets out to exemplify, 
the holistic interpretation of culture as an integral way of life (as “a whole way of life”), 
as a total embodiment of meaningful relations and their derivative set of values, can 
express the vital dimension of social inquiry – while external, forensic, observation only 
grasps at the surface.  
The journey home is a relapse into the rhythms of a foregone past (“Abruptly the 
rhythm changed, as the wheels crossed the bridge”),62 into the realm of an old habitation 
colliding with the circumstances of personal dislocation. The crossing of the border, 
signalled in the narration by a change of rhythm which is reflected in the syntax as a 
shift to longer, parsimonious, sentences, marks the resurrection of an experiential kernel 
punctuated by distance, nostalgia and, increasingly, the proper combinations of an 
enabling recognition.63 Along with the peculiar rattle of the carriage, as the 
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Herefordshire borderlands fade into the Welsh landscape, the temporally removed 
awareness of belonging is shaped into a present concern, into an immediate compulsion 
to re-live forgotten connections and repressed ways. This becomes apparent as soon as 
Matthew sets foot in the local station at Gwenton and, self-engrossed in reverie, fails to 
recognise the voice of an old family friend, Morgan Rosser, who has come to pick him 
up:  
As he walked down the station approach, a car drove towards him, raking 
him with its headlights, in which the rain drifted. The driver blew his horn, 
but Matthew ignored it. He walked on, steadily, turning his face from the 
wind. So much of his memory of this country was a memory of walking: 
walking alone, with the wind ripping at him; alone it seemed always, in 
memory, though not in fact.64  
In trying to reconstruct this elemental, distant sensation – the core images of his native 
life – Matthew seems to forget or exclude the determining factor in that ungraspable 
“substance” which his scientific method cannot properly isolate: the lived experience of 
community, which was characterised, as Williams had reportedly known it in childhood 
and adolescence, by “the extending obligations of neighbourhood”.65 
Williams’ definition of the “country” is fleshed out in this distinctive quality of 
the minimal bond and the loaded interpersonal space. Matthew’s encounter with 
Morgan Rosser prompts the re-absorption of his present, alien self (urban, middle-class, 
intellectual) into the old textures and patterns of behaviour – it compels, without the 
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intervention of external measurement, a deep, unverbalised understanding of life in 
common: “[i]t is like this, this country; it takes you over as soon as you set foot in it.”66  
The encounter with the bed-ridden father makes this resurgent awareness all the 
more pressing and urgent. Now the formal, contrived, veil upon which much of his 
acquired, contemporary identity depends is revealed useless in this extraordinary effort 
to communicate with the past. Matthew gives way to Will, the name under which he had 
been known throughout childhood, and words, for the most part, give way to postures, 
to gestures and generally, to the physical immediacy of emphatic silence and muted yet 
meaningful dialogue: 
[H]is whole mind seemed a long dialogue with his father – a dialogue of 
anxiety and allegiance, of deep separation and deep love. Nothing could 
stop this dialogue, nothing else seemed important, yet here, with the pale 
hand laying by his own hand, with the face no longer an image but there, 
anxiously watched, the command to silence was absolute, while the 
dialogue raced.67  
The relative distance of personal circumstance and temporal ascription (the fact that 
Matthew belongs in the 1950s whilst Harry comes across as more of a figuration of a 
bygone world) is bridged by this elemental community of sensation between dying 
father and returning son. The loaded temporality of imminence (the tense expectancy of 
the coming end, of Harry’s death) is overlaid in this passage with an intensity of 
identification which lays, in a way, the emotional foundations of subsequent instances 
of community in the novel.  
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The family (interestingly emblematised by the father-son relationship, while the 
role assigned to the mother is considerably less prominent) supplies a preliminary 
context for communality – a primordial scenario of shared meanings and obligations 
which prefigures, and yet is only validated or sanctioned by its extension into the larger 
social grouping. Thus, for example, the psychologically distant portrait of the paternal 
grandfather, hanging on the bedroom wall, manages to convey a secret intimation of a 
primary bond which only becomes meaningful as part of a larger, social, experience:  
Here again was complexity. The mediocre photograph had the life of a fine 
portrait… Jack Price, labourer, very formal in the stiff, high collar and the 
smooth, unworn lapels and waistcoat. Then the eyes, colourless in the hazy 
enlargement, but not his son’s eyes, clouded, unfocused; eyes still with the 
devil in them, the spurt of feeling and gaiety. Remembering their living 
excitement, Matthew stared back feeling their world.68  
It is the intimation of a whole way of life made available in the visual trajectory – the 
longing eye meeting the full expression of a past life-world. The weight of the silent 
dialogue is sustained by the look and the deep understanding of a process which is 
unexceptional, yet complex, ongoing and thoroughly social.  
Matthew Price’s journey home is an attempt to unravel the inner significance of 
this life-world as it has grown removed and foreign from personal experience. And it is 
fundamentally an attempt to reconnect its outward aspects – its crystallisation in 
memory and detached analysis as a familiar image, a landscape etc – to the dense, inner 
life of a living world. The bid to resuscitate the old codes of interaction – the “intrusive” 
neighbours, the closeness and mutuality of social life – combines with the effort to 
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galvanise old graphic detail – the valley and the mountains of childhood – back into a 
real, effective presence. Work, that is, the realisation of work as the primary social 
relationship whereby individual human lives are brought together into a functioning 
whole, marks the transition to this galvanic activation. It operates as the organising 
framework (the social context) within which the reconnection can be achieved:  
He had felt empty and tired, but the familiar shape of the valley and the 
mountains held and replaced him. It was one thing to carry its image in his 
mind, and he did, everywhere, never a day passing but he closed his eyes 
and saw it again, his only landscape. But it was different to stand and look at 
the reality. It was not less beautiful; every detail of the land came up with its 
old excitement. But it was not still, as the image had been. It was no longer 
a landscape or a view, but a valley that people were using. He realized, as he 
watched, what had happened in going away. The valley as landscape had 
been taken, but its work forgotten. The visitor sees beauty; the inhabitant a 
place where he works and has his friends… This was not anybody’s valley 
to make into a landscape. Work had changed and was still changing it, 
though the main shape held.69 
The colour of social interaction – the interpersonal rhythms of the border country – is in 
itself a constant reminder, for Matthew’s exilic consciousness, of that “network” in 
which native life had been steeped in the beginning.70 The emotional reawakening of 
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“Will”, by the father’s deathbed, is inextricably bound up with a reawakening, from the 
torpid social and political standpoint of 1950s metropolitan Britain, to the collective 
energies of, first, an old country mode and, second, a foregone conjuncture of politically 
conscious “common life”.  
The novel rehearses History as both the general horizon and the natural extension 
of conflicts, negotiations and victories achieved at the level of small-scale interpersonal 
alliances. The drama of the 1926 General Strike provides the concrete framework in 
which these patterns are tested and the specific formulations of community and culture 
(of the whole way of life), fleshed out. With the novel’s time frame shifting to 1926 and 
the crucial events of that year, the circumstances of unprecedented co-ordinated class 
action serve a particular purpose of collective self-definition and identification. The 
strike is accorded pride of place in the general organisation and ulterior 
contextualisation of social and individual identities: the bonds and fractures generated 
by this single, but momentous action constitute the historical and biographical 
foundation upon which subsequent instances of community and communication 
(between Matthew and his father, between Matthew and Morgan Rosser, between 
Rosser and Harry etc) will – implicitly, for the most part – be measured.71  
Thus the idiosyncratic forms of labour and militancy enacted on the structural 
(and geographical) outskirts of industrial life (whose “centre” would be represented by 
the mining valleys to the south-west) constitute a symptomatic development of the idea 
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and the practice of community. The experience of the Strike in Glynmawr is mediated 
by its marginal position in the Black Mountains, and its “border” location between 
England and Wales, between an old, backward rurality and the foward-looking world of 
industrialisation. Analogously, Harry Price and Morgan Rosser’s active participation in 
the Strike is marked by yet another border position within their class affiliation: as 
signalmen working at the local railway station their identification with the cause of the 
miners is both external and yet central; it is dialecticised as a formative dynamic of their 
own social relations in and personal experience of the local community. As Williams 
noted in a later piece: 
[B]y the very fact of the railway, with the trains passing through, from the 
cities, from the factories, from the ports, from the collieries, and by the fact 
of the telephone and the telegraph, which was especially important for the 
signalmen, who through it had a community with other signalmen over a 
wide social network, talking beyond their work with men they might never 
actually meet but whom they knew very well through voice and opinion and 
story, they were part of a modern industrial working class.72  
The striking railwaymen, through their particular experience of commitment, solidarity, 
internal defection and eventual defeat, manage to isolate the dynamic and formative 
nature of social relations as a dialectical structure with general, external conditions in 
the public realm and local, particular developments in the personal sphere. A specific 
discipline of loyalty to their fellow workers, to their union and to their class is exercised 
in what constitutes the novel’s political and emotional core. From the general 
“principle” of class solidarity which causes the action (as Harry puts it to Major Blakely 
“[p]art of the fair price for any man is a fair price for his brother. I wouldn’t want it if 
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the miners went without”)73 to the final, validating consequence derived by the striking 
men (a concrete experience of “actual” solidarity), a routine of rural, border-country, 
common life has been strengthened and a new prospect of mutual endeavour has risen 
from the known textures of common experience: “[t]hey seemed to know instinctively 
that it was important to be with each other.”74   
The bitter realities of defeat, betrayal (by the union and the TUC) and 
victimisation in the wake of the strike contribute a further dimension to this complex 
arrangement. The most characteristic transformation concerning the social corollary of 
this experience is perhaps that which affects Morgan Rosser: 
The end of the strike had changed Morgan. Harry had lost most, by being 
off work, but recovered quickly… But for Morgan, really, there was no 
satisfaction. A struggle had been lost; a common effort had failed. And it 
was not only the failure that broke him, but the insight this gave, or seemed 
to give, into the real nature of society. His life had been centred on an idea 
of common improvement. The strike had raised this to an extraordinary 
practical vividness. Then, suddenly, a different reality had closed in.75  
The imperative confirmation of compromise over commitment, as rehearsed in the 
traumatic form of a major historical disappointment (a calculated betrayal – in the bitter 
reckoning of the more militant elements of the labour movement – of conceivable, 
radical, social change), is rationalised through the reorientation of personal purpose. 
Morgan becomes a vehicle for the essentially dramatic subsumption of a whole world (a 
whole “structure of feeling”, in a phrase Williams would popularise) within its 
                                                          
73
 Williams, Border Country, 142 
74
 Williams, ibid., 156 
75
 Williams, ibid., 189 
234 
 
embodied negation: feelings of political solidarity and collective effort give way to the 
individual ambitions of small-scale entrepreneurship.  
But despite the apparent failure of the common project outlined and heralded by 
the strike, the nature and scope of the living sociality addressed by the novel lies deeper, 
in a structure of interpersonal feeling and action which surfaces under external contrast 
and which underpins the general rationale behind Matthew’s adult re-encounter with the 
community through a “private” re-encounter with the dying father. This deeper structure 
is captured in the novel by one of those external observers – the vicar, Arthur Pugh – 
who, early on in Matthew’s life, supplies him with a key to the general understanding he 
will only attain many years later. The actual profile of a “common life” is distinguished 
beyond the external appearances of customary interaction, in a logic of mutual 
dependency and undivided existence which underpins every other aspect of observable 
social life. As Pugh puts it: 
‘The real life here, Matthew, is the growing and the selling. At least it often 
seems so, seems no more. But that isn’t fair. The real life, for these people, 
is each other. Even their religion is for each other… The chapels are for 
people to meet, and to talk to each other or sing together. Around them, as 
you know, moves almost the whole life of the village. That, really, is their 
religion… The chapels are social organizations, Matthew. The church here 
is not. I don’t mean that their religious professions are insincere, but they 
could equally, it seems to me, be professions in almost anything – any other 
system of belief, for instance. What matters, what holds them together, is 
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what their members do, through them, for each other. God, you might say, is 
their formula for being neighbourly.’76  
The traditions of Welsh Nonconformity are singled out as the native locus of an 
organisation of feelings and loyalties through which community – qua real, lived 
experience of moral togetherness – is forged in this context.77 And neighbourliness, 
perhaps the semantic crux of emotional alliances in this novel, is given as the 
interpersonal formula on which an entire social ontology, as it were, is predicated.78                     
Matthew Price’s removal from this universe of physical and moral continuities 
involves the traumatic blurring of a native ethic and a vital space in which identity still 
preserves the organic meaning of an actual way of life. The realisation of psychological 
distance and personal exile gives the measure of loss, through which ultimate recovery 
is rendered possible. Thus the climax of the novel is to some extent epiphanical, as the 
interrupted journey back to London (due to Harry’s second and fatal stroke) presents the 
adult son with the open profile of his predicament and, paradoxically, with the enabling 
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condition of his successful homecoming. While waiting on the platform for the 
outbound train, the communal principle of this forgotten life becomes apparent: 
The long platform was crowded, and he moved into one of the few empty 
spaces. Then he caught what he was doing, and hesitated. It had become a 
habit, this moving away, a habit no less his own because it was also the 
habit of his crowded society. The immediate defence prepared itself; that he 
was country-bred, used to space and aloneness. And this defence was 
plausible, the need to be alone was real, until the crowded hall, the chapel, 
the bus, were remembered. He saw how over the years he had been steadily 
moving away, avoiding contact. The way of thinking which had supported 
him in this seemed suddenly a dead weight, an immaturity of which he had 
been conscious since this crisis in his father’s life… Closing his eyes, he 
saw Harry’s heavy body, and the crowd moved in it, the crowd in its 
constant pressure.79  
The completion of the journey awaits in this climactic realisation, and in the unspoken 
knowledge of a deep continuity across differences of circumstance, emphasis and 
manner. The distance presupposes change, evolution and separation, but it also dictates 
– in the final reckoning – a complex and substantive arrangement whose acceptance 
alone can end exile and grant the sort of understanding from which external, scientific 
analysis is excluded: “[n]ot going back, but the feeling of exile ending. For the distance 
is measured, and that is what matters. By measuring the distance, we come home.”80  
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 Williams’ work is deeply immersed in this peculiar “ethic” of measurement. 
Some of the critical aspects outlined in his early interventions on the theory of culture 
were thus to be recombined in a multi-form yet co-ordinated effort whose projected 
political consequences were, as we have seen, often inseparable from the most personal 
and reflective formulations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
members of the community, to acquire the necessary sensibility to feel and understand the close 
relationships which connect the people of an “organic” community together.”, Di Michele, ibid., 28 
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2. The Long Revolution: history, communication and 
conflict  
 
With the publication of The Long Revolution in 1961 Williams felt to “have 
completed a body of work” spanning Culture and Society and Border Country which 
had commenced with his initial interrogation of the “idea of culture” in the early 1950s. 
According to certain commentators, the later book attempted to counteract some of the 
lingering theoretical confusions harboured by Culture and Society – notably, the 
allegedly unresolved semantic instabilities in his use of the term “culture” – “by laying 
stronger theoretical and empirical foundations”.1 Yet as other critics have noted, the 
book remained characteristic of Williams’ style (“as much as collection of essays as a 
work with a single theme”)2 and yet simultaneously more firmly determined to address 
the urgent political tasks derived from culture analysis and less satisfactory in the 
overall outcome. As Fred Inglis has noted, The Long Revolution “caused quite a stir, 
and was even more fully noticed than its older sibling.”3 The degree of hostility which it 
first attracted – notably from the Right, but as we shall, in a very significant way, also 
from the Left –4 coincided with Williams’ full incorporation into the vanguard of the 
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emergent New Left as a leading figure (“our best man”, in Thompson’s words)5 and 
inescapable intellectual referent.  
The “long revolution” charted by Williams in the book was, by his own admission, 
“a difficult revolution to define, and its uneven action is taking place over so long a 
period that it is almost impossible not to get lost in its exceptionally complicated 
process.” Yet it was, all the same, “a genuine revolution, transforming men and 
institutions; continually extended and deepened by the actions of millions, continually 
and variously opposed by explicit reaction and by the pressure of habitual forms and 
ideas.”6 This complex process had three interweaving strands or lines of development, 
which in turn constituted “revolutionary” processes of their own: the democratic 
revolution, the industrial revolution and the cultural revolution. The first accounted for 
the ongoing and explicit development of power struggles through which the possibility 
of inclusive decision-making and effective political participation was conceived. The 
second, for its part, was intimately connected with the productive dimension of society 
and the technical and scientific mobilisation of material resources. As Williams notes, 
“[t]he complex interaction between the democratic and industrial revolutions is at the 
centre of our most difficult social thinking.”7 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for 
the general emphasis of the book, the phrase “cultural revolution” sought to account for 
the even more complex articulation of the new available means and modes of 
communication with the transformative programme for a common culture.    
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This latter concern offers a thematic springboard for the first section of the book, 
which opens with a historical analysis of creative activity and theories of creation. In it, 
Williams returns to the emphases of his concluding remarks in Culture and Society, 
insisting on the inseparability of individual creation from its embodiment as 
interpersonal meaning in a collective context. Thus:  
Communication [of which artistic creation is but one manifestation] is the 
process of making unique experience into common experience… The ability 
to live in a particular way depends, ultimately, on acceptance of this 
experience by others, in successful communication. Thus our descriptions of 
our experience come to compose a network of relationships, and all our 
communication systems, including the arts, are literally parts of our social 
organization.8  
The essential task is to reconnect the specialised areas of meaning into which an 
increasingly complex social totality tends to direct its diverse functions, for indeed, 
“[e]ach kind of activity in fact suffers, if it is wholly abstracted and separated.”9 
Following closely in the steps of the 1958 book, Williams returns to a 
summation of his position and general conceptualisation of culture and its analysis as 
“the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life.”10 This analysis is 
fundamentally concerned with the organisation, the patterning, of the component 
elements in a particular historical reality. Yet even if these are rendered accessible as an 
intellectual abstraction or precipitate, the living quality of any given period (that is, “a 
sense of the ways in which the particular activities combined into a way of thinking and 
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living”) remains essentially irretrievable.11 The more or less archaeological 
reconstruction of what Fromm terms the “social character” of a given historical 
conjuncture (“a valued system of behaviour and attitudes”) or what Benedict calls the 
“pattern of culture” (“a selection and configuration of interests and activities, and a 
particular valuation of them”), still remains essentially impersonal and abstract in 
nature, far removed from the specific tension of lived experience. In his determination 
to link the effective analysis of culture to this integral and community-orientated notion 
of experience, Williams avows the possibility of “gain[ing] a further common element, 
which is neither the character nor the pattern”.12 This undefined remainder of a common 
trait can be isolated through the scrutiny and close study of the art of a period, once 
individual idiom and general characteristics have been set aside. There remains, in that 
unstated but defining tegument, “a particular sense of life, a particular community of 
experience hardly needing expression” which nevertheless articulates the deep structure 
of a given social identity.13  
The famous coinage which Williams introduces to capture this key aspect of 
culture, structure of feeling, is precisely allusive to the “firm and definite” connotations 
of the term “structure”, whilst properly referring to “the most delicate and least tangible 
parts of our activity”. “In one sense, this structure of feeling is the culture of a period: it 
is the particular living result of all the elements in the general organization.” The 
position of the arts in this organisation (and in the retrospective construction or 
reconstruction of it from a later point in time) is paramount, for here “the actual living 
sense, the deep community that makes the communication possible, is naturally drawn 
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upon.”14 Thus the structure of feeling is the enabling condition on which 
communication (that is, in turn, the very possibility of bringing community to a real and 
dynamic actualisation, as the conclusion of Culture and Society made clear) is 
predicated.15 It supplies the unconscious textures and meanings on which a sense of 
wholeness, of integrity and organicity, can be erected. 
“Our thinking about society is a long debate between abstractions and actual 
relationships”:16 the challenge presented by the ongoing “long revolution”, with its 
manifold components and strands of development, requires a strategic resolution of this 
opposition. The reduction of a society and social thinking to the levels of politics (the 
“system of decision”) and economics (the “system of maintenance”) is characteristic of 
a particular, and historically determined, description of interpersonal relations in which 
“society” and the “individual” function as hegemonic abstractions. A resolution of this 
deadlock would necessarily require a repositioning of the terms of antagonism and 
resistance in a more subjectively relevant perspective of immediate relationships and 
identities – indeed, of “communicable” social experience. In this respect, available 
formulae of oppositionality have often incurred a debilitating exposure to and 
complicity with their critical target, rehearsing, en bloc, tools and elements of the 
hegemonic discourse:17  
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It has been the greatest error of socialism, in revolt against class societies, to 
limit itself so often to the terms of its opponents: to propose a political and 
economic order, rather than a human order. It is of course necessary to see 
the facts of power and property as obstacles to this order, but the alternative 
society it has proposed must be in wider terms, if it is to generate the full 
energies necessary for its creation.18  
In the third and final section of The Long Revolution (which, as Fred Inglis notes, 
“really got read and discussed in the clubs”), Williams identifies the contemporary crisis 
of the 1950s and early 60s with the breakdown or loss of “an adequate sense of society”. 
The often critical assessment of reformist or social democratic approaches to wealth 
redistribution and extension of opportunity rests on a fundamental distortion and lack of 
integral understanding, argues Williams, of the social process: “[w]e think of my 
money, my light, in these naïve terms, because parts of our very idea of society are 
withered at root… In a society whose products depend almost entirely on intricate and 
continuous co-operation and social organization, we expect to consume as if we were 
isolated individuals, making our own way.”19  
In this final section, which constitutes a departure from the general tone and 
orientation of the preceding chapters (and which Williams later explained as responding 
to “the quite new situation of ’57-9, including to some extent the discussion of Culture 
and Society itself”),20 Williams propounds an extensive notion of communication as the 
required antidote to the abundant side-effects derived from the process of abstraction 
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which increasingly characterises the modern social experience. The aggressive logic of 
atomisation threatens to dissolve, in a vortex of private consumption of goods and 
experiences, the real connections and internal coherences of a complex, industrialised, 
society.21 The obscurity which befalls this steady complexification of “our real 
relationships” leads to dangerous confusions regarding the actual causes of the 
overarching problematic. Thus, industrial production, “large-scale organization” or even 
society itself and its inherent set of pressures, are variously misidentified as contributing 
factors to the general disorientation:  
For my own part I am certain, as I review the evidence, that it is capitalism 
– a particular and temporary system of organizing the industrial process – 
which is in fact confusing us. Capitalism’s version of society can only be 
the market, for its purpose is profit in particular activities rather than any 
general conception of social use, and its concentration of ownership in 
sections of the community makes most common decisions, beyond those of 
the market, limited or impossible.22 
The consolidation of the “mixed economy” and its attendant institutions in the 
1950s created the conditions for an ideological recrudescence of the profit-motive and 
its resilient expressions in the electoral gamble. Revisionism within the Labour Party 
(under the executive leadership of Hugh Gaitskell and the intellectual patronage of 
Anthony Crosland) represented a particularly symptomatic adjustment of traditional 
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working-class institutionality to the confused dynamics of “affluence” and what the 
party’s left wing characteristically described as a “meretricious society”.23 Its fresh 
projection of Britain as a “post-capitalist” country paved the way for a smooth 
reinscription of “Socialism” within a consensual system of bi-partisan alternation.24  
Against such as backdrop of semantic and structural shifts, Williams’ contention 
that “the patterns of thinking and behaviour [promoted by capitalism] have never been 
more strong” necessarily prompts a realignment of terms and analyses which may 
strategically reposition the programme for a common future:25  
The main challenge to capitalism was socialism, but this has almost wholly 
lost any contemporary meaning, and it is not surprising that many people 
now see in the Labour Party merely an alternative power-group, and in the 
trade-union movement merely a set of men playing the market in very much 
the terms of the employers they oppose. Any such development is generally 
damaging, for the society is unlikely to be able to grow significantly if it has 
no real alternative patterns as the ground of choice.26  
The suggestion remains, however, in the face of ostensive betrayal (or “revision”), that 
these institutions (understood, in the formulation of Culture and Society, as the great 
cultural creations of the British working class), in their basic outline of a general social 
principle – co-operation –, registered a viable, alternative blueprint for the general 
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functioning of society. The thrust of a reinvigorated capitalism notwithstanding, the 
space of possibility opened up by the continuing existence of these “collective 
democratic institutions”, lies in the fact that “their crisis is not yet permanently 
resolved.”27  
The fundamental challenge remains the creation and substantiation of “new 
meanings”: the crucial advancement of an alternative pattern of choices and 
identifications whereby the margin for democratic practices may be enlarged. The 
inherent danger of a received institutionality organised around the party system resides 
in the growing “assumption that direct popular government is not what democracy is 
about.”28 Thus, a “tightly organized party system and parliament seem to have 
converted the national franchise into the election of a court”.29  
The loss of any real sense of effective participation results from an overbearing 
allegiance to impersonal processes: the shifts and gradations of popular opinion are 
slighted in favour of results measured “at the level of the court”, rather than with direct 
reference to “actual persons”, in what amounts to a brand of “conventional thinking” 
which, “when it is traced to its sources, is again the tactical wisdom of a defensive 
autocracy”.30 This alarming estrangement from the parliamentary-democratic process is 
further complicated by a “relative absence of democracy in other large areas of our 
lives”: 
The crucial area is in work, where in spite of limited experiments in ‘joint 
consultation’, the ordinary decision process is rooted in an exceptionally 
rigid and finely-scaled hierarchy, to which the only possible ordinary 
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responses, of the great majority of us who are in no position to share in 
decisions, are apathy, the making of respectful petitions, or revolt.31    
The extension of the principles of managerialism (“man-management, now more 
grandly renamed personnel management”) again witnesses a substitution of centralised 
decision-making for any real affirmation of democracy in the workplace. The standard 
Socialist solution of public ownership is further complicated by the lingering 
bureaucratic instinct found in the public corporation model and hinted at in the 
customary objection that “little is gained by substituting a series of still largely 
authoritarian state monopolies for a series of private monopolies”.32 However, the 
general tone of “apathy, concession and revolt” alternately rehearsed under conditions 
of rampant managerialism suggests that an incomparable amelioration in terms of “more 
rational and responsible solutions” would be achieved through the real extension of 
participative strategies: 
The necessary principle is that workers of all kinds, including managers, 
should be guaranteed the necessary conditions, including both security and 
freedom, of their actual work, in precise ways that are perfectly compatible 
with general decisions about the overall direction of the enterprise... In 
publicly owned industries and services, and in reformed companies, the 
principle of boards elected by the members of the industry or service, to 
operate within the agreed national framework, is surely not difficult.33       
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In Williams’ opinion, the inherited repertoire of distinctions allusive to birth and 
status further distorts the real sources of division generated by post-war British 
capitalism. The endurance of an older system of nobility and essentially feudal 
gradation within a solidly capitalist society (explained by the anomalous development 
of the English bourgeoisie and its consequent compromise with “the class it had 
virtually defeated” in the nineteenth century)34 survived in the systematic confusions of 
language and semantics: the traditional identification of an “upper” and a “middle” class 
terminologically based on hereditary distinction (“upper” and “middle” as opposed to 
“lower” in a stratification without mobility) was contrasted with the fundamentally 
economic determination of a “working” class in what seemed like a radically distinct 
frame of reference.35  
The sharp increase in affluence after a period of post-war austerity contributed a 
further dimension to the received set of contradictions and confusions.36 The 1950s saw 
an overall increase in material wealth and a corresponding growth in upward 
identification amongst broad layers of traditionally working-class wage earners. The 
general movement in patterns of consumption and the rapid expansion of consumer 
credit involving large sectors of the population paradoxically gave rise to an increasing 
convergence between the traditionally unpropertied (the working class of an earlier, 
proletarian, moment) and a presumptive middle class caught up in the expanding circle 
of credit and illusion.37 As a result, the hegemonic doxa of “affluence” and “welfare” 
was typically premised on a blurring of real divisions often disguised by the 
institutionalised differential (between, for example, “salary” and “wage” earners): “[a]s 
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we move into this characteristic contemporary world, we can see the supposed new 
phenomenon  of classlessness as simply a failure of consciousness.”38  
Williams insists on the need to produce new meanings and descriptions in order to 
accommodate emerging patterns (“new kinds of work, new forms of capital, new 
systems of ownership”).39 However, the characteristic modulation of traditional social 
gradations in the new “managed” capitalism of the 1950s operates within a general drift, 
not away from but towards, a general “proletarianisation” (a generalisation of hired 
labour) across virtually the entire economy:     
Our true condition is that in relation to a complicated economic and social 
organization which we have not learned to control, most of us are factually 
servants, allowed the ordinary grades of upper, middle, and lower, insistent 
on the marks of these grades or resentful of them, but, like most servants, 
taking the general establishment for granted and keeping our bickering 
within its terms.40 
Against a social background of new communities “where work is very mixed”, a split 
was generated between the kind of consciousness bestowed by the specific conditions of 
labour (which Williams terms “trade-union consciousness”) and a larger consciousness 
(a “Labour consciousness”) “which has to be in terms of a mixed community and a 
whole society”.41 In this context, the “affluent worker” can easily dissociate the 
particular realities of waged work – and the class specificities of the workplace – from a 
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wider vision and social identity.42 Williams recognises the potential of 1950s 
Conservatism (finally divested of its ominous 1930s aura) for an explicit identification, 
in the eyes of many people in the new socially mixed communities, with rising trends 
and patterns of “learning and response”: “[f]or at just this point, Labour seems to have 
very little to offer. A different version of community, a pattern of new consciousness, it 
has not been able to give. Its compromise policies combine the two irrelevant elements 
of appeal to old and fading habits and memories, and of cultural adjustment to the 
present social confusion.”43  
In this sense, both the old party left and the new revisionism appeared to 
perpetuate the irrelevancy of Labour descriptions to the new configurations of social 
interaction and consciousness, leaving “the ruling interpretations and directions 
essentially unchallenged".44 Only the re-statement of a “real feeling of community” – an 
acceptance of everyone’s involvement in the production of social wealth – could break 
the deadlock of artificial oppositions and superimposed (and essentially false) 
antagonisms between different kinds of workers. The old Socialist question of 
ownership, Williams argues, remains a central constituency of this analysis: and so, the 
isolation of “that basic inequality” (the continuing ownership and control of “social 
production” by only one section of the society – that “which then employs the rest”) 
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would automatically refocus the terms of a debate overly muddled by “the survivals, the 
irrelevancies, and the confusion of other kinds of distinction”.45   
The growth of cultural institutions in this context must capitalise on the plethora 
of possibilities offered by an advanced industrial society. Yet it must equally face up to 
the paradoxes and challenges inherent in a system of economic relations riddled, as the 
preceding analysis suggests, with contradictions and inequalities of a new type. 
Williams confronts the basic premise of the book (the notion that “the human energy of 
the long revolution springs from the conviction that men can direct their own lives, by 
breaking through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society, and by 
discovering new common institutions”)46 with the actual state of cultural production and 
exchange under alleged conditions of “post-capitalist” consensus (in the sense 
suggested by Crosland). In particular, the fundamental and systematic undermining of 
artistic freedom – torn between market dynamics and bureaucratic interference – 
dramatised, for Williams, “the deepest difficulty in the whole development of our 
democracy”:  
[T]hat we seem reduced to a choice between speculator and bureaucrat, and 
while we do not like the speculator, the bureaucrat is not exactly inviting 
either. In such a situation, energy is sapped, hope weakens, and of course 
the present compromise between the speculators and the bureaucrats 
remains unchallenged.47  
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This paradox remains one of Williams’ long-standing concerns in his analysis and 
advocacy of democratic enfranchisement for contemporary cultural institutions.48 In the 
specific context of early-Sixties Britain, this preoccupation with the real difficulties 
confronting cultural production and consumption still rehearse a Leavisite emphasis on 
minority culture and the distinguished or “great” tradition of canonical practitioners.49  
This emphasis is evidently modulated into the language and interests of the long 
revolution and tempered with a critical assessment of the potential distortions associated 
with Leavis’s elitist approach. In the critical framework espoused by Leavis (and Eliot), 
“‘[l]ow’ equals ‘unfamiliar’ is one of the perennial cultural traps, and it is fallen into 
most easily by those who assume that in their own persons, in their own learned tastes 
and habits, they are the high tradition.”50 The conservative projection of the great 
tradition runs the risk of isolating what is truly “a mixed inheritance” culled from 
“many societies and many times as well as from many kinds of men.”51 The argument 
for its preservation against the modern onslaught of a massified society and its attendant 
cultural products prescribes, in Williams’ opinion, the promotion of the tradition’s 
general availability. The real danger therefore lurks in a cancerous growth which, 
threatening the achieved products and practices of a shared social life and its actual 
communities, substitutes “instead a synthetic culture, or anti-culture” that “reduces us to 
an endlessly mixed, undiscriminating, fundamentally bored reaction.”52 In the midst of 
this characteristic proliferation of the affluent society, the “spirit of everything, art and 
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entertainment, can become so standardized that we have no absorbed interest in 
anything, but simply an indifferent acceptance.”53  
This pseudo-cultural excrescence of modern industrial society was described by 
Richard Hoggart in The Uses of Literacy as a “candy-floss world” characterised by a 
depletion of emotional and intellectual value. The spurious reproduction of sameness 
induces a chronic indifference and inability to discern or effectively respond to “any 
serious suggestion of responsibility and commitment.”54 A symptomatic development 
was to be found in the new publications designed for mass consumption: in these, 
“[e]verything has gone vicarious: this is puff-pastry literature, with nothing inside the 
pastry, the ceaseless exploitation of a hollow brightness.”55 This overflow of “mass” 
cultural products engenders a devaluation of the democratic process by promoting “a 
hypothetical figure” of the new social average – “the common man” – “whose main 
value is to those who will mislead us.”56 In that sense, argues Hoggart, “[w]e are 
encouraging a sense, not of the dignity of each person but of a new aristocracy, the 
monstrous regiment [sic] of the most flat-faced.”57  
It is worth noting that this line of cultural criticism had also been fostered, in the 
early years of the decade, by the Communist Party itself.58 Characteristically, the 
damaging expansion of a devalued commercial culture had been linked to the 
hegemonic position of the United States in the wake of the war and its consequent 
saturation of the British market with American products. Williams takes up this 
identification of the “synthetic anti-culture” designed for mass consumption in 1950s 
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and 60s Britain with the directive role of America.59 The special receptivity 
demonstrated by the British public responds, according to Williams, to a deep-set 
rejection of that English minority culture often decried as elitist and therefore 
inaccessible. The American ego-ideal encapsulates in this context a self-distancing from 
the burdensome social distinctions of a traditional kind. Thus, “[t]o go pseudo-
American is a way out of the English complex of class and culture, but of course it 
solves nothing; it merely ritualizes the emptiness and despair.” It is the simultaneous 
exclusivisation of a preserved minority culture in the hands of traditional class 
distinction and the condescension shown towards a “genuinely popular tradition” which 
enables the cultural dominance of “the speculators” in their colonisation of common 
meanings and practices.60   
As we have seen, the critique of mass culture is, in the analytical fabric woven 
by Williams, inseparable from the real hegemony of an unbridled market economy 
committed to an “antiquated system of advertising, which is simply a pre-democratic 
form of manipulation of a public regarded as ‘masses’”.61 A truly democratic counter-
programme for culture should include a prescription against the “kind of social 
collapse” which facilitates this noxious proliferation. And this involves, in turn, a head-
on confrontation of the market society as the limiting horizon beyond which any real 
sense of social growth must go.62    
Williams’ proposals for Britain in the 1960s are brought together in a general 
plea for the extension of democracy (the extension of the basic common inheritance of a 
long, unfinished revolution in social, political and economic life) into ever newer 
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spheres and domains of participation, retaining a basic commitment to the advancement 
of life in common as the real basis of collective and individual freedom: 
The aim has been there, in many minds, for several generations: to create an 
educated and participating democracy. We can achieve this only in terms of 
an advanced industrial society, and the community we are building is and 
must be a wholly new kind of community, in which the new kinds of 
communication... must be not only taken into account, but welcomed.63 
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3. Towards Cultural Materialism 
 
The body of cultural theory produced by Williams in Culture and Society and The 
Long Revolution (Communications should be regarded as an extension of the latter 
work’s concerns) was subject to a number of criticisms from the left which would, in 
turn, help to shape his subsequent emphases and approaches. E.P. Thompson’s review 
of The Long Revolution stands out as perhaps the best critical engagement by a fellow 
New Leftist, isolating some of the general confusions and limitations detected by 
socialist opinion in the country.1  
Thompson’s essay begins with a generous recognition of Williams’ centrality to the 
movement, which he contrasts with his paradoxical distance – in sources and method – 
from the mainstream of the socialist intellectual tradition: “[f]or a socialist thinker Mr 
Williams is extraordinarily curt with the socialist tradition – and indeed in his reference 
to any minority radical tradition.”2 This curtness was already apparent, according to 
Thompson, in Culture and Society, where “a procession of disembodied voices – Burke, 
Carlyle, Mill, Arnold” was substituted for a social totality with its complex interplay of 
tensions and forces. The overall effect, as other critics had pointed out, could be felt in 
the deadpan of Williams’ style, which resulted from “his determination to de-
personalize social forces and at the same time to avoid certain terms and formulations 
which might associate him with a simplified version of the class struggle.”3 This 
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impersonality was further complicated by the debt to Eliot and his problematical notion 
of culture as “a whole way of life”. Thompson’s criticism dwells on the conceptual 
imprecision and the underlying ideological motives of this formulation, which appears 
to ignore the actual distribution of power in a capitalist society. In adhering to this 
neutral conceptualisation of social processes, the entire structure of antagonism within a 
class society was overlooked or even naturalised as part of an indistinct whole. In this 
sense, argued Thompson, to “pass from a ‘way of conflict’ to a ‘way of life’ is to pass 
out of the main line of the socialist intellectual tradition.”4  
To this major objection Williams was to respond explicitly in the series of 
interviews with New Left Review published as Politics and Letters, and implicitly, in the 
theoretical modulation, in subsequent years, of his model of the long revolution. 
Williams’ contention, as articulated in 1979, drew attention to the specific outlook of 
British society in the post-war period and its general unsuitability to a critical 
description such as the one derived by Thompson from his historical expertise and 
dedication to the more “heroic” or obviously conflict-ridden periods: 
The term “class struggle” properly refers to the moment at which that 
structural conflict [class conflict within the capitalist social order] becomes 
a conscious and mutual contention, an overt engagement of forces. Any 
socialist account of culture must necessarily include conflict as a structural 
condition of it as a whole way of life. Without that it would be wrong. But if 
you define the whole historical process as struggle, then you have to elude 
or foreshorten all the periods in which conflict is mediated in other forms, in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
contradiction from him, founding their case on the assumption that what the Industrial Revolution brought 
to England was something essentially new, and essentially bad.” Kiernan objected that “a procession of 
individuals does not add up to a class. We are not shown the literati in their social setting, as a congerie of 
class and corporations with specific functions and specific links and points of contact with the other 
classes.”, The New Reasoner, no. 9 (Summer 1959), 78 
4
 Thompson, ibid., 34 
258 
 
which there are provisional resolutions or temporary compositions of it. I 
was after all particularly conscious of this, because the fifties in England 
had precisely been a period... of marked diminution of class struggle in a 
situation in which there was nevertheless class conflict. Unless one could 
make this distinction, one was in danger of falling into the rhetoric of “a 
whole way of struggle”, which was peculiarly unfitted to a time in which 
what was permanently there as conflict was expressed in terms precisely 
other than struggle.5   
The development of British politics in the 1960s – especially after the election of 
the Wilson government in 1964 and then, with an enlarged majority, in 1966 – laid 
down the terms for a fresh analysis concerning the nature and effective role of the 
Labour Party as a significant agent of social change.6 The effect of Labour’s second 
parliamentary majority was, among the New Left, one of “complete revelation” as to 
what the party had become. The initial distancing impulse of Labour revisionism vis-à-
vis the traditional aims and aspirations of British social democracy (to the extent that 
the 1945-51 government had rehearsed them) was now given the full sanction of power 
and the full shock of confirmation to those supportive critics – Williams included – 
whose assessment of Wilson’s overly timid first two years had put the blame on its 
reduced majority in Parliament. However, the election of March 1966 issued in a new 
state of affairs (of which a foretaste had been given in the government’s unquestioning 
support of the United States in the Vietnam War)7 which required a fundamental change 
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of orientation from the constructive criticism offered in The Long Revolution and 
Communications.  
Williams reconstructed this moment of radicalisation and organisational 
regrouping among the different sensibilities of the New Left in Politics and Letters: 
Within three months, Wilson was on television doing everything he could to 
break the seamen’s strike, denouncing their leaders as a small group of 
politically motivated men. Nobody resigned from the Cabinet – it was a 
very complete revelation of what the Labour Party had become. A month 
later there was the July sterling crisis, when Wilson’s rhetoric could 
certainly have identified small groups of politically motivated men if this 
had been even a shadow of a left government – but no, there was deflation 
and cuts in the social services to defend the exchange rate. Watching these 
two connected performances, I concluded that this was the end of the road. I 
decided to leave the Labour Party and write some sort of manifesto, stating 
very clearly that the Labour Party was no longer just an inadequate agency 
for socialism, it was now an active collaborator in the process of 
reproducing capitalist society.8 
The programmatic outcome of this critical period was the May Day Manifesto of 1967, 
edited by Stuart Hall, Thompson and Williams – and virtually entirely written by 
Williams himself.9 The Manifesto (which was published in 1968 by Penguin in a 
revised version under Williams’ editorship) represented a concerted effort, as Stephen 
Woodhams has recently noted, to re-totalise the fragments in which British capitalism 
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currently sought refuge.10 The text consequently tackles a multiplicity of issues 
(housing, health, education, the economy, international politics etc.) in an attempt to co-
ordinate a global response to the inertia of the late-Sixties Labour experience. It also 
included a crucial reflection on the political meaning of Labour’s realignment, dwelling 
on the widening distance of its unfolding project from the historical goals of social 
democracy, in a way which the Williams of Politics and Letters was keen to emphasise 
and belabour: “social democracy can be that form of socialist struggle which is 
available as a serious option in societies which have relatively open democratic 
institutions and the necessary freedoms to use them. Or it can be the gradual 
assimilation of socialism to the forms of the society which it began by opposing.”11 
The process of radicalisation that is already detectable in the Williams of the late 
Sixties, and fully fledged by the following decade, runs parallel – and can be causally 
related – to his critical engagement, after a prolonged period of isolation from the 
specific formulas and analyses of the socialist tradition (as Thompson had indicated in 
his review of The Long Revolution), with a certain brand of continental Marxism.12 The 
publication of The Country and the City in 1973 marks a crucial intermediate stage in 
this development and confluence of interests and analyses between the relatively 
idiosyncratic critical language of the early Williams and the “Western Marxism” of 
Goldmann, Lukàcs and Gramsci. Williams’ tackling of the English literary tradition 
since the eighteenth century, and in particular of its ever-unresolved treatment of the 
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country/city polarity, attempted to supersede the analytical limitations of a narrow-range 
formalism (even of the kind brandished by “some recent criticism on the left”),13 whilst 
simultaneously offering a radical reformulation of literature as a process of 
production.14  
This “return” to the fold of Marxist criticism after the political disaffection 
experienced in the late Sixties, commenced, for Williams, with a mapping of the 
theoretical groundwork laid down by 1930s English Marxism and in particular, with its 
peculiar conceptualisation of cultural processes. Williams points to the “crushing 
defeat” endured by this unrefined materialist interpretation at the hands of practical 
criticism and the Scrutiny group. A careful consideration of this defeat, he claims, must 
serve as the preliminary condition from which any fresh confrontation of “the original 
questions” may be countenanced in the Seventies.  
The avowed inferiority of the Old Leftist analysis stemmed, according to 
Williams, from the reductionism of the base and superstructure formula which 
invariably informed every cultural analysis. In this simplistic rendition, actual works 
were denied “precise and detailed... accounts of actual consciousness” and were instead 
dismissed in a mechanistic isolation of superstructures as mere reflections or spurious 
ideological by-products of “real” historical dynamics whose sources were to be found in 
the economy.15 As Williams explained from the vantage point of 1971, it was a 
determination to re-chart the sources of a critical reconstruction of cultural formations 
which would not rely on the abstract and utilitarian categories of the model, that 
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impelled the quite different totalising efforts of Culture and Society and The Long 
Revolution: “to see the study of culture as the study of relations between elements in a 
whole way of life... to replace the formula of base and superstructure with the more 
active idea of a field of mutually if also unevenly determining forces.”16  
What the encounter with the Marxism of Lukàcs and Goldmann represented was 
an outlet for this impulse, and what the theory itself propounded was an undogmatic 
resolution of the vulgar-Marxist quandary. In particular, its promise of totalisation 
revealed a historical understanding which made sense of the basic tenet of economic 
preponderance. Lukàcsian reification suggested a specific “deformation”, in capitalism, 
of the complex of relations within a given society: and so, that this apparent dominance 
of the economy preached by Marxism was in fact a historical effect of the specific mode 
of production. Whilst acknowledging methodological limitations in the general idea of 
totalisation (such as the fact “that most of the work we had to look at [as well as “our 
own consciousness, our work, our methods”] was the product of just this epoch of 
reified consciousness”),17 Williams credited Goldmann, in particular, with significant 
advances in the field.  
Goldmann’s development and application of the concept of structure suggested a 
specific genetic relationship between particular literary and social facts.18 This was not 
to be understood as a correlation of contents but, crucially, as a co-development of 
mental structures: “[a] relation of content may be mere reflection, but a relation of 
structure, often occurring where there is no apparent relation of content, can show us the 
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organizing principle by which a particular view of the world, and from that the 
coherence of the social group which maintains it, really operates in consciousness.”19 
  This theoretical point was supplemented by the distinction between “actual” and 
“possible” consciousness, that is, between the multiform and often incoherent 
worldview actually found in the historical experience of a particular social group/class 
and the more formalised and in that sense, advanced, projection of the group.20 In this 
perspective, a genetic-structural sociology of literature would be concerned with 
analysing “the organizing categories, the essential structures, which give such works 
their unity, their specific aesthetic character... and which at the same time reveal to us 
the maximum possible consciousness of the social group”.21 Williams nevertheless 
recognises that his own concept of the structure of feeling – despite the obvious parallel 
with Goldmann’s concerns – was a way of circumventing what he interpreted as the real 
distance between either formation of consciousness and “the real structures and 
processes of literature.”22  
His search for a resilient alternative to the dead-ends of Leavisite practical 
criticism, on one hand, and vulgar Marxist reductionism, on the other, set Williams on a 
meandering journey through the complexities of a theoretical revisionism – after the 
idiosyncratic engagements of Culture and Society and The Long Revolution – whose 
first significant port of call had been, precisely, the work of Lukàcs and Goldmann. This 
encounter involved, first of all, a fresh restatement of the basic conceptual tools of the 
Marxist stock, beginning with the much abused formula of base and superstructure.  
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Williams is particularly critical of the abstract manoeuvring implicit in the 
scholastic differentiation between these two terms. In his opinion, the “force of Marx’s 
original criticism had been mainly directed against the separation of ‘areas’ of thought 
and activity... and against the related evacuation of specific content – real human 
activities – by the imposition of abstract categories.”23 The deterministic character of 
the traditional model (in which the economic base of a given society is said to determine 
its superstructures) revealed a fundamental set of problems regarding, first, the precise 
nature (and semantic scope) of this “determination” and second, the specific range of 
definition included in the terms base and superstructure.  
The notion of determination was soon associated, in a certain stock of Marxist 
thought, with a sense of absolute conditioning rooted in an external system of economic 
relations. According to this “economistic” reading, the abstract determination exerted by 
the economic base upon the cultural superstructure was in the manner of a full 
prefiguration disconnected from any real sense of lived human process. An alternative 
characterisation was that which restored the idea of direct human agency to the 
workings of historical development and therefore challenged the monolithic abstraction 
of economic forces from a measurable historical objectivity. The standard justification 
for this challenge to economism was found in Engels’ classic disclaimer in his 1890 
letter to Bloch: “we make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very 
definite assumptions and conditions.”24 This qualifying statement gave a different angle 
to the idea of determination: history was effectively the province of human agency and 
not the disembodied resultant of pre-figured “iron laws”. In this sense, stating that “the 
ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of human 
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life” consigns man-made history to a precise set of objective conditions but it does not 
revoke its relative autonomy in favour of an empty teleology:  “Any abstraction of 
determinism, based on the isolation of autonomous categories, which are seen as 
controlling or which can be used for prediction, is then a mystification of the specific 
and always related determinants which are the real social process – an active and 
conscious as well as, by default, a passive and objectified historical experience.”25 
The notion of economic base, for its part, was severely impaired in the more 
vulgar characterisations of the model by a narrow range of definition. Its strict 
identification with economic activity – that is, the mechanistic reduction of that primary 
point of reference, “the production and reproduction of real life”, to a “fixed economic 
or technological abstraction” – supposed a disabling conceptual limitation which made 
economism well-nigh ineluctable.26 This resulted, crucially, from the narrow description 
of productive forces in the context – and the terms – of historical capitalism. The danger 
was often real, in Marxism, of “slip[ping] into describing them as if they were universal 
and general, and as if certain ‘laws’ of their relations to other activities were 
fundamental truths. Marxism thus often took the colouring of a specifically bourgeois 
and capitalist kind of materialism.”27  
This essentialisation of the particular dynamics of commodity production within 
a capitalist economy evicted every other area of (re-)production from the axis of social 
life. And yet, as Williams observes, “[t]he social and political order which maintains a 
capitalist market, like the social and political struggles which created it, is necessarily a 
material production”.28 Its real derivation cannot be labeled “superstructural” and left at 
                                                          
25
 Williams, ibid., 87-88 
26
 Raymond Williams, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory”, in Culture andMaterialism 
(London and New York: Verso, 2005 [1980]), 34 
27
 Williams, Marxism and Literature,  92 
28
 Williams, ibid., 93 
266 
 
that. Analogously, the brand of materialism which discarded political and social 
structures from the effective matrix of production could not but disregard cultural 
practices as equally inessential. In that precise sense, “the concept of the 
‘superstructure’ was … not a reduction, but an evasion.”29  
The kind of aesthetic theory to which the vulgar model of base and 
superstructure typically gave rise was tied to a limiting conception of the “real world” as 
a series of discrete objects – “including human actions as objects”. This mechanistic 
version of materialism contrasted with a more flexible conception of real social relations 
as processes. In this perspective, then, “art could be seen as reflecting not separated 
objects and superficial events but the essential forces and movements underlying 
them”.30 Williams’ criticism of reflection theories is directed against the paralysing 
impulse which their version of aesthetic production propounded. The radical division 
introduced between a reified conception of social activity and the sphere of culture 
understood as a passive reflection of the former resulted in a negation of the very 
materiality and processual character of the art work and its domain of intervention. It 
was precisely against this fossilisation of a complex material dynamic that the notion of 
“mediation” was introduced to account for the peculiarity of cultural activity. However, 
as Williams acknowledges: 
It is difficult to be sure how much is gained by substituting the metaphor of 
‘mediation’ for the metaphor of ‘reflection’. On the one hand it goes beyond 
the passivity of reflection theory; it indicates an active process, of some 
kind. On the other hand, in almost all cases, it perpetuates a basic dualism. 
Art does not reflect social reality, the superstructure does not reflect the 
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base, directly; culture is a mediation of society. But it is virtually impossible 
to sustain the metaphor of ‘mediation’ (Vermittlung) without some sense of 
separate and pre-existent areas or orders of reality, between which the 
mediating process occurs whether independently or as determined by their 
prior natures.31  
Subsequent theoretical innovations, whilst addressing the evident limitations of the 
reflection model, still adhered to the dualistic logic consecrated by the base-
superstructure binomial. Both the idea of typification and homology (even in the more 
“advanced” theorisations of Lukàcs and Goldmann, respectively) suggested a static 
analysis of known structures which ruled out the possibility of active process and real 
intervention:  
None of the dualist theories, expressed as reflection or mediation, and none 
of the formalist and superstructuralist theories, expressed in variants of 
correspondence or homology, can be fully carried through to contemporary 
practice, since in different ways they all depend on a known history, a 
known structure, known products. Analytic relations can be handled in this 
way; practical relations hardly at all.32  
Williams’ enthusiastic invocation of the Gramscian concept of hegemony was 
offered as an apt alternative to this theoretical universe of objectification and stasis. The 
comparative advantage represented by the notion of hegemony over, for example, the 
notion of totality was that the former did not overlook the specific class intentionality of 
a given social formation. As a conceptual means of dispelling the blatant inadequacy of 
a mechanical materialism premised on base and superstructure, the notion of totality had 
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provided the foundations of a complex interpretation of social practices without abstract 
prefigurations or determinism. Yet the sometimes overhasty acceptance of models of 
totality ran the risk of ignoring, precisely, the one aspect which the theory of base and 
superstructure had isolated best; that is, “the facts of social intention, the class character 
of a particular society” and hence the materialist specification of any subsequent 
historical analysis. For “[i]f totality is simply concrete, if it is simply the recognition of 
a large variety of miscellaneous and contemporaneous practices, then it is essentially 
empty of any content that could be called Marxist. Intention, the notion of intention, 
restores the key question, or rather the key emphasis.”33  
The logic of hegemony presupposes a totality in which the facts of class 
domination are asserted not in a specialised, abstract sense (as suggested by the notion 
of superstructure and a certain Marxist inflection of the term “ideology”), but in a 
complex and multi-modal fashion even to the point of “constitut[ing] the substance and 
the limit of common sense for most people under its sway”.34 In its Gramscian 
derivation, hegemony was distinguished from dominio, that is, explicit political control 
in a given social formation. The term suggested an effective penetration of class rule 
and a specific distribution of power throughout the social tissue which was not restricted 
to any single sphere of specialisation: “[i]t is in just this recognition of the wholeness of 
the process that the concept of ‘hegemony’ goes beyond ‘ideology’. What is decisive is 
not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs, but the whole lived social process as 
practically organized by specific and dominant meanings and values.”35  
The notion of hegemony was also distinct from the earlier concept of culture as a 
whole social process or a “whole way of life”: whilst retaining the same emphasis on 
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inclusion, the facts of actual power gave the totality a particular orientation and 
historical identity. In Gramsci, the concept was very closely connected to that of “civil 
society”, understood as the operative domain of a ruling worldview beyond the 
“political society” of positive institutions. What singles out a hegemonic ideology (what 
marks its implantation as a “hegemonic bloc”) is, precisely, its homogenous and porous 
distribution across the totality of a social formation, often acquiring a naturalised 
existence – as “common sense”, for example – beyond the external exertions of a state 
apparatus. The role of “organic” intellectuals is central to the maintenance of hegemony 
and to the preservation of structural domination by the ruling class. 36  
Gramsci stresses the importance of intellectual monopoly within civil society – 
the strategic position accorded to those intellectuals who are organically linked to the 
empowered class.37 The solid position of these intellectuals within civil society (their 
identification with “progress” within the historic bloc) facilitates the advancement of a 
particular ideology which consolidates the hegemonic claims of its class subject. It is 
the task of these intellectuals, first, to “assimilate and conquer” the representatives of 
“traditional” groups,38 and to obtain, from all other sections of the social structure, a 
fundamental endorsement of their hegemonic bloc – and consequently, of the social and 
economic interests of the class which it seeks to uphold. 
Williams is unambiguous about the need to flexibilise the Gramscian concept and, 
crucially, to avoid excluding oppositional possibilities from the hegemonic matrix:  
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A static hegemony, of the kind which is indicated by abstract totalizing 
definitions of a dominant ‘ideology’ or ‘world-view’, can ignore or isolate 
such alternatives and opposition, but to the extent that they are significant 
the decisive hegemonic function is to control or transform or even 
incorporate them. In this active process the hegemonic has to be seen as 
more than the simple transmission of an (unchanging) dominance. On the 
contrary, any hegemonic process must be especially alert and responsive to 
the alternatives and opposition which question or threaten its dominance. 
The reality of cultural process must always include the efforts and 
contributions of those who are in one way or another outside or at the edge 
of the terms of the specific hegemony.39  
The historical analysis of a particular culture then requires a detailed account of those 
tendencies which operate within but also surpass or exceed the actual conditions of “a 
specific and effective dominance”.40 The hegemonic perspective must therefore 
discriminate between the various trends or forces which make up a given totality.   
Williams’ taxonomical contribution to this hegemonic model specifically 
distinguishes between dominant, residual and emergent aspects of a culture. Thus, 
while dominant expressions are clearly placed at the core of the hegemonic formation, 
underpinning those elements in the specific practices of the ruling class which give it 
pre-eminence over other classes, alternative and even oppositional components of the 
culture must also be included in any general description of the social whole. A 
description of residual practices cannot be conflated or univocally identified with 
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“archaic” expressions within the culture (that is, with those elements which are fully 
inscribed within a past articulation):       
What I mean by the ‘residual’ is very different. The residual, by definition, 
has been effectively formed in the past, but is still active in the cultural 
process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an 
effective element of the present. Thus certain experiences, meanings, and 
values which cannot be expressed or substantially verified in terms of the 
dominant culture, are nevertheless lived and practised on the basis of the 
residue – cultural as well as social – of some previous social and cultural 
institution or formation. It is crucial to distinguish this aspect of the residual, 
which may have an alternative or even oppositional relation to the dominant 
culture, from that active manifestation of the residual (this being its 
distinction from the archaic) which has been wholly or largely incorporated 
into the dominant culture.41  
Williams offers three characteristic examples in contemporary English culture which 
illustrate this double aspect of the residual: “organized religion”, for one, expresses an 
evidently residual dimension of advanced bourgeois culture, inherited from a past social 
formation and yet accommodated within dominant structures. However, its ambivalence 
rests on the combination of effectively counter-hegemonic – that is, alternative and 
sometimes even frankly oppositional – meanings and values (“absolute brotherhood, 
service to others without reward”) and those incorporated aspects (“official morality, or 
the social order of which the other-worldly is a separated neutralising or ratifying 
component”)42 which reinforce the dominant set of meanings and values. Similarly, the 
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idea and imagery of rural life can sometimes counterpose a logic of resistance to the 
forms of urban/industrial capitalism whilst simultaneously purveying a fanciful or 
escapist complementarity to the ruling order. The eminently archaic instance of the 
monarchy is finally given as an example of the controlling function which even such a 
scarcely oppositional expression can have (“marking the limits as well as the methods”) 
in a capitalist democracy. It is therefore the distinctive role of the residual to articulate 
whole areas of meaning rooted in some past totality as part of the present one “if the 
effective dominant culture is to make sense in these areas.” 43     
On the other hand, the logic of emergence must attempt, for all the practical 
difficulties, to distinguish between those elements which, within a given culture, 
effectively signal the rise of a new social reality (i.e. those elements which, on account 
of their actual oppositionality, can be rigorously described as “emergent”), and those 
which merely indicate “some new phase of the dominant culture”.44 In that sense, a 
“new class is always a source of emergent cultural practice, but while it is still, as a 
class, relatively subordinate, this is always likely to be uneven and is certain to be 
incomplete.”45 Williams here hints at the classic Gramscian description of the proletariat 
(the emergent class in a capitalist society) as continuously forestalled in its 
revolutionary mission by the workings of hegemony. Thus, what characterises this class 
in Western societies (where civil society is strong, in contradistinction to, for example, 
pre-revolutionary Russian society) is its “corporate” character, that is, its effective 
subordination to the hegemonic articulation of reality promoted by the ruling class. The 
transformation of this class into a real agent of change necessarily requires, as its 
preliminary step, the conversion of its position in the hegemonic structure as a truly 
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dominant force beyond the pitfalls of “incorporation”. By this last term, Williams 
means that operation which, as it were, defuses the transformative potential of any 
emergent social practice, re-inscribing it under the sign of dominance and closure:    
Straight incorporation is most directly attempted against the visibly 
alternative and oppositional class elements: trade unions, working-class 
political parties, working-class life styles (as incorporated into ‘popular’ 
journalism, advertising, and commercial entertainment). The process of 
emergence, in such conditions, is then a constantly repeated, an always 
renewable, move beyond a phase of practical incorporation: usually made 
much more difficult by the fact that much incorporation looks like 
recognition, acknowledgement, and thus a form of acceptance.46  
Cultural emergence therefore rests on the creation of real, systemic conditions of 
transformation: any truly emergent form must, in that sense, break through the inherited 
limitations of the hegemony which it seeks to move beyond. However, the emergent is 
not necessarily found in ready-made or directly accessible expressions – these are for 
the most part still subject to the logic of incorporation and thus tend to signpost novelty 
within the dominant set. On the contrary, effective emergent culture “is never only a 
matter of immediate practice”:    
[I]t depends crucially on finding new forms or adaptations of form. Again 
and again what we have to observe is in effect a pre-emergence, active and 
pressing but not yet fully articulated, rather than the evident emergence 
which could be more confidently named. It is to understand more closely the 
condition of pre-emergence, as well as the more evident forms of the 
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emergent, the residual, and the dominant, that we need to explore the 
concept of structures of feeling.”47  
Williams’ great theoretical innovation, the notion of structure of feeling, addresses the 
problematical tendency in cultural thinking to transmogrify the facts of social 
experience into the reified products of an impersonal observation. This self-defeating 
gesture typically engenders an analytical paralysis whereby “relationships, institutions 
and formations in which we are still actively involved are converted, by this procedural 
mode, into formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes.”48  
By contrast, an accurate description of cultural change within a given social 
totality and its hegemonic organisation must be attentive to the processual quality 
expressed in its practical consciousness: for it is here, in “what is actually being lived, 
and not only what it is thought is being lived” that the observable facts of social 
existence are found.49 The term “structure of feeling” aims, precisely, at a totalising and 
experiential – that is, non-reified – reconstruction of lived meanings and values as a 
particular historical reality organises them. Yet these are not reducible to formalised 
systems of belief or consciousness; on the contrary, the distribution is characteristically 
affective, manifested in lived (and therefore fluctuating) forms of individual and trans-
individual experience. As Williams points out, this cultural hypothesis is particularly 
relevant to descriptions concerning art and literature, for in these social content is 
distributed in the peculiar mode of an affective, indirect and informal manner. As a 
result, structures of feeling “can be defined as social experiences in solution, as distinct 
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from other social semantic formations which have been precipitated and are more 
evidently and more immediately available.”50  
One of the central contentions of Marxism and Literature was the need to 
interrogate, problematise and finally revoke the concepts of literature and criticism as 
they were hegemonically constituted in specialised discourse. As Williams put it in 
Politics and Letters: “[t]here would be absolutely no need to reject the concept of 
literature … if it still meant what it did in the 18th century: a group of written works of a 
certain level of seriousness, capable of sustaining an attention that others could not.” 
However, the real effects of specialisation, since the 19th century, had generated a 
compartmentalised area of writing “secluded from the kinds of correlation with social 
reality which in principle were always there”.51 An associated consequence of this 
specialisation had been the obscuring of processes and modes of production and 
composition in other kinds of writing which were not, procedurally, dissimilar from 
those customarily acknowledged in the “reserved area” of literature.   
Similarly, the established practice of criticism courts a danger of dissolution of the 
real conditions of production of a particular text, making judgment of a specialised, so-
called literary, kind a direct threat to any significant engagement with the actual 
historicity – the structure of feeling – of which the text partakes. Williams describes this 
argument as “a clearing operation” taking aim, beyond the kind of individualist-elitist 
criticism of a Leavis, at the “pseudo-impersonal attempt to judge works without any 
sense of the presence of the individual making a critical judgement”.52 The polemical 
target is here primarily the New Criticism (“the immediate predecessor of 
structuralism”) and its claims on objectivity and exteriority from the judging process. 
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However, Williams is adamant not to confine this general conceit of the critical 
operation to a particular school or tendency, but rather to situate it at the core of 
criticism proper qua specialised function of literature. His materialist counter-proposal 
calls for a re-connection or reinscription of judgment of this kind within its specific 
conditions of production. It is only by extending the analytical focus to the totality of 
relations which, in the first place, accommodate the critical function that an effective 
material account of the whole process (of production and reception) can be achieved:  
Our response to writing does then become a much more extended practice 
than this quite extraordinarily privileged area in which the reader is put in 
the position of a judge, which I don’t think anybody can assume without 
damage. Criticism leads to the hypostatization of the critic above the 
process: making judgments inside the process, in the way people do in 
everyday contemporary argument, is a very different matter.53        
This proposed inclusion of critical judgment of a non-specialised kind within the very 
process of textual production is central to a solid comprehension of the cultural 
materialist project and its wider political remit as an enabling theoretical hypothesis 
pointing the way for a radical reconceptualisation of culture and society.    
 The formulation of the cultural materialist agenda can be read as a crucial 
theoretical supplement (and a methodological detour, as it were) conditioned by the 
bitter political experience of the Wilson governments in the late Sixties. Thus, its 
conceptual sophistication – with the tools of continental Marxism – of the initial model 
of culture (as developed in Culture and Society) allowed Williams to resume the basic 
outline of his critique of contemporary British society (in The Long Revolution) whilst 
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circumventing the ideological traps of a reformist agenda. As we shall see in the 
following section, his later work sought to carve out a measure of novelty, hope and 
possibility (considerably refined and mediated by this “cultural materialist” phase of his 
reflection) beyond the inherited social, cultural, political and economic structures of an 
obsolete nation-state and its inscription within the hegemonic parameters of 
multinational capitalism.   
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4. The Return(s) of Community: Class, Nation, and “the 
desire called utopia” 
 
Towards 2000 represents a reappraisal of the terms of analysis laid down in The 
Long Revolution for their confrontation with a new period of capitalist expansion and 
ideological recrudescence: the 1980s. Beyond the particular circumstances of 
Thatcherism –1 to which Williams devotes a significant portion of his inquiry – the 
general condition affecting parliamentary politics in Britain is analysed through the 
previously rehearsed problematic of (what Williams had typified in 1961 as) the  vast 
subsumption of democratic practice within the logic of capitalist exchange. According 
to this analysis, the primary check on foreseeable democratic extension within the terms 
and limits of “parliamentary democracy as we know it” was exerted by the ritualistic 
gamble of electoral calculation: “[a] whole style of political consumerism, in which 
there need not be any hard choices, takes over as the essence of politics, and then has an 
evident congruence with the styles of commodity consumerism, similarly stimulated 
and financed by a manufactured credit.”2  
In this context, programmatic choice, the ordinary expression of political 
alternatives within the party system, becomes divested of any precise reference to 
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principle or committed realisation. Prevalent styles of social consumption reduce an 
entire, and hitherto dominant mode of temporal construction or reconstruction of society 
in the political programme or manifesto (“the only widely available form of positive 
thinking about the future”),3 to a void game of opportunity in a market-like exchange:   
The full scale of what can be rationally predicted, or at least of what has to 
be allowed for with some degree of possibility, is excluded or foreshortened 
to permit more persuasive or less disturbing short-term programmes. Or, 
through failure after failure, the idea of gaining some effective common 
controls of our future is steadily given up, leading on the one hand to a 
culture of nostalgia, on the other to the cruder politics of temporary tactical 
advantage.4  
Williams identifies this latter trend in “actually existing” parliamentary democracies 
with a debased form of rational prediction and projection which he generically describes 
as “Plan X”. Plan X thinking implies a ruling out of long-term solutions or projects as a 
conceivable possibility by which to guide a given political effort. This orientation is not 
exclusive to any one political tendency or party, but is to be found diffusely in the 
general outlook of parties, trades unions and individuals within a systemic vacuum of 
alternative horizons:  
A phase at a time, a decade at a time, a generation at a time, the people who 
play by Plan X are calculating relative advantage, in what is accepted from 
the beginning as an unending and unavoidable struggle. For this is 
percentage politics, and within its tough terms there is absolute contempt for 
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those who believe that the present and the future can be managed in any 
other way.5  
This systematic emaciation of possibility as an effective – rather than illusory, as 
hegemonic versions of Plan X would have it – guide to political action, often results in a 
compensatory empowering of utopian imagination as a means of escaping or 
circumventing these barriers. The traditional utopian mode or systematic utopianism 
from Thomas More to William Morris gives way in more contemporary conjunctions to 
a heuristic version of particular demands and calls for inclusion: this latter conception of 
Utopia is typically linked, in the context of advanced capitalism, to specific formations 
of desire – and is characteristically expressed as “an imaginative encouragement to feel 
and to relate differently, or to strengthen and confirm existing feelings and relationships 
which are not at home in the existing order and cannot be lived through in it.”6 
The inherent limitations of this mode spring from the particular susceptibility of 
its more private and subjective versions (“as so often in the 1960s”) to incorporation 
within the general style of consumption as yet another buttress of the existing social 
order.7 Williams however insists on the symptomatic validity of these challenges – 
partial and unsystematic, at worst, rigorous and thorough-going, at best, yet always 
expressive of an urgency to modify the terms and conditions of common life. His own 
sort of cultural materialist hermeneutics are credited with the comparative advantage of 
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offering a “total” – that is, integrated and exhaustive – critique of the social order 
beyond the epistemological fragmentation (into “specialist ‘areas’ of society”) of earlier 
approaches: “it is only by continuing to attend to a whole lived social order, and at the 
same time identifying the primary determining forces within it, that this kind of general 
humanist analysis can significantly contribute to thinking about the future.” 8  
The uses of totality found within Williams’ cultural Marxism of the Seventies 
are now mobilised, in the dire context of Thatcherite Britain, as vital resources of 
systematic opposition and as primary foundations for a language of radical social 
transformation. Beyond the immediate references of an earlier reformism – that which 
subtends the project of Culture and Society and The Long Revolution – the return of a 
strategic commitment to the notion of “a whole way of life” expresses a renovated 
affinity with utopian thought and projective social practice.  
The key temporal dimension explored in a novel such as The Fight for Manod or 
in a certain analysis of the modern city in The Country and the City9 – the future as 
concrete social possibility – is positivised in this social critique of the Eighties as the 
effective benchmark of any viable Socialism. The logic of futurity which an earlier faith 
in programmatic expression typically registered, before the advent of Plan X fatalism, is 
still to be sought out in the hopeful practice of a socialist imagination grounded in the 
idea of possibility. This must entail a determination to avoid the limiting terms of a 
received conceptuality, “an inherited sense of what a society is and should be” and 
advance towards a fresh set of definitions where the human reality of a living and lived 
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complex of relationships may take over from prevalent notions of utility both right and 
left.10  
This fundamental reorientation, which the bleak prospect of an arch-reactionary 
decade enhances, confirms the continuing relevance and validity of the main lines of 
inquiry outlined by the 1961 paradigm of “the long revolution.” According to the 
analysis of 1983, the latter can still be properly described as industrial if we move away 
from a narrow determinism which chooses to ignore the defining nature of relations of 
production focusing instead on technological modifications within productive forces. 
For, in effect, the “point of entry for an analysis, either of the fundamental nature of the 
industrial revolution or of the severe crisis of industrial society which we are now 
beginning to experience, is the idea of employment.”11  
Within this ideological horizon, social relations of every kind are insistently 
reinscribed within a “narrow scheme of production for the market”, reducing the virtual 
entirety of its human world to a position of practical subordination. Most tellingly, the 
idea of work itself is subsumed within the utilitarian rationale of capitalist production, 
generating a selective system of definitions and relegations. Thus, for example, “[a]ll 
that work which is the nurture and care of human beings, on whom the entire system 
depends, is excluded unless it is paid employment.”12 This overarching conception of 
production, developed to the utmost in advanced capitalism, is however not exclusive to 
capitalist forms of property and waged labour. For this general orientation towards the 
world as a “raw material” is equally palpable in traditional socialist approaches 
(otherwise “we would have no way of explaining the continuing appropriation and 
exploitation of the world... in the ‘communist’ or ‘actually existing socialist’ 
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economies”). A gaining of emancipatory consciousness in this context requires an 
understanding “that this orientation to the world as raw material necessarily includes an 
attitude to people as raw material.”13  
This rampant exploitation reaches a totalitarian climax with the inclusion of 
human personality in its range of marketable and disposable objects, both in the 
devastation of interpersonal relationships (“[f]ailure in such versions of relationship is 
wholly predictable since relationship is precisely an alternative to the use of others as 
raw material”) and in “the cruel punishment of self” (“in alcoholism, in addiction to 
dangerous drugs, in obesities and damaging asceticisms”).14 Marxism itself, observes 
Williams (in a related emphasis to Thompson’s in The Poverty of Theory) is not 
exempted from this exploitative orientation and commitment to a utilitarian notion of 
production. It was, in Marx, this complicity, this “open triumphalism in the 
transformation of nature” shared with his capitalist enemies, which ultimately prevented 
the “outline of a fully alternative society.”15  
The totalising epistemology of cultural materialism (founded, as we have seen, 
upon the overcoming of spurious divisions and relegations in the field of cultural/social 
production) finds its proper programmatic political correlate in an equally totalising 
analysis of social alternatives which may go beyond the limiting rationality of 
utilitarianism. This crucial opening to action requires a replacement of the ruling 
representations of “‘society as production’ with the broader concept of a form of human 
relationships within a physical world: in the full sense, a way of life.”16 This 
fundamental substitution is not to be lightly dismissed in terms of an opposition 
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between rational and emotional demands. “For it is in what it dismisses as ‘emotional’ – 
a direct and intransigent concern with actual people – that the old consciousness most 
clearly shows its bankruptcy”:     
  Emotions, it is true, do not produce commodities. Emotions don’t make the 
accounts add up differently. Emotions don’t alter the hard relations of 
power. But where people live, what is specialised as ‘emotional’ has an 
absolute and primary significance. 
   This is where the new broad concept most matters. If our central attention 
is on whole ways of life, there can be no reasonable contrast between 
emotions and rational intelligence. The concern with forms of whole 
relationship excludes these specialised and separated projections.17  
The need to go beyond the abstractions and divisions of a particular social order and its 
associated worldview is expressed as the more concrete need to ground our social 
experience in specific practices of community, in tangible patterns of human 
relationship, in work, creativity and cooperation.  
The language of culture and communication, which informed Williams’ analyses 
of the late Fifties and Sixties, now returns as a complex materialist logic of totality in 
which the emancipatory vision of society is equally inseparable from a realist ontology 
of the social. Society is, for the Williams of 1983, experientially mediated in the way 
that “culture” in his early work was a primary mode of articulation of collective life as 
lived experience. The “realism” implicit in this view is perceptible in the refusal (which 
“cultural materialism” makes clear at the level of artistic and literary analysis) to 
separate or specialise orders of existence according to a dominant pattern of social 
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organisation. The “whole way of life” of social experience is therefore a complex and 
determinate (yet not deterministically conditioned) horizon in which a living 
multiplicity interacts and produces values and meanings with a specific reference to its 
human world. These values and meanings are practically inseparable from a sense of 
place and belonging, a particular notion of origin which may be private in expression 
(as in the discourse of biographical experience) yet whose collective bearings – in a 
genetic and procedural sense – are undeniable.  
This was the “realistic” position voiced in fictional form in Border Country and 
in analytical terms in The Long Revolution, a position which lays the groundwork for a 
vital reinscription of “possibility” and “hope” of a specifically democratic socialist kind 
within the rehearsed coordinates of community: “[u]nless we achieve some realistic 
sense of community, our true standard of living will continue to be distorted. As it is, to 
think about economic activity in the limited terms of the consumer and the market 
actually disguises what many of us are doing, and how the pattern of economic life is in 
any case changing.”18 
Towards 2000 resumes this basic theme in the “pivotal essay” on “The Culture 
of Nations”,19 where the older conceptuality of culture as a whole way of life meets the 
specific discursivity of nationality and nationalism as a particular horizon for 
community. The abstraction of social identity implicit in modern capitalism produces a 
basic antagonism between the sources of human experience (the fact that “[w]e are born 
into relationships, and we live and grow through relationships”) and the impersonal 
categories derived from a “mobile privatisation” of collective life.20 This inertia of 
abstraction is characteristically expressed in the “formal legal definitions” of the nation-
                                                          
18
 Williams, The Long Revolution,  325 
19
 Williams, Towards 2000, 20 
20
 Williams, ibid., 188 
286 
 
state and, generally, in its “artificial” cooptation of “primary” and “placeable” forms of 
bonding. As such, the nation-state subsumes, within its complex apparatus of positive 
juridical reference, a wealth of local continuities through which the basic human need of 
belonging finds expression. The fundamental distortion operated by this hegemonic 
form lies precisely in its deliberate appropriation of real social urges and tendencies 
with the distinct purpose of legitimising a particular group in power. In Williams’ 
analysis, this deflection of primary social attachments into a formally organised 
expression of class rule motivates a crucial discrimination between nation and region:  
What has then happened is that the real and powerful feelings of a native 
place and a native formation have been pressed and incorporated into an 
essentially political and administrative organisation, which has grown from 
quite different roots. ‘Local’ and ‘regional’ identities and loyalties are still 
allowed, even at a certain level encouraged, but they are presumed to exist 
within, and where necessary to be overridden by, the identities and the 
loyalties of this much larger society.21  
Yet only in the absence of division, in the assertion of common experience and in the 
factual maintenance of such experience through real, collectively-lived arrangements of 
work, creation or resistance, can a viable oppositional politics arise with a claim to 
totality and resilience: 
 A socialist position of social identity certainly rejects, absolutely, the 
divisive ideologies of ‘race’ and ‘nation’, as a ruling class functionally 
employs them. But it rejects them in favour of lived and formed identities 
either of a settled kind, if available, or of a possible kind, where dislocation 
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and relocation require new formation. It happens that I grew up in an old 
frontier area, the Welsh border country, where for centuries there was bitter 
fighting and raiding and repression and discrimination, and where, within 
twenty miles of where I was born, there were in those turbulent centuries as 
many as four different everyday spoken languages. It is with this history in 
mind that I believe in the practical formation of social identity – it is now 
very marked there – and know that necessarily it has to be lived. Not far 
away there are the Welsh mining valleys, into which in the nineteenth 
century there was massive and diverse immigration, but in which, after two 
generations, there were some of the most remarkably solid and mutually 
loyal communities of which we have record. These are the real grounds of 
hope. It is by working and living together, with some real place and 
common interest to identify with, and as free as may be from external 
ideological definitions, whether divisive or universalist, that real social 
identities are formed.22  
The “grounds of hope” are thus indistinguishable for an empirical foundation of 
collective life: beyond abstract derivations or calls to action, it is ultimately in an 
experiential dimension – in a charged sense of place – that Utopia may be found. As 
Fredric Jameson wrote in The Political Unconscious, “one of the most urgent tasks for 
Marxist theory today” is the activation of “a whole new logic of collective dynamics, 
with categories that escape the taint of some mere application of terms drawn from 
individual experience.”23 The idea of the nation is one particular area – as his 
enthusiastic assessment of Tom Nairn’s The Break-up of Britain, attests – for the 
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generation of revolutionary “hope” in this precise sense. However, a certain tendency to 
theoreticism leads Jameson, in his bid to combine a “negative hermeneutic, a Marxist 
practice of ideological analysis proper” with a “positive hermeneutic, or a decipherment 
of the Utopian impulses”, to disregard the intricate complexities of the national question 
which a more “empirical” or even “experiential” analysis (such as the one pursued by 
Williams) may clarify.24  
For Williams, a progressive imaginary of the national requires a non-divisive 
recognition of common possibility. That is, in other words, a realistic experience of 
social change endowed with a wealth of particularity and immune to the debilitating 
abstractions of essentialism. The analysis of Welsh culture as a distinctive formation 
with a complex history of subordination within the British nation-state is thus to be 
undertaken, for Williams, at a fundamental remove from any standard or received 
version of cultural nationalism. For indeed the kind of genealogy which adheres to such 
dominant “concepts as continuity and essence”,25 far from creating the conditions for a 
fresh articulation of common possibility, in fact reproduces the operative ideology of 
the traditional nation-state. This effect of ideological contagion and false projection 
effectively distorts the actual potentialities and hard-won autonomies carved out within 
a real position of subordination.  
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Williams seeks to subvert the old valences of Welsh nationalism by arresting its 
dominant pattern of inclusion and its ritual emphasis on continuity of a linguistic-
literary kind. Welsh culture, Williams argues, is to be found in a “mixed and uneven 
process” of constitution in which the ideal and subjectivist versions of resistance to 
English hegemony – often composed of mythical, resounding names from Aneirin to 
Dafydd ap Gwylim – are all too frequently overridden, in social history, by a set of 
“forced and acquired discontinuities”: sharp demographic movements, radical shifts in 
the productive (and consequently, in the physical) landscape of its regions and 
convulsive emergences of new social identities derived from the latter. And yet it is in 
the extreme heterogeneity and unsmooth lineages of this history that a specific 
singularity, distinct from the “selective, dominant and hegemonic” patterns of an 
imported English culture, is founded and extended as a native source of alternative 
social horizons.26         
The particular complexity of the Welsh case, as Williams points out, stems from 
a co-occurrence of often contradictory impulses: a residual – yet at the same time 
resurgent – attachment to an older, romantic cast of unproblematic national identity; a 
superimposed and non-exclusive loyalty to the imperial formula of the British state; a 
specifically Welsh development of Liberalism, Labourism and trade unionism; and 
even, most significantly, a characteristically oppositional mode of “anti-nationalist 
nationalism” rooted in the particular accents of an intensely local and yet powerfully 
universalist tradition of class struggle.27 
This cultural archaeology of Wales beyond “Welsh culture” (that is, beyond a 
stabilised and ideological concept of the nation) brings Williams’ inquiry ever closer, in 
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his later years, to the political emphases of a younger generation of Welsh historians, 
notably represented by Gwyn A. Williams and Dai Smith. Whilst acknowledging the 
importance and enduring relevance of a specific emphasis on literary-linguistic 
continuities in Welsh-speaking Wales (as demonstrated in the work of an author like 
Emyr Humpheys), Williams turns to the emergent identification of a national paradigm 
which seeks to transcend the restrictive definitions of an allegedly undisrupted and 
homogeneous tradition. He finds a powerful expression of this fresh problematisation of 
the nation from within in Dai Smith’s work on industrial Wales. It is precisely in the 
convulsive history of the south-eastern valleys, in the breaks and disruptions of a 
culturally and linguistically heterogeneous recombination where the defining moment of 
a specifically Welsh identity (and thus not “Anglicised” in any facile or dismissive 
sense)28 is to be explored.  
The complexity of a human history traversed by population movements, 
technological intrusions upon the landscape and a broad resultant of institutions and 
ideologies pulsing at the heart of the nation sits uncomfortably with any univocal 
narrative of “tradition”. This tradition, significantly revived during the interwar years in 
a recognisably linguistic nationalism (under the strong leadership of figures such as 
Saunders Lewis), was thus in essential contradiction with the real, unfolding social 
history of Wales. As Williams points out “[a]gainst all the modern political experience 
of Wales, this tendency was on the cultural Right then influential throughout Europe. 
Wales was offered by some as the last noble fragment of a classical and catholic world, 
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 The work of writers in this distinctive, English-speaking south Welsh tradition: “Anglicized, at least, it 
was not. The work of the English-language writers of industrial South Wales is unmistakably indigenous; 
its English in tone and rhythm is not an English literary style. There seems good justification, in these 
writers and in the everyday speech of the valleys, for the recent significant assertion, from within what 
has been the ‘nationalist’ tendency, that English is a Welsh language.” Raymond Williams, 
“Community”, in Daniel Williams (ed.), ibid., 32 
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Welshness had the function of ‘Englishness’ in Leavis or of ‘timeless’ in Eliot: a stand 
of old values against a destructive industrial civilization.”29    
Against this backward emphasis, still predominant in the context of an 
increasingly conscious resistance to the centripetal tendencies of the old British nation-
state (the “Yookay”), the precise reconstruction of a mainstream history of social 
change – however diversified and irreducible to a univocal signifier or mythical 
construct – is essential to any future-oriented socialist agenda, and thus, in Williams’ 
general orientation vis-à-vis the immediate challenges of 1980s reaction, it supposes an 
inescapable test of validation for counter-hegemonic strategies of resistance.  
In Wales! Wales?, a work selected by Williams as the historiographic alternative 
to the genealogy proposed by Humphreys’ The Taliesin Tradition, Dai Smith insists 
that:  
The nation is, as Benedict Anderson recently coined it, an ‘imagined 
community’. However, people do not all necessarily ‘imagine’ the same 
community. ‘Public’ definitions may collide with ‘private’ realities in 
America or even England without serious questioning of national identity, 
but the ‘imagined community’ applied to Ireland or, in muted fashion, to 
Wales can become a monolith imposed on or offered to the subjected or 
blind people. Monoliths are easier for outsiders to recognize, and there is a 
patronizing kind of sympathy to which small countries like Wales are prey 
which prefers to accept such an easy answer than hear a babel of voices.30      
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This differential opening to the national idea and its “resources of hope” is 
inseparable from Williams’ gradual development of an articulate language of the 
“local”, of the specific (dis)continuities of culture as expressed through the complex 
interaction of a people in a particular place.31 This fundamental gesture of de-
essentialisation requires an evolution of collective imaginaries beyond the static 
controls of a fixed “landscape”. As Smith points out in relation to the internal 
subordination, within a hegemonic Welsh nationalism, of industrial – and primarily 
English-speaking – South Wales to a clichéd and ruralistic projection of the Welsh-
speaking North and West: “[e]mpathy with the sea, lakes, mountains and rock strata 
may serve one kind of purpose but scarcely scratches at the surface of a lived, human 
history.”32  
In this particular realisation, the conceptual horizon of “the regional” or “the 
local” transcends the subaltern dimension of a geographical specialisation within the 
dominant hierarchies of the nation-state. Instead, the region accrues a material 
specificity endowed with both a particular and a general reference: the first points to the 
concrete dynamics of a thoroughly articulated society marked out by characteristic traits 
while the second places it in the context of a wider, systemic process of economic 
integration. Thus, “the region” appears as both larger and smaller than the essentialist 
discourse of nationalism would warrant:  
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These industrial regions and sub-regions of Europe were out of step with the 
nations in which they were situated. From the Ruhr to Lancashire, from 
Northern France to North-East England, from the Sambre-Meuse basin to 
South Wales, they had more in common with each other than they did with 
their ‘nations’, established or emerging. They were already the future. South 
Wales, slowly at first and then with increasing momentum, was such a 
European region in the way North Wales... was not.33       
The distinctive history and social identity of an area like the industrial valleys of South 
Wales makes its reduction to the abstract generalities of an integrated global market 
(and its subsidiary agent, the modern nation-state), or to a mythical essence wholly 
discontinuous with its real processes and collective experience, an obvious resistance to 
the complex texture of a “whole way of life” seething with alternative and oppositional 
possibilities.  
Williams’ clearest identification of culture (understood in the full sense of a total 
material process of social production) with the particular history and society of a 
conflict-ridden and therefore irreducible Wales is to be found in his 1985 novel 
Loyalties.34 The book is organised as a collection of episodes and settings spanning a 
broad chronology (from the time of the Spanish Civil War to the Miners’ Strike of 
1984-5) and charting the interactions and developments of a group of men and women 
from different social backgrounds: the Cambridge-educated, middle-class Communists 
Norman and Emma Braose, “Georgi” Wilkes and “Monkey” Pitter, on the one hand, 
and the working-class Nesta Pritchard and Bert Lewis, on the other.  
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 The unfinished – and monumental – fictional project of People of the Black Mountains should be 
regarded as a final totalising summation of these developments in Williams’ thought. See Raymond 
Williams, People of the Black Mountains, vol. 1: The Beginning (London: Chatto and Windus, 1989) and 
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The notion of loyalty which vertebrates the novel is ultimately determined and 
mediated by the overarching class divisory and regional specialisation with which the 
latter is almost confused. Thus the distance – social, geographical and moral – between 
Bert and Norman is fleshed out in the conjunctures, conflicts and experiences through 
which their respective meanings and values are formed. The two main different 
trajectories mapped by the novel – middle-class, “intellectual” Socialism and working-
class, “lived” Socialism – are systematically filtered through the contrastive patterns of 
commitment espoused by the two sets of characters. The middle-class evolution is 
epitomised, to a degree of variation, by the strict yet still purely abstract orthodoxy of 
Emma and by the shifting and highly suspect Communism embraced by Norman. The 
latter emerges, over the decades, as an accommodating kind of socialist, adjusting to the 
changes imposed by historical “necessity” and opportunity (including a stint as a 
nuclear spy for the Soviet Union) and finally betraying the cause in an affirmative 
resumption of ruling class identity and loyalty. Emma, for her part, reproduces the 
purity of party discipline and subservience to a nominal class and its vanguard 
organisation (the Communist Party) whilst remaining within the material bounds of her 
social background and maintaining its general outlook on the working class itself.  
 Emma’s brand of loyalty is thus of a reliable, continuous and predictable kind 
and it is, in that sense, more recognisable and sincere in its simplicity. However, its 
exteriority, its lack of lived definition and real grounding in a tangible social space 
brands it, in the eyes of the actual working class of the novel, as fundamentally specious 
and void. As Nesta critically remarks, apropos of Emma’s visits to Danycapel and her 
insistent hypostasising of the proletarian condition: “[t]hat’s all we get, whenever she 
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comes here. How we’re the real life. How we really understand things. How much 
stronger she feels when she’s been here.”35 
The sources of commitment and attachment in Danycapel and its social world 
seem to flow in a different direction. Beginning with the experience of the Spanish Civil 
War, Bert Lewis encounters a living definition of the kind of loyalty which will guide 
his steps to the very end. For the working miner, fighting fascism and political 
commitment generally are not theoretical exercises in detachment but first and foremost, 
a pulsating actuality, an immediacy of experience: “[w]hat I’ve found is what comrade 
means. I would never have believed it. It’s here on the ground, a real movement, not of 
strangers but of comrades.”36 This fundamental logic of attachment is carried on to the 
battlefields of France during the Second World War – where he is badly wounded and 
permanently disfigured – and further into a long continuous series of struggles and 
setbacks from which no impersonal distance or temporary respite can be gained. Bert’s 
Communism – unlike Emma’s or Norman’s – is found in solution, in an integral sense 
of life pledged to the cause of his class and lived within its horizon.37 One of the most 
representative expressions of this version of loyalty is his response to the nationalisation 
of the coal industry by the Labour government. Far from registering critical distance 
from the reformist agenda of the government, he remains adamant in his determination 
to recognise Vesting Day as a genuine watershed, a collective acknowledgement, as he 
puts it, that “[t]his has been our bloody war and now it’ll be our bloody peace.”38   
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In its representation of this older generation of militants, the novel builds a 
contrast between working-class sensibility, in which the Communist idea remains a 
“cultural” fact in the sense of a whole attachment to a particular social identity, and the 
middle-class interpretation according to which orthodoxy (or unorthodoxy) is a matter 
of conceptual (and often conjectural) projection. This nodal divergence is dialecticised 
by a younger generation – especially by Gwyn, Nesta and Norman’s natural son and 
Bert’s adopted son – who must wrest from the lived complexity of a mixed inheritance 
the patterns and the values underpinning the notion of commitment and, by extension, 
the real meaning of loyalty.  
Gwyn’s conscious embrace of his “border” identity coincides with the last 
temporal conjuncture charted by the novel, 1984. After Bert’s death, Gwyn decides to 
confront his biological father, Norman, and thereby work through the complexities of 
his own filiation. This peculiar “homecoming” clearly departs from and complexifies 
the liminal habitation of Matthew Price’s return to Glynmawr and to an orginal 
“history” of relatively stable alliances and notions of belonging in Border Country. The 
country-house world of the bourgeois Braoses contrasts sharply – and even bitterly, for 
Gwyn – with the lived notions and values defined through the closely-knit experience of 
mutuality adumbrated by his real background in the mining valleys. Gwyn’s exilic 
identity is, like Matthew Price’s, forged in the scripted leave-taking of a particular kind 
of upward mobility whose middle stations – in a dynamic which deeply concerned 
Williams throughout his own life-time – included university training and a different 
kind of social position from the one enjoyed in childhood. Yet unlike Matthew’s linear, 
if blurry and irreducibly complex, “journey”, Gwyn’s self-positing in the problematical 
network of loyalties which traverse his biography requires a middle passage through 
that urban, middle-class and “enlightened” identity in order to expose its betrayals and 
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ultimately settle for a moral identification with a more distant, if native, world of solid 
and genuinely alternative solidarities.    
Gwyn’s conscious disavowal of this external background of ideological 
redefinitions and personal opportunisms reaches a climax in the dramatic exchange with 
Norman. Thus the essence of the latter’s betrayal does not lie in the conservative 
reorientation of his later politics, or in his covert actions as a Comintern agent in Spain, 
or even in the personal betrayal of trust dealt to Nesta and Gwyn himself (when, before 
Gwyn’s birth, he chooses with Party encouragement to abandon Nesta and her world), 
but in the precise and extensive cooptation to which Norman and his “people” subjected 
Gwyn’s: “[y]our special betrayal was that you involved and damaged the only 
substance, the only hope of our people. You involved and damaged socialism: our own 
kind of hope but converted by people like you to a distant and arbitrary and alien 
power.”39      
Gwyn’s loyalty is ultimately stabilised in this recognition of a particular 
projection of possibility whose very exteriority and living opposition to the abstract and 
colonising definitions and constructions of an alien society makes it enduring and 
hopeful in the face of desertions and accommodations: “[a]ny real socialism depends on 
an actual society. I grew up in such a society, under pressure and hardship but still with 
its own bonds, its own loyalties. And then no authentic act for socialism can distance 
itself, let alone hide, from these ties of its own people.”40 Contextual confirmation of 
this authenticity is provided (in a way that “1926” had done for Border Country) in the 
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experience of the Miners’ Strike – in which the whole community of Danycapel, 
including Gwyn’s mother, Nesta and his brother Dic, are involved –.41  
The imagination of possibility capitalises here – as elsewhere, practically 
everywhere, as we have seen, in Williams – on the logic of a lived social identity 
defined in and through the particular struggles of an experiential history. “The real 
grounds of hope” are in this sense inseparable from the logic of community and from 
the integral – and integrative – conception of culture as a “whole way of life”. This 
imaginative productivity, which can be related to what Fredric Jameson has dubbed “the 
desire called utopia”, is the precise location of Williams’ “resources of hope”. 
Ultimately, as Jameson himself had noted in the early Eighties, the “practice of 
possibility” involved in a socialist re-mapping of culture and society is inextricable 
from the projection of a common future inflected in collective terms.  
 
The experiential grounding of this future in empirical, immediately personal 
terms is a shared trait, as we have seen, of three distinctive modes of utopian praxis. For 
all the particular differences of emphasis and programme, Orwell, Thompson and 
Williams converge upon the term “Socialism” as a concrete figural outlet for this 
“desire”. The moral and – often emphatically – humanist idiom of their respective 
strategies (in shorthand: egalitarianism, antinomianism, communalism) projects a plural, 
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open and ultimately unresolved horizon of emancipatory realisation which may 
nevertheless be coordinated under the unitary notation of “possibility”.  
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Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, Williams’ critical project of the 1970s and 80s capitalises in a 
very direct way on the resources of hope provided by a particular engagement with 
history – by a native and yet post-essentialist sense of conjuncture: an integrative and 
multiple balancing of class, regional and personal loyalties whose point of convergence 
(whose mode of totalisation) is a permanent, processual and open inscription of change 
in the “border” zones of social experience. The irreducibility of lived history, combined 
with the acute awareness of possibility (of systemic, revolutionary, utopian change) 
provides a fundamental dimension of continuity: beyond formal or “abstract” 
resemblances in programmatic outline, the cultures of possibility rehearsed by Orwell, 
Thompson and Williams share a heightened sense of commitment, in the words of 
Stuart Hall, “to the specificity of a historical conjuncture: how different forces come 
together, conjuncturally, to create the new terrain on which a different politics must 
form up.”1  
Thus the adaptability of hope must be constructed through the specific resources 
of particular moments and experiences, giving rise to a diversified idiom of resistance. 
In Williams, for example, we have seen that the logic of “a common culture”, qua 
diagrammatic inscription of an alternative social imagination, takes on – at a certain 
point in time – the concrete expression of an engagement with the nation or “the 
national”. In this particular modulation, the construction of a “practical social identity”, 
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that is, the processual and experientially given articulation of life in common, reaches 
beyond the abstract temporality of the nation-state, grounding its communicative logic 
in lived relationships and alliances. The moral topography of the border (the border 
between industrial and rural society, between working-class and intellectual exile, 
between languages and cultural traditions, etc) thus becomes constitutive of an 
alternative space of the national in which external definitions and hierarchies (the 
normative categories of “Euro-modernity”) are replaced by partial totalities, whole ways 
of life whose proper area of applicability, on account of their position within the 
hegemonic formation, is the resistant margin.2  
Yet the crucial recognition which pulsates throughout Williams’ reflection on 
alternative forms and experiences of social imagination is the fact of internal coherence 
which animates these totalities. The exemplarity of the Welsh border lies precisely in 
the resilient continuities which, for all the fragmentation and practical limitations of 
their historical achievements, relentlessly inform their sense of belonging and identity. 
Culture transacts, in the context of these inquiries, as a radical hypothesis of integration 
rather than as a stabilised or inherited model. A basic continuity can be traced between 
Williams’ identification of culture as an “ordinary” process inscribed within the 
unspecialised wealth of concrete social arrangements (“[t]he making of a society is the 
finding of common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active debate and 
amendment, under the pressures of experience, contact, and discovery, writing 
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themselves into the land”)3 and his later definition of a “hegemonic” totality traversed 
by dominant, emergent and residual forces. In both formulations, despite the intervening 
gaps and transitions in emphasis and epistemology, a common appraisal of the wealth 
and complexity of “unauthorised” or resistant expressions can be detected. The model 
of hegemony allows, as we have seen, for a more systematic and exhaustive analysis of 
the precise distribution and significance of oppositional dynamics within the totality of 
a whole social configuration. In that sense, the total effect of Williams’ interrogation 
(and his fiction often brings this to a boiling-point) can be described as a detailed 
acknowledgement of the irreducible multiplicity of historical eventuation as constituted 
in a permanent and unresolved interaction between power formations and their 
alternatives.4  
Towards the end of his life, Williams remarked apropos of Modernism and the 
bleak prospects of a post-modern exile from History in this particular, lived, sense, that: 
If we are to break out of the non-historical fixity of post-modernism, then 
we must search out and counterpose an alternative tradition taken from the 
neglected works left in the wide margin of the century, a tradition which 
may address itself not to this by now exploitable because quite inhuman 
rewriting of the past but, for all our sakes, to a modern future in which 
community may be imagined again.5      
It is precisely in the recognition and substantial engagement with these often relegated, 
marginal or “border” expressions and articulations  (that is, as his fiction often proposes, 
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in the internal processing and inhabiting of particular structures of feeling, of fully-
fledged spaces of collective life) that access to this common future may be gained.  
For Williams, the role of cultural inquiry remained embedded in this configuration 
of social experience as a matrix of alternatives and possibilities. In other words, the 
“turn” to culture implied an immersion without preconditions in the substance of social 
production beyond the organising (epistemic) violence of hierarchies and privileged 
spheres. The proposal of cultural materialism (as evolved from the more intuitive yet 
concomitant idiom of his earlier work) thus stated the need of positing a complex whole 
and of identifying prevalences, exertions, and continuities, but also contradictions, 
antagonisms and alternatives. In this precise sense, cultural inquiry entailed “cultural 
revolution”, or in other words, the radical politicisation of collective experience from 
within:  
Thus a cultural revolution, by contrast with other social programmes, is 
directed towards the general appropriation of all the real forces of 
production, including now especially the intellectual forces of knowledge 
and conscious decision, as the necessary means of revolutionizing the social 
relations (determination of the use of resources; distribution and 
organization of work; distribution of products and services) which follow 
from variable forms of control and of and access to all the productive 
forces… The principle of cultural revolution offers an outline of ways in 
which there can be both effective association and new forms of negotiation 
beyond specific associations. In this assertion of possibility, against all the 
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learned habits of resignation and skepticism, it is already a definition of 
practical hope.6  
It is perhaps in the emphasis on disenfranchised traditions of various kinds and the 
insistence on their totalising vocation (their prefiguration of an alternative life-world) 
that Williams’ comes closest to Thompson’s idiom. The latter’s analysis of the 
formative “moment” of the English working class, for example, represents a particular 
instantiation of an alternative imagination which a canonical (hegemonic) projection of 
modernity has tended to suppress. The internal reconstruction of the “voice” of that 
alternative dramatises the complexity of a conjuncture admittedly nourished by defeats 
and limitations, but also composed of tangible scenarios of “practical hope”.   
For Thompson, it has been argued, the experience of politics is indefatigably 
informed by a notion of complexity which no doctrinal or theoretical stabilisation can 
possibly circumvent. This complexity is typically articulated in the recognition of 
process and relationship as the dynamic constituents of historical formations. 
Thompson’s conception of class is paradigmatic: class is “a fluency which evades 
analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomize its structure”.7 
It is only by extricating the “form” from its processual milieu – from its lived reality – 
that a neat structuralist concept can be obtained, and this, at the expense of historical 
causality and eventuation.   
Thompson’s assault on Althusserian theory follows from the political corollary 
of his epistemology. For the reduction of historical complexity to a set of intellectually 
generated assumptions is ultimately indistinct from the Stalinist tendency to control and 
“centralise” the multiplicity of voices which animate the historic struggles of the 
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working class. The marked strands of “idealism” in theory thus replicate, for Thompson, 
the debilitating instincts of a bureaucratic monolith against which “1956” had defined 
itself. Thompson’s historical work is, as we have insisted, radically involved in this 
biographically-motivated attempt at political redefinition. The “socialist humanist” 
project originating in the Hungarian crisis was thus ultimately concerned with the 
articulation of a resistant space within Marxism – a space of oppositionality whose 
figures and models were often derived from an idiosyncratic genealogy of English 
antinomianism.    
Thompson’s deployment of History is fundamentally mediated by an 
overarching notion of “experience” which places his work in direct conversation with 
that of Williams. This central category has been systematically berated from 
structuralist and post-structuralist quarters for its alleged incapacity to function 
critically, outside the confines of ideology. Thus, it has been argued “that any attempt to 
grasp experience without closely attending to language is an illusion founded on the 
conception of experience as a self-authenticating truth.”8 In other words, without a 
careful dissection of the structured nature of experiential discourses, historical scrutiny 
is in danger of succumbing to self-validating (and hence, ideological) truth-claims. This 
important debate in cultural theory should not distract us, however, from the political 
effectivity of attempting a reconstruction of subordinated voices under conditions of 
hegemony. As Michael Pickering has argued (in an emphasis which resonates with 
Thompson’s work): 
What has also to be insisted upon is the importance of listening attentively 
to those voices, in whatever ways it is possible to ‘recover’ them, not 
because they themselves are more true than dominant subject-positions, but 
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because they have the right to be heard, and heard where possible in their 
own words. More significantly, we need to listen to such voices because 
they sometimes speak against the grain of subject-positions assigned from 
‘outside’, because they are then in some way resistant to the dominant 
definition of those subject-positions, and strain against the power-lines that 
run through identity and experience.9  
It is by excavating the tonalities and native accents of these relegated subjects (and their 
“neglected works”, according to Williams) that an alternative future may be construed – 
that a collective hope may be imagined.  
Orwell’s importance is clarified in the light of this experiential understanding of 
History. Often disavowed by the New Left (not least by Thompson and Williams), what 
Orwell offers is, nevertheless, a benchmark of practical experience against which hopes 
and possibilities of a collective future may be measured. In a way that 1956 would do 
for Thompson, and 1926 – at least partially, among other “moments” – for Williams, 
1936 and the Spanish Civil War would articulate for Orwell a horizon of collective 
deliverance mediated by the troubled disposition of forces and antagonisms within the 
Left. In Orwell, the political topography of the 1930s is complexified by an internal rift 
between centralising and dissident definitions of the collectivist project. The 
denunciation of Soviet totalitarianism introduces an enabling criterion of “authenticity” 
with which both Thompson and Williams’ emancipatory visions will be aligned. The 
logic of equality which presides over Orwell’s works thus inscribes the problematic of 
possibility (the hopeful generation of alternative social horizons) as a bid for self-
definition.  
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The idea of Socialism which transpires from a contextual reading of Orwell, 
Thompson and Williams, refers us to a concept of social transformation or utopia rooted 
in the experiential version of History. The latter is, in that sense, irreducible to an 
external definition of possibility, to a finalised construct or projection without organic 
links to lived processes and relations.  
The narratives of hope which different conjunctures tell are in each case, as we 
have seen, inseparable from the complex dialectic of oppression and resistance. Neither 
pole is reducible to the other. And yet this ongoing, precarious equilibrium – this 
“border” zone inhabited by the logic of possibility – is enduringly committed to the 
compelling imagination of an emancipated human world.  
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Resumen 
 
Esta tesis doctoral propone una lectura comparativa de tres proyectos de 
imaginación social transformadora situados cronológicamente entre la década de 1930 y 
la consolidación del Thatcherismo. Mi objetivo fundamental es la reconstrucción de 
aquellos elementos comunes que dan sentido y coherencia ideológica al concepto de 
“socialismo” como matriz discursiva generadora de lógicas e imaginarios sociales 
alternativos en el contexto de la obra de George Orwell, Edward Thompson y Raymond 
Williams.  
La adscripción de estos tres autores a una idea anti-determinista de alternativas y 
posibilidades emancipatorias y oposicionales, así como su especial sensibilidad hacia 
los conceptos de “experiencia” y “agencialidad”, los convierte en un punto de partida 
ideal para el estudio del proyecto político y cultural de la izquierda británica en su 
encarnación anti-autoritaria desde la Gran Depresión hasta el final de la Guerra Fría.  
Se pretende demostrar, dentro del espectro intelectual de dicha izquierda 
británica, la especial afinidad (y aun consecutividad) de los proyectos intelectuales de 
Orwell, Thompson y Williams, como tres “momentos” secuenciales en el desarrollo de 
esta tradición política y cultural. El peculiar entramado discursivo que encontramos en 
estos autores presupone una conceptualización amplia del término “política”, 
extendiéndose a través de una red compleja de prácticas textuales que van desde la 
ficción a la crítica y la teoría, pasando por la historiografía y el periodismo. Esta tarea 
comparativa plantea por tanto un esfuerzo interdisciplinar que trasciende la identidad 
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canónica de cada autor (como novelista, historiador o crítico) con el fin de rescatar su 
especificidad histórica dentro de una genealogía política concreta. 
Este recorrido comienza con un análisis de la evolución política de George 
Orwell, tomando como referencias contextuales básicas: a) la coyuntura inicial que 
desencadena su adscripción socialista a mediados de los años treinta (la “experiencia” 
de la Gran Depresión en el Norte de Inglaterra), b) su paso por España durante la Guerra 
Civil y subsiguiente decantación por la opción revolucionaria anti-estalinista y c) su 
posterior adopción de un programa reformista de transformación social radical 
vinculado a una determinada opción izquierdista dentro del laborismo británico.  
The Road to Wigan Pier constituye la primera aproximación significativa por 
parte de Orwell al ideario socialista. El análisis con el que se abre la primera sección de 
este trabajo propone por tanto una evaluación tanto del contexto socio-político en el que 
se inscribe (las condiciones de vida “objetivas” de la clase obrera inglesa, especialmente 
en el Norte, y el avance del fascismo) como de los elementos subjetivos que conforman 
la singular “conversión” orwelliana al socialismo. Prestaremos especial atención a los 
rasgos idiosincrásicos de este momento inicial de definición de su programa o visión de 
la acción política (un primer momento de “intuiciones”) para luego contrastarlos con la 
madurez “experiencial” de sus reflexiones revolucionarias en Homage to Catalonia y 
sus escritos de los años 1938-40.  
Se tomará en especial consideración el contexto político de la España 
republicana que conoció Orwell, como fuente de imaginarios concretos de “posibilidad” 
transformadora, por un lado, y como escenario de limitaciones y coacciones 
“totalitarias” a dichas formaciones emancipatorias. Se tratará, especialmente, de evaluar 
en qué medida sus escritos de la época consiguen dotar de contenido e identidad 
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programática a las observaciones intuitivas y el desiderátum ético de The Road to 
Wigan Pier. El concepto de experiencia al que aludiremos sistemáticamente en nuestra 
exposición plantea un aspecto crucial en la evolución intelectual de este autor. Así pues, 
el término socialismo pasa, de ser un mero anclaje significante de nociones “pre-
políticas” o al menos fundamentalmente intuitivas (igualdad, justicia, decency) en su 
obra anterior, a funcionar como el contexto discursivo básico de una experiencia de 
emancipación colectiva.  
La constelación ideológica e institucional representada por el estalinismo en sus 
diversas vertientes supone un paradigma negativo frente al que esta experiencia de 
movilización revolucionaria queda definida como realización posible del ideal 
igualitario. En ese sentido, la Guerra Civil Española supone en la obra de Orwell un 
momento de distinción interna entre una versión mecanicista y dogmática (que Orwell, 
y posteriormente Thompson, asociarán a la escolástica marxista-leninista) del 
socialismo y una encarnación vivencial en la cual el principio cooperativo nace de la 
experiencia y el contacto directos con el proceso de transformación social. Este mismo 
compromiso con la agencialidad, con la participación activa, lo encontramos en el 
Orwell de 1940-41, acaso el momento culminante de su fase revolucionaria. Con el 
comienzo de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Orwell traslada las dinámicas aprendidas en 
la milicia del POUM al frente doméstico, vislumbrando en organizaciones paramilitares 
de tipo voluntario como la Home Guard el germen de una potencial fuerza 
revolucionaria con rasgos propiamente británicos. 
El siguiente polo de definición del socialismo orwelliano (lo que hemos dado en 
llamar su reformismo radical) surge como respuesta específica y por tanto inseparable 
de la coyuntura histórica desarrollada al término de la Guerra Mundial y la dinámica de 
bloques a la que dio lugar. Sus obras clásicas de denuncia anti-totalitaria (Animal Farm 
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y Nineteen Eighty-Four) suponen un momento de repliegue frente a las esferas de 
influencia estadounidense y soviética cuyo objeto último es una estrecha identificación 
con el programa de reformas igualitarias llevado a cabo por el gobierno laborista de 
1945.  
Las limitaciones y contradicciones internas de esta última fase de la obra de 
Orwell nacen directamente de una coyuntura histórica (la Guerra Fría) a la que la 
disidencia comunista británica, especialmente a lo largo de los años 50 (Orwell muere a 
principios de 1950), trató asimismo de dar respuestas nuevas. 1956 (el año de las 
“revelaciones” internas en el vigésimo congreso del PCUS y la Revolución Húngara) 
marca un punto de inflexión en la toma de conciencia del fenómeno estalinista. Dentro 
del Partido Comunista Británico, el frente de oposición liderado por los historiadores 
E.P. Thompson y John Saville marca un momento clave de ruptura con la cultura 
política de la izquierda en el período de entreguerras, articulando una definición de 
“socialismo humanista” que entronca directamente con el enfoque libertario del Orwell 
poumista y lo desarrolla en nuevas direcciones. 
 La obra de Thompson representa, por su parte, un amplio abanico de momentos 
y expresiones disidentes cuyo entramado epistemológico queda estructurado en torno al 
concepto de experiencia. El paso de Orwell a Thompson supone, con relación a este 
concepto, un importante avance en términos tanto de aplicación analítica como de 
sofisticación teórica. En cierto modo, la totalidad de la obra científica (y también no-
científica, incluida su breve incursión en el terreno de la ficción) de Thompson plantea 
una descripción de posibilidades emancipatorias dentro de los parámetros experienciales 
de las coyunturas estudiadas. Así pues, obras fundamentales de su corpus, como The 
Making of the English Working Class, ofrecen un esfuerzo de legitimación de las 
realidades vividas por sujetos silenciados en las narrativas dominantes. Su conocida 
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polémica con Althusser señala un rechazo frontal, desde una posición historiográfica 
(pero también ética y propiamente política), del rigorismo teórico propio de 
determinadas versiones de la filosofía marxista. Para Thompson, el esfuerzo de 
transformación radical connatural a la opción socialista no puede sustraerse (tampoco 
dentro de la práctica historiográfica) a los procesos subjetivos que en última instancia 
vehiculan cualquier horizonte de cambio social. La experiencia, por tanto, constituye la 
potencia emancipadora del socialismo y como tal es irreductible (aunque no ajena) a 
cualquier “objetividad” histórica. 
 La fundamentación subjetivista que encontramos en Thompson adquiere, en la 
obra de Williams, los contornos precisos de una formulación flexible, adaptable a 
contextos en permanente evolución y, finalmente, abierta. Los términos “cultura” y 
“comunidad” aparecen  en su obra temprana con una doble proyección: por un lado, 
constituyen el vocabulario básico de su marco analítico y por otro, remiten 
constantemente a un hinterland experiencial propio. La obra de Williams es 
especialmente interesante puesto que marca, dentro del linaje intelectual de la izquierda 
británica (y en especial, de la llamada Nueva Izquierda o New Left), una síntesis 
avanzada de biografismo y formalización. Así pues, el concepto de cultura desarrollado 
por Williams en su célebre Culture and Society está directamente enraizado en la 
experiencia personal de la frontera entre Gales e Inglaterra, pero también de la 
“frontera” entre una identidad de clase forjada en las luchas históricas del proletariado 
británico (como la Huelga General de 1926) y un exilio intelectual y social dentro del 
establishment académico inglés. La noción de comunidad es, en este contexto, un 
ámbito de proyección interpersonal insoslayable, un elemento de permanencia y 
continuidad básico. Pero también es un horizonte de posibilidad transformadora ulterior, 
un programa general derivado de la experiencia concreta. 
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 Nuestra incursión en la obra de Williams toma como punto de partida su 
importante recorrido arqueo-filológico por el concepto de “cultura” desarrollado en 
Gran Bretaña como respuesta específica al capitalismo industrial y su proyecto de 
sociedad. Esta tradición intelectual (representada por nombres como Edmund Burke, 
William Cobbett, Samuel Coleridge, Thomas Carlyle, Matthew Arnold etc.) surge de las 
transformaciones estructurales de finales del siglo dieciocho y principios del diecinueve, 
ofreciendo un caudal de significados estéticos y morales cuya función última es 
contrarrestar la fragmentación social propia del paradigma liberal del laissez faire. 
Williams halla una complementariedad esencial entre esta tradición intelectual a 
menudo reaccionaria y la experiencia colectiva del naciente proletariado industrial y sus 
modos específicos de oposición. Frente a una concepción individualista de lo social, la 
idea de una “cultura común” – cuya génesis está precisamente en la conjunción de estas 
dos tradiciones – ofrece un futuro cooperativo de creación a salvo de los procesos de 
reificación y atomización imperantes en la sociedad capitalista.  
  Para el Williams de The Long Revolution este proceso emancipatorio parte de 
una voluntad alterizadora fundamental: la transformación social efectiva radica en la 
creación de significados diferentes, en la producción de descripciones nuevas y en el 
desarrollo de nuevas fórmulas de comunicación interpersonal (frente a las tendencias 
limitativas de la “sociedad de masas”). A lo largo de los años setenta, el pensamiento de 
Williams experimenta una cierta convergencia con la tradición marxista continental 
(especialmente, con la obra de Lucien Goldmann, Georg Lukàcs y Antonio Gramsci) 
que le permite desarrollar un nuevo marco teórico y analítico con el que abordar el 
concepto de cultura y su ámbito de referencia tal y como quedan definidos en las obras 
anteriores.  
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Los últimos trabajos de Williams ofrecen un momento de síntesis entre su 
concepción inicial de la cultura como un proceso complejo y “ordinario” dotado de una 
densidad cotidiana, enteramente social y por tanto no restringida a una determinada 
esfera de producción intelectual, y un paradigma más formalizado e incisivo de análisis 
en el que los elementos básicos de crítica y proyección política anteriormente estudiados 
alcanzan una nueva formulación adaptada a los desafíos de la posmodernidad.  
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Conclusiones 
 
Los proyectos emancipatorios articulados por Orwell, Thompson y Williams 
prestan especial atención a los recursos específicos de momentos y experiencias 
particulares, de coyunturas históricas concretas, dando lugar a un lenguaje plural de 
oposición y resistencia. En Williams, por ejemplo, hemos visto que la lógica de una 
“cultura común”, en tanto que inscripción diagramática de un imaginario social 
alternativo, adopta – en un momento determinado – la expresión concreta del discurso 
nacional. En esta modulación particular, la construcción de una “identidad social 
práctica”, es decir, la articulación procesual y experiencial de la vida en común, 
trasciende la temporalidad abstracta del estado-nación y funda su lógica comunicativa 
en alianzas y relaciones vividas. La topografía moral de la frontera (la frontera entre la 
sociedad industrial y la rural, entre el exilio intelectual y la posición de clase, entre 
lenguas y tradiciones culturales, etc.) es constitutiva de un espacio alternativo de lo 
nacional en el que las definiciones externas y jerárquicas (las categorías normativas de 
la “Euro-modernidad”) son sustituidas por totalidades parciales, modos integrales de 
vida cuya área específica de aplicación, en virtud de su posición dentro de la formación 
hegemónica, es el margen. 
La ejemplaridad de la frontera galesa reside precisamente en las continuidades 
que, más allá de la fragmentación y limitaciones prácticas de su devenir histórico, 
forman su sentido de pertenencia e identidad. La cultura se manifiesta, en este contexto, 
como una hipótesis radical de integración más que como un modelo estable y heredado. 
Así pues, se puede trazar una línea continua entre la identificación que hace Williams de 
317 
 
la cultura como proceso “ordinario” inscrito en una pluralidad de circunstancias sociales 
(“la formación de una sociedad es el hallazgo de significados y direcciones comunes, y 
su crecimiento es un debate y modificación continuos, bajo la presión de la experiencia, 
el contacto, y el descubrimiento, grabándose en la tierra”)1 y su definición posterior de 
una totalidad “hegemónica” atravesada por fuerzas dominantes, emergentes y 
residuales. En ambas formulaciones, y a pesar de la distancia en cuanto a enfoque y 
epistemología, se puede detectar una apreciación compartida de la riqueza y 
complejidad que caracteriza a dichas expresiones culturales. El concepto de hegemonía 
permite, como hemos visto, un análisis más sistemático y exhaustivo de la distribución 
y significado precisos de las dinámicas oposicionales dentro de la configuración social. 
En ese sentido, el efecto total de la obra de Williams (y su obra de ficción lo pone 
especialmente de manifiesto) se puede describir como un reconocimiento detallado de la 
irreductible multiplicidad del devenir histórico entendido como interacción permanente 
– y no resuelta – entre las formaciones de poder y sus alternativas.  
Hacia el final de su vida, Williams comentaba a propósito del modernismo y de 
las sombrías perspectivas de un exilio posmoderno fuera del devenir histórico en este 
sentido experiencial, que: 
Si hemos de romper con la fijeza anhistórica del post-modernismo, entonces 
debemos buscar y contraponer una tradición alternativa tomada de las obras 
olvidadas y abandonadas en el ancho margen del siglo, una tradición que se 
pueda dirigir no ya a esta reescritura explotable – en tanto que inhumana – 
                                                          
1
 Raymond Williams, “Culture is Ordinary”, en Robin Gable (ed.), Resources of Hope (London: Verso, 
1989), 4 
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del pasado, sino, por todos nosotros, a un futuro moderno en el que la 
comunidad pueda ser imaginada de nuevo.2 
Es precisamente mediante el reconocimiento y estudio sustancial de estas expresiones y 
articulaciones a menudo relegadas, marginales o “fronterizas” (tal y como propone su 
ficción, mediante un procesamiento interno de “estructuras de sentimiento”, de espacios 
desarrollados de vida colectiva) como se puede acceder al imaginario viable de un 
futuro en común.   
 Para Williams, la tarea de la investigación cultural permanece unida a dicha 
configuración de la experiencia social como una matriz de alternativas y posibilidades. 
En otras palabras, el “giro” cultural supone una inmersión sin precondiciones en la 
sustancia de la producción social al margen de jerarquías organizativas y otras formas 
de violencia epistémica. La propuesta del materialismo cultural (según queda definida 
en la evolución de su obra) afirma por tanto la necesidad de postular un todo complejo y 
de identificar, en su seno, prevalencias, esfuerzos y continuidades, pero también 
contradicciones, antagonismos y alternativas. En este sentido preciso, el análisis cultural 
conlleva una “revolución cultural”, o en otras palabras, una politización radical de la 
experiencia colectiva: 
Así pues, una revolución cultural, a diferencia de otros programas sociales, 
va dirigida a la apropiación general de todas las fuerzas reales de 
producción, incluyendo ahora especialmente las fuerzas intelectuales del 
conocimiento y la decisión consciente, como el medio necesario de 
revolucionar las relaciones sociales (determinación del uso de los recursos; 
distribución y organización del trabajo; distribución de productos y 
                                                          
2
 Raymond Williams, Politics of Modernism (London: Verso, 2007 [1989]), 35  
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servicios) que surgen de las formas variables de control y de acceso a todas 
las fuerzas productivas… El principio de revolución cultural ofrece un 
esquema de modos en los que se puede dar asociación efectiva y nuevas 
formas de negociación más allá de asociaciones específicas. En esta 
afirmación de posibilidad, contra todos los hábitos adquiridos de 
resignación y escepticismo, [la revolución cultural] es ya en sí una 
definición de esperanza práctica.3 
El punto en el que el enfoque de Williams se acerca más al de Thompson es 
precisamente este especial interés por las tradiciones silenciadas y lo que ambos autores 
caracterizan como su vocación totalizadora. El análisis que hace Thompson del 
momento formativo de la clase obrera inglesa, por ejemplo, representa la encarnación 
particular de una imaginación alternativa de lo social que la proyección canónica 
(hegemónica) de la modernidad tiende a suprimir. La reconstrucción interna de la “voz” 
de dicha formación alternativa escenifica las complejidades de una coyuntura nutrida 
ciertamente de derrotas y limitaciones, pero también de escenarios tangibles de 
“esperanza práctica”. 
 Para Thompson, según hemos observado, la experiencia de lo político viene 
articulada por una noción de complejidad que ningún intento de estabilización teórica o 
doctrinal puede eludir. Esta complejidad queda plasmada en el reconocimiento de 
procesos y relaciones en tanto que elementos constituyentes de las formaciones 
históricas. La concepción thompsoniana de clase es paradigmática: la clase es “una 
fluidez que evade todo análisis si tratamos de fijarla en un momento determinado y de 
                                                          
3
 Raymond Williams, “Beyond Actually Existing Socialism”, in Culture and Materialism (London: 
Verso, 2005 [1980]), 257, 272 
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anatomizar su estructura”.4 Sólo se podría obtener un nítido concepto estructuralista 
mediante esta sustracción de la “forma” a su medio procesual, a su realidad vivida: y 
esto únicamente a costa de la causalidad y el devenir históricos. 
 El ataque que lanza Thompson contra la teoría althusseriana nace del corolario 
político de su propia epistemología. La reducción de esa complejidad procesual del 
acontecer histórico a una serie de premisas formales es, en última instancia, 
indistinguible de la tendencia estalinista a controlar y “centralizar” las múltiples voces 
que inspiraron y animaron la lucha de la clase obrera. La marcada tendencia “idealista” 
de este linaje teórico reproduce, según Thompson, los instintos burocráticos frente a los 
cuales la coyuntura oposicional de 1956 quedó definida. La obra histórica de Thompson 
es, tal y como hemos insistido, inseparable de sus esfuerzos biográficos por ofrecer una 
redefinición política. El proyecto del “humanismo socialista” que surge de la crisis 
húngara viene marcado por un intento de articulación de espacios de resistencia internos 
a la tradición marxista; espacios de oposición cuyas figuras y modelos provienen a 
menudo de otra tradición idiosincrásica, radical, inglesa y antinómica. 
 El despliegue que hace Thompson del concepto “historia” viene mediado por la 
noción de “experiencia”, que sitúa su obra en conversación directa con la de Williams. 
Esta categoría central ha sido criticada sistemáticamente desde ámbitos estructuralistas 
y post-estructuralistas, por su supuesta incapacidad para escapar a los dictados de la 
ideología. Así pues, se ha argumentado “que cualquier intento por captar la experiencia 
sin atender escrupulosamente al lenguaje es una ilusión fundada en una concepción de 
la experiencia como verdad auto-autentificadora.”5 En otras palabras, sin una disección 
cuidadosa de la naturaleza estructurada de los discursos experienciales, el análisis 
                                                          
4
 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1991 [1963]), 8  
5
 Michael Pickering, History, Experience and Cultural Studies (London: Macmillan, 1997), 211 
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histórico corre el riesgo de sucumbir a los reflejos lingüísticos del poder. Este 
importante debate en el ámbito de la teoría cultural no debería distraernos, sin embargo, 
de la tarea de rescatar y reconstruir aquellas voces subordinadas bajo condiciones 
hegemónicas. En palabras de Michael Pickering: 
En lo que también se ha de insistir es en la importancia de escuchar 
atentamente aquellas voces, de “recuperarlas” en la medida en que sea 
posible, no porque sean en sí más verdaderas que las posiciones dominantes, 
sino porque tienen derecho a ser oídas, y oídas si es posible en sus propias 
palabras. Más aún, necesitamos escuchar tales voces porque a veces hablan 
en contra de posiciones que han sido asignadas desde “fuera”, porque en 
cierto modo se oponen a la definición dominante de dichas posiciones y 
presionan contra las líneas de poder que recorren la identidad y la 
experiencia.6 
Es en la exploración de estos acentos y matices de los sujetos relegados (y de sus “obras 
olvidadas”, según Williams) donde se puede alcanzar un futuro alternativo, donde se 
puede imaginar una esperanza colectiva. 
 La importancia de Orwell queda de manifiesto a la luz de este modo 
“experiencial” de comprensión histórica. A menudo excomulgado por la Nueva 
Izquierda (también por Thompson y Williams), Orwell ofrece sin embargo un patrón de 
experiencia práctica que permite medir las esperanzas y posibilidades colectivas de una 
determinada coyuntura histórica. Del mismo modo que 1956 representa un punto de 
inflexión radical para Thompson, o que 1926, entre otros “momentos”, supone un polo 
retrospectivo fundamental  para Williams, 1936 y la Guerra Civil Española habría de 
                                                          
6
 Pickering, ibid., 212 
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articular para Orwell un horizonte de liberación colectiva mediado y condicionado por 
la compleja disposición de fuerzas y antagonismos en el seno de la izquierda. En 
Orwell, la topografía política de los años treinta viene marcada por una cesura interna 
entre definiciones centralizadoras y disidentes del proyecto emancipatorio. La denuncia 
del totalitarismo de raíz soviética introduce un criterio de “autenticidad” que queda 
alineado con las concepciones humanistas y comunitarias de Thompson y Williams. La 
lógica igualitaria que preside el corpus orwelliano inscribe por tanto la problemática de 
la posibilidad (la generación esperanzada de horizontes sociales alternativos) como una 
apuesta por la autodefinición. 
 La idea de socialismo que emana de una lectura contextual de Orwell, 
Thompson y Williams, nos remite por tanto a una concepción de la transformación 
social (de la utopía, incluso) arraigada en la versión experiencial de la Historia. Esta 
última es, en ese sentido, irreductible a una definición externa de la posibilidad, a un 
constructo o proyección acabados sin vínculos orgánicos con los procesos y relaciones 
vividos.  
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